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‘So when they ask me just how come I came up winning you
Though it took hours of flowers and the wining and dining
and telephone calls to get the pot to perk
I smile and say it was all in a night’s work’​[1]​

When I was offered a Ph.D. position starting July the 1st, I knew the process towards this thesis would be a difficult one. Almost two months less to conduct my research and writing: that would be though. Nevertheless, thanks to a tight planning, lots of discipline and much support at home, the “monster” is finally tamed. It took some pains, however; long working days, often accompanied by evenings filled with more work. Now I write this, it seems already as the distant past and I know that the hard work will be largely forgotten later on. The pride about this thesis, although it is far from perfect, will remain. It is a pretty good achievement set of against the available time, the vastness of the topic and my own perfectionism and strong desire to write down every interesting episode.
	Firstly, I would like to thank the men who taught me important things during our tutorials, and thus enabled me to write a better thesis: prof. dr. B.J.P. van Bavel and dr. D.M.L. Onnekink. Prof. dr. H.F.K. van Nierop also brought an interesting lecture held by Tracy (‘For Holland’s garden’) under my attention. Moreover, dr. A.J. van den Hoven van Genderen so kind to make room in his very busy schedule to act as second assessor. I am sorry to have condemned you to a hot attic in order to read my “monster”. However, most of all I would like to thank dr. G. de Bruin, the supervisor of this thesis and my mentor for the last two years. Beside his great expertise and critical attitude, I really enjoyed the freedom and trust he gave me. I could not have had a better supervisor during my research master.
	Secondly, during both my traineeship at the Gelders Archief and the research for this project, I felt really at home among my (now ex-) colleagues there. I would like to thank them all for the good times and their assistance, when necessary. I would also like to thank drs. C.C. de Glopper for teaching me the art of palaeography and for her help with small difficulties. I am most of all very grateful to dr. Peet Theeuwen, my supervisor during at the Gelders Archief. He was a source of inspiration, as a person and as a scholar. With his enthusiasm he inspired, without knowing this at the time, me to write a thesis about this subject. I also thank him for bringing me in contact with mr. J. Drost, the “grand old man” of the Landdagen, and for gladly sharing his lecture, bibliography, notes, and preliminary drafts with me. This project could not have been done without it. Peet was also very committed to my research and provided me with useful suggestions. 
	Thirdly, I am very grateful to my friends and family for their support and love. Vincent, Yde and Jan-Willem	 provided me with the necessary relaxation during evenings – filled with kebab, beer, card games and conversations about football – together. Together with Vincent, I could also unwind at the stands of Gelredome, experiencing another fairly dreadful, but lively, year for Vitesse. I look forward to the next season. Due to this project I missed birthday parties, family reunions and a wedding, but the attempt, initiated by my cousin Marco and brother Erik, to abduct me from my work was priceless. Thanks. And, Erik, I really admire the way you developed yourself in the direction of (hopefully) a Ph.D. in chemistry. I enjoyed our chats, in Rome most of all, very much. Thanks to my in-laws Nicole and Dennis for their support and, of course, to John and Nel, Mascha’s parents, for the Monday nights of good company, good food and the occasional beer. Jos, thanks for your quiet commitment from the sideline. Last, but certainly not least, I thank my parents, Els and Wouter, and Mieke, my godmother, for their continuous engagement and support. 
	Lastly, it was the situation at home that enabled me to complete this project in the first place. My furry friends Inky and Polly, cats and therefore prime examples of “particularism”, occasionally distracted me from my work – usually around the time they claimed it was their suppertime. Moreover, they made clear that caressing them is a good weapon against RSI. But Mascha, more than anyone else, was my greatest support and inspiration. She took over my share of the household and had to put up with a guy who was continuously locked in his study. You deserve all my gratefulness and love!        

Arnhem July 6th 2009.
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Note on the spelling
Names of Dutch institutions are often hard to translate in English; their British names do not necessarily cover the Dutch meaning. I will translate every important term the way native British scholars like Jonathan Israel​[2]​ and Geoffrey Parker​[3]​ do, and choose the one that suited best according to me if they use different terms. For essentially Guelders terms I look to R.W.M. van Schaïk, who published about this province in English.​[4]​ When a term is used for the first time in English, the Dutch translation will be mentioned between round brackets. At the end of this paper a glossary of important terms in Dutch, with the proper translation and a short description, is provided. 
Dutch works and primary sources are quoted in the original language, otherwise it would not be direct quotes. In the corresponding footnote, a translation will be provided. The primary sources are often inconsistent or incomplete with regard to personal names. Nevertheless, one version of a name will be consequently used. When the English literature uses a British version for a Dutch name – for instance William of Orange instead of Willem van Oranje – this will be followed. The same applies to geographical names.










‘De gedeputeerde van de Staeten [van Gelre], sijnde op den Lantdach, seiden, dat die van [het Kwartier van] Veluwe waeren de sinceerste, die van de Graefschap [Zutphen] de looste, ende die van [het Kwartier van] Nimmegen de opiniatreste; ’t welck oorsaeck heeft gegeven aen andre, te vergelycken die van de Veluwe by scapen, die van de Graefschap by vossen, ende die van Nimwegen by stieren.’​[6]​

This observation, made, in the 1620s, by Alexander van der Capellen, an Arnhem-born noble and statesman, characterizes the way inhabitants of Guelders saw their province: a composite of quarters. Their basic loyalty was that of the region rather than the province at large.​[7]​ Indeed, Guelders consisted of four quarters – Nijmegen, the Overkwartier (upper quarter), Zutphen and Veluwe – with their own distinct character. After about 1590, when the Overkwartier was lost in the war, the three lower quarters would form the province of Gelderland. Politically, the government of Guelders under the Republic, wherein Van der Capellen lived, was fairly decentralist; it was a miniature federal state within the Dutch Republic, a confederation of provinces.​[8]​ The quarters had their own administration on the regional level and were governed by their Quarter Estates (Kwartierdagen): gatherings of the convoked nobility (Ridderschap) and deputies of the voting cities.​[9]​ The Estates of the province of Guelders gathered as the so-called Landdag a couple of times per year. Herein, Ridderschap and deputies of the cities of the distinct quarters met to deal with matters of general provincial concern. Nevertheless, although the Landdag had legislative power, the Quarter Estates were the real sovereigns in Guelders: they had absolute authority.​[10]​ As a result, Gelderland was under the Republic ruled by the nobility and the cities.​[11]​
In the Middle Ages, Guelders had been an independent duchy, but in no way an unified territory.​[12]​ Regions had been conquered and lost, and the lands formed a personal union under one lord: the duke of Guelders and the count of Zutphen. Even under the Republic the former duchy continued to pride itself on its old name – duchy of Guelders and county of Zutphen –, almost as to accentuate its disunited nature. The formation of the Guelders state had been marked by two distinct processes since the fourteenth century. At the one hand, the duke ruled with his council. His power was, however, increasingly curtailed by his subjects. Nobles and municipal representatives worked together on the local level and united themselves in Quarter Estates, and also increasingly in the Landdag, the combined meeting of the quarters of Guelders in the fifteenth century.​[13]​ They regarded themselves as most competent to determine what was best for the realm. The Estates could exert a great deal of influence on the rule of their duke because he depended on them, politically and financially. 
After decades of warfare, however, Guelders lost its independence in 1543. Charles V (1500-1558) conquered the duchy and added it to the Habsburg Netherlands. With this new rule came a new administration that replaced the old ducal government. The so-called Hof van Gelre en Zutphen (the Provincial High Court) was invested with both judicial and political tasks. The chancery, the Hof with its supporting institutions, ran day-to-day administration within the province, when the newly-appointed stadtholder was absent. However, the new prince still had to turn to the Landdag in matters of taxation.​[14]​ 
During the 1560s and 1570s, the atmosphere in the Netherlands deteriorated rapidly. All kinds of problems led to a revolt that started in Holland and Zeeland. Guelders, although it did not want to get involved, could not stay out of this conflict for long; mainly due to its strategic position in the Northern Netherlands.​[15]​ Gelderland joined the Pacification of Ghent in 1576 and three years later stadtholder John of Nassau got it involved in the Union of Utrecht. Markedly, Guelders eventually joined this alliance per quarter, not as a single province.​[16]​ From thence onwards, Gelderland was fully involved in the Dutch Revolt, although its commitment often seemed lukewarm. In 1581 the provinces of the United Northern Netherlands officially abjured their lord, Philip II (1527-1598). With the Act of Abjuration (Akte van Verlatinge) the States General of the young Republic took over the sovereignty from their former overlord.​[17]​ Due to the fear of centralization on account of the Estates of the separate provinces, this sovereignty became eventually vested with them, not the Generality.​[18]​ 
	The newly-won sovereignty, although still in the making, and the collapse of the Habsburg-administration, made it necessary for the provinces to develop their own government. Every region did this in its own way, but everywhere the Provincial High Courts were stripped of their political and administrative tasks and standing committees (Gedeputeerde Staten) were erected to take them over. Everywhere, except in Guelders.​[19]​ Here, the individual quarters developed their own States Executives instead of a central one. On the provincial level, the Hof continued to combine its judicial tasks with the day-to-day administration. To explain this strange institutional development, historians traditionally point at the strive for autonomy within, and the jealousy between, the quarters.​[20]​ This has often negative connotations; Guelders failed to develop an institution other provinces did have and, as a consequence, it did not join the path towards “modern” government. Jonathan Israel sums the traditional interpretation up as he speaks of ‘the entrenched particularism of the (now three) separate quarters’.​[21]​ 
	Although such statements may seem credible on the basis of the disunited nature of medieval and early modern Guelders, they are one-sided and not free from, nineteenth century-based, bias. This makes it worthwhile to re-evaluate this strange institutional development once again. The present research project tries to provide a new view on the matter and to answer two interrelated questions: (1) why did Gelderland not develop a single / central standing committee during the last quarter of the sixteenth century and (2) how can we explain that only in this province the Hof retained its dual task?  
There several reasons to pay attention to the subject once again. Firstly, the actual historiographical situation encourages re-investigation. The institutional history of early modern Guelders can, as we shall see below, certainly use new impulses. Most of the scarce literature is old and often based on a small corpus of (published) primary sources. The present research is also useful outside this small historiographical niche; it contributes to the institutional history of the Dutch Republic at large. Old explanations still color the image of the Guelders’ institutions in standard works; the above-mentioned quote from Israel’s Dutch Republic is a case in point. Moreover, James Tracy recently exposed the traditional use of “particularism” as based on (implicit) teleological and anachronistic visions on history, with nineteenth-century origins.​[22]​ In agreement with him, instead of pointing simply at “particularism”, although I do not deny the pivotal role the sense of autonomy of the quarters played in Guelders, their interests will be reconstructed carefully in this thesis. This will be done on the basis of a case study, the Landdag of 1582, further discussed below. Formed by both actual problems and a more general political agenda, the preferences of the contemporaries must be taken seriously. Collision on the basis of deviating interests played an important part in the formation of Guelders’ particular institutional setting; simply dismissing them as “particularism” is short-sighted. 
Furthermore, the discipline of institutional history witnessed a reorientation in the last decades.​[23]​ Nowadays, historians feel a strong need to investigate the buildup and activities of institutions bottom-up. Formal and legalist methods, as well as anachronistic centralization-based views, from the (recent) past led to a distortion of the image. In the same vein, the study of representative assemblies – like the Estates of Guelders – experienced a reorientation towards the actual practice of government.​[24]​ Revisionist works of historians like Wim Blockmans also aim at a comparative history of representative activity in Europe. Although these studies are strongly focused on the Middle Ages, the sixteenth century also deserves, and sporadically gets, attention. However, the interesting case of Guelders is still completely absent from this kind of debates. Only primary sources-based research, and the resulting publication of works that are up to today’s historiographical standards, can change this. This is especially necessary, because until now for the Netherlands research has heavily focused on Brabant, Flanders and Holland, even though the source material on representative activity in Guelders is more diverse.​[25]​ For the institutional history of the Republic, a “hollandocentric” vision is the result. To counterbalance the distorted image, historians need to investigate the government of the peripheral provinces of the Republic. In sum, the questions under review in this paper have neither been answered satisfactorily yet, nor were they analyzed in the way that nowadays holds sway in the research field.
Due to the restricted time available to write a master thesis, the present research has some limitations. Most importantly, it was only possible to investigate a circumscribed set of primary sources (more about this at the end of chaper I), so I decided to limit the research to a case study: the Landdag of 1582. This meeting of the Estates of Guelders, the only one that year, began June 17th  and ended July 6th . It is interesting for three reasons. Firstly, the erection of a standing committee was discussed and approved, although this body would ultimately only be active for just one year.​[26]​ In the second place, the role of the Hof was brought under discussion and some measures were proposed to curtail its competencies. This was done, however, during an unofficial Landdag: the quarter of Nijmegen had made up proposals and discussed them with the Overkwartier, but the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe refused to attend. They immediately uttered their protests at Nijmegen’s high handed initiative, and protested again to the propositions and the decisions that were taken during this “illegal” meeting, some weeks later. The way the quarters came into conflict with each other is – to my knowledge – extraordinary in the history of the Estates of Guelders.​[27]​ This makes the Landdag especially worthwhile to analyze, for the most important source for the institutional history of Gelderland, the acts of the Estates of Guelders (Landdagsrecessen), usually just list the resolutions of the complete assembly. In this exceptional case, however, the interests of three separate quarters can be reconstructed to a great extent. Moreover, there are also left many pieces of correspondence, and some rare and interesting incidental notes from a secretary present at the Landdag. Indeed, the study of special events (or persons), provided that the historian places them in a proper context, can give a sharp insight in social reality.​[28]​ 
The case study covers just one year, however. To answer the main questions at stake completely, it will be necessary to do far more research in the primary sources. This is not possible now, so we have to rely on the existing literature for a great deal. However, by studying the Landdagsrecessen, and a variety of other sources, of 1582 intensively this thesis provides an interesting new view on the matter. It was also not possible to conduct time-consuming prosopographical research. Another time-related limitation, the reliance on primary sources available in the Gelders Archief – the record office with the biggest collection on Gelderland history –, will be discussed in the next chapter. Limitations, imposed by the literature, will also be assessed there. Finally, with regard to the content of this thesis, the narrative focuses – mainly due to restrictions of space – most of all on Guelders. This is not meant to suggest everything happened in some sort of vacuum, but “outside” developments are mainly brought in when they are considered really important for what happened in Gelderland.  
In this thesis matters are thus re-evaluated to find a more balanced answer to these questions: (1) why did Gelderland not develop a single / central standing committee during the last quarter of the sixteenth century and (2) how can we explain that only in this province the Hof retained its dual task. In the following five chapters this is done by way of a thorough study of the literature, the case study based on primary sources and a comparison of developments in Guelders with those in other provinces, also based on literature. 
After an introductory chapter on the historiography, some theoretical problems and the primary sources, my argumentation will be threefold. Firstly, the deviate development in Guelders had its origins in the evolvement of its political constellation during the later Middle Ages and under Habsburg rule, it was ‘een vrucht van eeuwenlange ontwikkeling.’​[29]​. In chapter II will be argued that the medieval dualism between duke and Estates found its way, although transformed, into the early modern era and left its mark on the institutional constellation under the Republic. In Guelders had grown a political tradition marked by a strong demarcation between the rule of the duke and the involvement of the Estates in government. Although the Landdag saw itself as the bearer of the Guelders territory, it did not establish a tradition of self-government up to the Revolt; running the administration was the prerogative of the duke and his council, and after 1543, of the Hof of Guelders as replacement of the sovereign. When from the 1550s onwards the Estates and the Court increasingly collided, conflicts were mostly fought about judicial issues, not administrative matters. For these reasons, the Hof, although purged, as elsewhere, some time after full involvement in the Revolt (in 1578), was not strongly curtailed like in other provinces. A comparison with the situation in Holland, Utrecht and Overijssel in chapter V will underline this. The different path Guelders took, was not necessarily inferior to that of the others, however. 
Secondly, in chapter III will be made clear that the stadtholderate of John count of Nassau-Katzenellenbogen (1534-1606), between 1578 and 1581, marked a watershed for the relationship between the Estates and the Hof. In 1578, he high-handedly purged the Court and made it loyal to the Revolt, although its competencies in the political field were not taken away. During the reign of count John, Guelders became also heavily involved in the Revolt and this had dramatic implications for the duchy. Furthermore, the stadtholder played a part in the alteration of the magistrates in important cities. During his tenure in office the basis was laid for a mode of cooperation that would prove very fruitful in the future: the Hof, the municipal magistrate of Arnhem and the standing committee of the quarter of Veluwe started working together. This symbiosis between loyal adherents of the Revolt was initially not accepted by all members of the Estates, as will become clear in chapter IV. The “illegal” part of the Landdag of 1582 can be seen as their attempt to break this alliance and, most of all, the power of the counsellors.
In the third place, the course of the Revolt played its part. The 1580s were a period of institutional formation in Guelders,​[30]​ a development strongly affected by problems the rebellion brought with it. Problems between so called “middle groups”, moderates not totally and wholehearted attached to the Revolt,​[31]​ within the Estates and fanatical adherents of the rebellion – and the Protestant religion – brought the position of the Hof under pressure. The Landdag of 1582, the case study analysed in chapter IV, will show this. Inspired by current historiographical trends, the actual working of the assembly in general is briefly assessed. Thereafter we turn to the interests of the actors as the meeting is reconstructed as accurate as possible. One important issue at the heart of the conflict between the quarter of Nijmegen at the one side, and the quarters of Zutphen and Arnhem at the other, was the role of the Hof within the Guelders government. The political symbiosis within the city of Arnhem was distrusted by men from the Nijmegen quarter. Eventually however, due to the course of the war, for an important part waged on Guelders soil, the cities of Nijmegen and Zutphen were temporary lost to the enemy and existing institutional arrangements became somewhat more fixed by the last decade of the sixteenth century. The cooperation between Hof, Arnhem magistrate and Veluwe Delegated Quarter Estates tightened during the heavy 1580s and this status quo strongly influenced the form Guelders government slowly took from the 1590s onwards. The other quarters followed the Veluwe example and established their own standing committees. This will be set out at the end of chapter V.















I. Historiography, theory and primary sources

	‘Ten principale zij nog erop gewezen dat de afzonderlijke periodes van de 
Gelderse bestuurlijke geschiedenis met zeer verschillende intensiteit zijn onderzocht. Vooral onze kennis van de geschiedenis van voor 1350 en na 1450 vertoont nog heel wat lacunes. [Dit is] opvallend en in tegenspraak met het overvloedige bronnenmateriaal’.​[32]​

Political and constitutional history have always held important places on the historiographical agenda.​[33]​ The study of the development of states should enables us to understand how and why they became the way they are now.​[34]​ In the process of the emergence of the “modern” state representative assemblies played a vital part: as a check on royal power, as a voice of the needs and complaints of the subjects, as a political power to be reckoned with. In most regions, however, representative institutions lost much of their power to the emerging absolutist monarchies, ‘the central authority’, between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries.​[35]​ The Dutch Republic, where sovereignty eventually became vested in the various provincial Estates, is an exception. The development of the provincial Estates during this period has still to be mapped for many regions.​[36]​ Guelders is one of these.  
This chapter discusses the historiography and theoretical issues. An analysis of the Guelders historiography will show where we stand and what is still lacking. The consequences of this shall be discussed together with related theoretical problems that were pointed-out in the introduction. Thereafter, the focus will shift to the historiography of representative institutions; with a special interest for models created to study the subject. The work of authorative historians in this field of research makes clear which issues and topics are considered to be important. Their theories can also serve to structure one’s thoughts when interpreting the primary sources. The existing models provide no adequate framework to analyze the issues studied in this project, however. So, a frame of reference based on the institutional developments in other provinces of the Northern Netherlands is proposed instead; this also serves to strengthen the main argument of this thesis. Finally, the primary sources will be identified.

Historiography 
The institutional history of Guelders in the early Dutch Republic resembles a mostly uncharted territory.​[37]​ Up till now, no synthesis has been written on this subject. So, to get a general overview of the Guelders administration during the ancien régime, historians have to rely on some old standard works of early modern Dutch institutional history.​[38]​ These belong to an outdated nineteenth-century historiographical tradition, which will receive further attention below. Moreover, such books have been mainly written on the basis of published sources and literature, so they provide few new information. 
The same also applies to the history of the Estates of Guelders by G.A. de Meester.​[39]​ Although his style and treatment of the subject are no longer up to the standards of today’s historical profession, De Meester is the only author to devote a book to the history of the Landdag covering both the Middle Ages and the ancien régime. However, the two works of W. Jappe Alberts on the Estates of Guelders up to 1492 form a better guide for both the evolvement of representative action and the political developments in late medieval Guelders.​[40]​ His books are based on a corpus of both published and unpublished primary sources, although Alberts’ methods are also somewhat outdated now.​[41]​ He employs a legalistic approach and he devotes no attention to the way of work of the Estates, nowadays considered as an indispensable object of analysis. Fortunately, E.M. Fokkink maps the occupations and structure of the Quarter Estates of Veluwe between 1576 and 1594 from a more modern point of view in her unpublished doctoral thesis.​[42]​ This work is highly empirical, based on the Resolutions of the Quarter Estates (Kwartierdagsrecessen) and provides no more than the title promises: an analysis of the quarter-meetings. Fokkink devotes few attention to political and military dynamics of the Revolt and their impact on the Estates of Veluwe. She narrows her view down to the Quarter Estates and their members – however without extensive prosopographical research.
Other works also pay attention to the institutional history of Guelders, without solely focusing on representative action.​[43]​ However, in general most authors rely on the same corpus of published primary sources and literature. A notable exception is the work of A.J. Maris. The first chapter of her dissertation and her introduction to the inventory of the archive of the Guelders’ Hof – a book in its own right – are highly important contributions to the institutional history of the province.​[44]​ Maris knows her way in the literature and published sources, but also consults original source material. The same applies to Wil van de Pas, whose dissertation on the Guelders Audit Office was never completed due to his untimely death. Although he devotes most of his attention to Guelders under Habsburg rule (1543-1581), Van de Pas sometimes extends the investigation to the early decades under the Republic.​[45]​ Finally, F. Keverling Buisman rather recently wrote some general articles on Guelders institutional history.​[46]​ These articles, being heavily reliant on literature, mark only a starting point for further research.​[47]​ My bibliography further contains a number of contributions that, in some way or another, deal with the institutional history of Guelders. Some are based on original research, but the need for a modern synthesis is still felt. 
	This state of affairs is also true for the general political historiography of Guelders during the ancien régime, while the Medieval era and the decades under Habsburg rule are somewhat better of.​[48]​ The harvest of literature is not overwhelming at all for the period of the Revolt up to 1590. The Geschiedenis van Gelderland devotes one chapter to the timeframe 1566-1609, but this contribution is (again) based on literature and published primary sources.​[49]​ Nevertheless, some articles by A.E.M. Janssen are valuable acquisitions to our knowledge of certain episodes in the Revolt in Gelderland.​[50]​ The timeframe is discussed with various intensity of interest in the histories on three of the (former) capital cities of the Guelders quarters.​[51]​ Furthermore, J.S. van Veen wrote a well documented, although for current historiographical taste somewhat outdated, history of the crucial decades of the Revolt in Arnhem.​[52]​ A. Zijp and D. Brouwer also published their books in the second decade of the twentieth century. These valuable works map respectively the conflicts between the Estates of Guelders and the Hof (1543-1566) and the tumultuous relationship between Gelderland and the city of Zaltbommel during the Revolt.​[53]​ Furthermore, an article by Van de Pas also provides interesting insights about moderates in Guelders during the early 1580.​[54]​ Lastly, a recent Ph.D. dissertation about the city of Nijmegen during the tumultuous wonderjaar (year of wonders) 1566 and its aftermath provides both interesting new insights and an extensive overview of this tumultuous period.​[55]​ 

Some theoretical problems and "new-style” institutional history 
The institutional history of Guelders under the late sixteenth-century Republic thus suffers from three problems. In the first place, few specialist literature is available. Secondly, many works are, to a great extent, based on the same corpus of published primary sources and literature. And lastly, a great deal of the authors uses methods and has attitudes nowadays seen as outdated.
	The first two issues make clear that new research in the archives is highly necessary. The reliance on published sources is no result of a lack of other primary sources. These are, in fact, plentiful. A strange paradox is at work here: a wealth of source material is available, but few historians care to use it;​[56]​ thus reinforcing the present historiographical situation. Time and convenience are factors in this. Published sources can be consulted fairly easily outside the archives and early modern handwriting is no problem in this way. At the same time, the vast jungle of unpublished primary sources can be a deterrent for further research. Indeed, the historian devoted to institutional history of early modern Guelders, whatever facet he or she wishes to investigate, will be confronted with a vast undertaking. Fortunately, the important archives have been made accessible, but, because in most cases the content of the documents is not made available, assessing them remains time-consuming. Nevertheless, I hope to make clear with this thesis that consulting a variety of source material, although mostly limited to one year, can already provide interesting new insights. Only critical research in the primary sources will help the historiography of Guelders further.  
All the other information has, regardless of the drawbacks, therefore to be provided by the existing literature. We have to depend on interpretations of historians from the past, but the in many ways outdated historiography of Guelders is haunted by ghosts of the nineteenth century. This problem is also at work in many other branches of the historical profession. Notwithstanding the modern research, we can notice this, for example, in the historiography of the Dutch Revolt and the institutional study of the Dutch Republic.​[57]​ The repercussions of nineteenth-century interpretations in Dutch history, that in many ways held sway until after the Second World War, are both widespread and complex. Here, five problems, relevant for the subject of this thesis, will be discussed: a negative (and finalist) view on the political constellation of the Republic, a teleological interpretation of the history prior to the Gouden Eeuw (the Golden (seventeenth) Century), anachronism, a formal and legalist approach to institutional history, and “hollandocentrism”. These interrelated issues, often visible in the older literature, serve both as a warning and a justification for this and further research. 
Many nineteenth-century historians wrote from a nationalist perspective. The Kingdom of the Netherlands they lived in was a centralized state where, especially after the secession of Belgium in 1839, a sense of national awareness began to grow.​[58]​ Historians like Jan Rudolf Thorbecke, and Robert Fruin after him, were convinced of the blessings of the nineteenth-century national state. For them ‘the national state represented the logical terminus of a long historical development’.​[59]​ Seen from such a perspective, the foundation of a federal Republic during the sixteenth-century Revolt was an aberration in the development of the central state in the Netherlands. Indeed, many useful centralizing measures taken by the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers had been nullified in the process. According to Fruin, the Dutch Republic had been a dead-end on the way towards an unified state.​[60]​ In this intellectual climate, many historians regarded the  decentralized administration of the Republic as unworkable. 
At the same time, the nineteenth-century national state needed a worthy past. The Gouden Eeuw, with Holland as its shining center, was of course the zenith of Dutch early modern history. So, in spite of the bad press on account of the government of the Republic, there was – and still is​[61]​ – another form of teleology at work: a focus on the inevitable unification of the Netherlands under Charles V in 1543, ‘de territoriale afronding’.​[62]​ This event laid the basis for the Revolt and the glorious seventeenth century. In the same vein, the Dutch Revolt was made to fit the agenda. It was portrayed as a war of independence, a national undertaking aimed at freedom from Spanish tyranny.​[63]​ The eventual separation between the Northern and Southern Netherlands was seen as a natural development, because the divergent national characters of these lands;​[64]​ had the secession of Belgium in the nineteenth century not proven this again? Johan Huizinga even conceded in the 1920s that he saw historical development ‘with the eyes of determinism’.​[65]​ In this way, a caricature of the history of the Netherlands was created. Proverbial black and white predominated in this image thus marginalizing historical shades of gray. The Revolt was portrayed as a struggle between the Spanish and loyalist Netherlanders at the one side, and adherents of the rebellion (Staatsgezinden) at the other. 
Caricaturization was accompanied by anachronism: nationalist historians took their own central state as frame of reference and projected its blessings on the Republic. An essentially top-down approach to politics took the historical reality –  the seventeenth-century man reasoned rather from his local point of view – out of sight.​[66]​ Coupled with the determinism mentioned above, historians tended to emphasize tendencies towards “better” government. Hence, the erection of provincial committees of Delegated States, based on written instructions, was applauded as a step in the direction towards a modern administration. In this way, more informal, traditional and historically developed forms of government seemed by implication inferior.
Such views were only reinforced by the way of work of these generations of scholars: a formal and judicial approach to the history of institutions. It was this view, mainly based on legal documents that shaped a caricature of the institutions of the Dutch Republic. Historians identified the state with its formal outlook, completely disregarding practical arrangements that made it function fairly well.​[67]​ In this way, the Republic was also lifted out of its historical European context; it was regarded as an abnormality in early modern Europe, where monarchies prevailed, and, as we have seen, an aberration in the “natural” course of Dutch history. 
Finally, teleological interpretations of the history of the Northern Netherlands helped to create a “hollandocentric” vision.​[68]​ The emphasis on the unification of the Netherlands under Charles V does not just dramatically downplay the significance of the Middle Ages, or ignore the contingent nature of history,​[69]​ it also encourages a negative view of regions that did not cooperate with this “natural” development. While Holland already was a more or less loyal part of the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands, independent territorial entities like the bishopric of Utrecht and the duchy of Guelders resisted subjugation in the later fifteenth and first decades of the sixteenth centuries. Many histories have therefore been written from the perspective of Holland, the “good guys”, marginalizing other points of view. 
In much the same way, the history of the Dutch Republic is strongly focused on Holland. Although this is not entirely unjust with regard to the Gouden Eeuw, it is a dangerous way of distorting Dutch history. Teleology made nineteenth-century historians highlight unifying powers within the Republic and identify the interests of Holland with those of the United Provinces.​[70]​ This fitted in nicely with an established tradition, for already during the ancien régime many contemporaries saw Holland, the richest province, as the cornerstone of the Republic. Many a history of the Dutch Republic became over-simplified in this way. Historians took Holland as the frame of reference​[71]​ or, even worse, as pars pro toto for the government of the Republic,​[72]​ totally disregarding regional differences in the Netherlands. As a result – it is a kind of vicious circle – research still tends to focus on Holland, the center of the Republic, and according to Tracy ‘the most interesting of the seven provinces that sustained a long rebellion against Spain’.​[73]​ Hence the historiographical state of affairs with regard to a peripheral province like Gelderland. 
The broad problems sketched here have been noticed by many historians, ranging from Blockmans to J.J. Woltjer, and a reorientation is visible the last decades. In the field of institutional history it is now no longer reçu to sketch a form of government on the basis of legal documents alone. An one-sided top-down attitude is also accepted no more.​[74]​ Groenveld recently argued that the study of administrative activities within the Dutch Republic should start at grass-roots level; with the powerful families, the mentalities of the officials and their bonds with each other.​[75]​ In this way, we should be able to discover the ever shifting factions within administrative institutions. He also insists that we should study the practice of government.​[76]​ Here, he joins other historians highlighting the study of the actual occupations of the representative institutions.​[77]​ If we do this, it is possible to go beyond many, often negative, qualifications made by historians of past generations. Thorbecke and Fruin stated, for example, that delegates within the provincial Estates were mainly concerned with their own local interests. New research in previously undiscovered private notes of meetings of the States of Holland revises this negative image.​[78]​ 
In the same vein, Tracy recently deconstructed the idea of “particularism” with regard to the war-aims of the States of Holland.​[79]​ According to him, ‘our nineteenth-century forebears’ who used the term “particularism” referred to ‘the habit of preferring one’s own interest to the general good.’​[80]​ This is a nineteenth-century way of reasoning; in fact the term did not even exist in the abstract sense in the sixteenth century. This way of using it is anachronistic. Nonetheless, historians did, and still do, apply it to the behavior of provincial Estates and their delegates. Moreover, according to Tracy this “particularistic” behavior of the States of Holland did not even harm the common good! From early on in the Revolt, Holland mainly wanted to pay for a defensive war that was not waged on its territory. This was selfish, but it paid off, because Holland became, and remained, prosperous in this way and was therefore able to pay for the war against Spain. 





Many books have been written about the history and development of representative assemblies across Europe.​[84]​ Reputed historians sometimes tried to model the characteristics of such institutions, so various developments throughout Europe could be compared. This generated a problem, however: some scholars compared representative institutions across Europe without paying enough attention to the different political, social and geographical circumstances in the various regions. 
Blockmans, inspired by both the social sciences and Otto Hinze’s typology of representative institutions, wants to tackle this problem and much of the above-mentioned issues as well. To be able to compare representative action throughout medieval Europe, he proposed in 1978 five ideal types of representation based on the social-economic circumstances in a region.​[85]​ At the same time, he encouraged historians to map the fields of activity of the institutions over a long stretch of time and – if possible – to quantity them, as to facilitate comparisons.​[86]​ He later admitted that this ideal typical approach was not so suitable after all. It creates bias and is not well equipped to investigate the wide variety in representative activities. So, in 1998 he introduced a new theory.​[87]​ Blockmans considers two models of representation on the basis of political systems: the monarchical, when the prince took the initiative to assemble representatives of his subjects, and the communal, when the subjects did this themselves. Within these broad categories variation is the rule, depending on political, social and economical circumstances in different regions and the interaction between top-down and bottom-up organizational initiatives. Eventually however, almost all of these institutions lost powers to the princes during the later Middle Ages.​[88]​  
Blockmans also investigates the important role cities played in representative activities, together with social scientist Charles Tilly in a 1994 volume.​[89]​ In his contribution to the volume, Tilly aims to establish the part cities played in the process of state formation.​[90]​ This aim is accompanied by a strong dose of finalism; the nineteenth-century national state is his point of departure.​[91]​ In the same work, Blockmans zooms in on the relations between princes and (their) cities.​[92]​ He concludes that the biggest cities made their mark most clearly on the early modern states once they were finally integrated in them. 
H.G. Koenigsberger provides another kind of framework in his book Monarchies, States Generals and parliaments.​[93]​ He does not construct a model on the basis of theories from the social sciences, but he uses a contemporary distinction to map the relations between princes and Estates. The author borrows the terminology of the dominium regale and the dominium politicum et regale from a fifteenth-century English jurist. In the first kind of monarchy the prince could tax his subjects at will, but in the other he needed the consent of his subjects, assembled within Estates. The latter prevailed throughout Europe during the later Middle Ages. A delicate balance between prince and Estates, based on shared power and privileges, existed. But princely ambitions, warfare and fiscal pressure made it increasingly unstable. The resulting conflicts brought adjustments in the balance of power or, as in the Netherlands, outright revolt. In many countries the dominum politicum et regale eventually made place for absolutism or parliamentary government. 
For the present research the value of these models is limited. They are far too general to say anything conclusive about the particular case of Guelders,​[94]​ a case that is not present in this debate anyway. Blockmans’ focus on the Middle Ages makes his model not suitable to explain the exceptional case of the sixteenth-century Dutch Republic, where the provincial Estates had to create their own government. Moreover, the general interpretations of Blockmans and Tilly cannot predict – or rather: retrodict – the outcomes of this process of trial and error.​[95]​ 
Nevertheless, we should not discard the core issues discussed by the authors. Firstly, it should be kept in mind that cities played a complex but central part in representative activities.​[96]​ Blockmans’ emphasis on the social-political context wherein all actors operated and the variety in representation should be kept in mind. Relations between the actors – also emphasized by Koenigsberger –, the balance of power and the circumstances wherein institutions functioned could vary greatly from region to region, but also in time. Therefore we need to provide precise empiric information. It is certainly not sufficient just to assess the formal, institutional outlook of representative assemblies; it is the day-to-day practice that has to be considered.​[97]​ In this way we can try to reconstruct the power relations within the representative assemblies and their position vis-à-vis other political powers. Indeed, in this project the Landdag of June and early July 1582 is reconstructed as precisely as possible, as well as the aims of the actors. 

Frame of reference
While there is no adequate model available to analyze the development of new governmental structures systematically, as envisaged by the Dutch provincial Estates in revolt, I developed a new one.​[98]​ A comparison of the particular case of Guelders to some kind of “standard” makes it possible to single out explanations for deviating developments. The experience of Guelders can be best compared to corresponding processes simultaneously at work in other areas of the Northern Netherlands, to avoid anachronism. Just like Koenigsberger uses contemporary distinctions, rather that terminology borrowed from the social sciences. Fortunately, it is possible to reconstruct the build-up of government in Holland, Utrecht and Overijssel during the first decades of the Revolt, say 1572-1590, (mainly) on the basis of three Ph.D. dissertations.​[99]​
Although the authors employ different approaches, it is possible to draw some general lines from their works. Three important developments interconnected in each province after the Revolt. They form the frame of reference for the institutional transformation in Guelders and will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter V. We have to keep them in mind, for this province differed remarkably from the trend. The most important points of focus are (1) the occupations of the provincial Estates, and their composition and structure, both before and during the Revolt; (2) the institutions responsible for day-to-day government, the executive; and (3) the administration of justice at the provincial level. All these things were to transform in the provinces under review, although both the pace and the extent of change differed. Every region witnessed its own evolution due to its particular (institutional) structure and history, preferences of the elites who held the power and the ever changing political and military developments connected to the Revolt wherein, we have to remember, every province became involved for its own reasons and at its own point in time. 
The Revolt did not dramatically change the outward form of the representative institutions. Only in Holland their voting-base was broadened from six to eighteen cities, while the Ridderschap retained its single vote. In Utrecht, the clergy, nobility and cities held one vote each, while in Overijssel the IJssel cities held separate votes and the nobility retained the other three. However, in each province new representatives of the cities showed up at some point in time. These new-style regents were mostly Protestant and loyal to the Revolt and had often come to power after a purge of the municipal magistrate. Less is known about the nobles, although many of them continued to attend and a considerable number became Protestant. Clergy had only been present in the States of Utrecht and, shortly after the province revolted, its representatives were replaced by loyal Protestants. 
Once involved in the Revolt, the representative assemblies of each province saw their responsibilities increase vastly. Their main tasks had consisted of looking after the interests of their principals, preservation of their privileges and tax-related activities for the government. The collapse of Habsburg power, however, transferred almost every administrative duty their way. Some tasks, mainly foreign representation and warfare, were delegated to the Generality and others came under the competence of the stadtholder or an Audit Office, but the workload was certainly much heavier for the representative assemblies. To deal with this, the men in power relied both on traditional measures – for instance ad hoc committees nominated by the Estates – and newly created institutions. The erection of a standing committee (Gedeputeerde Staten) was important in this respect. Such an institution took over the day-to-day administration, beforehand a prerogative of a Habsburg Hof. Holland and Utrecht set one up in the 1570s. Overijssel only did so in 1593 under pressure of Holland and the Council of State (Raad van State). 
Holland and Utrecht curtailed the tasks of their provincial courts; they had to attend to their judicial occupations only. Overijssel, where no Chancery had functioned before 1568, disbanded it altogether. The Estates, who had already preformed some administrative tasks before the Revolt, also reclaimed their function as a high court. Interestingly, both Holland and Utrecht tried to install a court of appeal above their Hof, but only in Holland such a court would be actually instituted.​[100]​  

Primary sources
The wealth of primary sources, available in the Gelders Archief, enables me to analyze the Landdag of 1582 and its aftermath from different points of view. The reconstruction of this meeting in chapter IV would have never been possible on the basis of the resolutions of the Estates of Guelders alone. Other kinds of primary sources, most of all correspondence, provided much indispensable information. 
Multiple series of the resolutions (Landdagsrecessen) are available.​[101]​ These sources form a treasure chest of information on a wide range of subjects. The recessen are, however, just lists of resolutions of the Estates, the results of the decision-making process in the Landdag. As a consequence, they are a point of departure for historical inquiry rather than the one and only relevant source.​[102]​ The resolutions also provide few direct information about the practical way of work within the meetings. In the case of the 1582 Landdag this is even harder to reconstruct, because the recessen are not dated daily; only the begin and end dates of the meetings are provided. The Estates of Guelders did not form an archive of their own, so their resolutions are scattered throughout many archives. After a meeting, clerks copied the recessen for the three quarters. The main cities also received copies, as well as the Hof and Audit Office. Due to this decentralist way of record keeping many documents have survived. For my project, the lists of resolutions from the quarter of Nijmegen and the Audit Office were used.​[103]​ The latter is a contemporary copy. However, the former – a copy of 1614 – is easier to read and does hardly ever differ from the original. The Recessen of the Zutphen quarter contain no resolutions of the Landdag in 1582.​[104]​ 
The archive of the city of Arnhem is of indispensable value for the present research. Although the Landdagsrecessen of 1582 are incomplete in this collection, it offers resolutions (Kwartierdagsrecessen) of the quarter of Veluwe.​[105]​ Acts of the other quarters are for 1582 not left in their respective archives and – to my knowledge – other record offices do not possess them either.​[106]​ The Arnhem volume containing recessen over 1582-1583 also offers correspondence related to the Veluwe quarter and its standing committee. The handwriting is often hard to read, especially when secretary Derick Wetthen wielded the pen, and much of the documents are concept versions, so in many cases sentences are run through. To the great comfort of historians, however, president – i.e. oldest member of the Hof – Van Hell copied almost the whole volume in a clear handwriting in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century.​[107]​ What is more, unlike the original volume, Van Hell ordered almost all the documents chronologically. According to Fokkink this version is fairly reliable and the samples I took confirm this.​[108]​ The so-called annexes (bijlagen) to the recessen and the correspondence of the city of Arnhem also provide additional important information.​[109]​ The collection of separate letters made up and received by the Veluwe quarter, however, does not.​[110]​
The third pivotal source of information, consists of other correspondence. Beside the letters in the municipal archive of Arnhem, the Hof also left an interesting collection. This institution was in touch with the four quarters, the chancellor, the stadtholder, and powers outside Guelders. For this project, the internal Guelders correspondence, especially with the Nijmegen quarter, is most important.​[111]​  
Four (fairly) contemporary histories were consulted to complement the archival sources, but they add few new information for this research. The monumental work of Arend van Slichtenhorst – a translation of the Historia Gelrica by Johannes Pontanus – saw the light in the first half of the seventeenth century and is still considered an essential narrative source for the history of Guelders.​[112]​ However, the book stops in 1581. Three other ‘authorative authors’ deal with the Netherlands in revolt and can be considered as fairly reliable guides to this conflict.​[113]​ Everhard van Reyd was very well informed, for he worked in the service of the government for a long time.​[114]​ His history  pays ample attention to Guelders, but – alas – not for 1582. The histories of Pieter Christiaensz. Bor and Emanuel van Meteren rather deal with the situation in the Netherlands at large; Gelderland only comes in the picture in the event of important developments.​[115]​   
Lastly, three historical databases were used for this project. M.J. van Gent compiled a digital database of scanned documents related to the Landdagen, for the period 1423-1584.​[116]​ To great advantage of the historian, he collected a wide range of sources from archives all over Gelderland and he made them digitally available. However, the database does not aim at completeness and the dating of documents is not always correct.​[117]​ Almost all of the documents in his database that are relevant for this project were also available in the Gelders Archief, and I used those. To the comfort of the interested reader, the correct document number will be provided in a footnote if a document is also digitally available.​[118]​ A database of another kind is the calendar of Landdagsrecessen 1581-1798. Mr. J. Drost made the contents of all resolutions between 1711 and 1780 available and his inventories can be consulted online. P.J.H.M. Theeuwen recently took over the task and started in 1581. Up till now, he made the years 1581 and 1582 available on the internet.​[119]​ This database does not provide scans of the documents, but offers a complete calendar of the Landdagsrecessen with much background-information. Theeuwen also continues a project of Van de Pas: the database of provincial officials in Guelders from 1543 to the end of the ancien régime.​[120]​ This provides important information about many men in Guelders government, but it is not yet (digitally) available.






II. The Estates of Guelders before the Revolt

‘Nimmer heeft Gelderland die eenheid van staatsbestel bereikt, welke andere gewesten, als bijv. Brabant, Holland, Utrecht, Overijssel min of meer konden verwezenlijken. (…) Uit de omstandigheid, dat [in Gelre] de Staten der kwartieren volledig tot ontwikkeling konden komen en de Landdagen bijeenkomsten zijn geworden van de Staten der Kwartieren gezamenlijk, volgt mijns inziens, dat de ontwikkeling der Staten van Gelre-Zutphen “Kwartierlijk” moet hebben plaatsgevonden.’​[122]​

The history of the Estates of Guelders is inevitably intertwined with the history of the duchy itself. Medieval Guelders never was a unified territory, rather a personal union made up of smaller regions, but from the thirteenth century onwards some territorial unity can be spotted.​[123]​ The government of the duchy also developed in this age: at the one hand, ducal officials gradually became part of a regulated territorial administration, at the other, the first signs of the involvement of towns in the affairs of government can be noticed.​[124]​ Eventually, a kind of dualism between the prince and his subjects emerged. They – or rather an elite of nobles and burghers – increasingly participated in government, without taking it over, however. The Landdag and the Quarter Estates became the institutions wherein the Guelders subjects could intervene in the rule of the duke, but they created no shadow-administration. Cities and Ridderschappen, often divided among themselves, wanted to defend their privileges and made sure ducal rule served the best interests of the realm – i.e. their own. 
Traditional ways of interference in territorial affairs did not change markedly up to the Revolt, for ‘once a practice had grown into a tradition (..) it could not easily be discarded and thus it influenced its further evolution.’​[125]​ Although circumstances changed, the Estates pursued their aims in essentially the same way. Tracy calls this habits of action ‘that tend to be repeated simply because people find it easier to do so.’​[126]​ The medieval dualism did transform, however, when Guelders became part of the Habsburg Netherlands in 1543. The Hof became the main aim of resistance and the goals of the Estates changed accordingly. We will see in the last part of this chapter that a status quo emerged under Habsburg rule: while the Court, as successor of the ducal council and the agent of the central government, performed its political tasks more or less uncontested, the Estates resisted it mainly on the judicial level. The provincial political elite saw the Hof intruding their power bases, based on customary and landed law (landrecht) and tried to defend their interests. As a result, the Estates were not highly accustomed in the field of provincial government when the Revolt started. 
While the history of the Estates is above all one of local and regional cooperation, few is known about this. Due to the lack of literature about it, and for the sake of the narrative, this chapter focuses quite strongly on the interaction of representation and government at the central / provincial level. We should, however, always keep in mind its development “by the way of the quarters”, an essential feature of the history of Guelders and the transformation of the Estates under the Republic.

The Estates and their duke before 1543
According to Blockmans, many forms of representation within European territories came about due to dynastic crises that befell on their ruling dynasties. A second feature was the constant need for money, most often triggered by funds-consuming warfare.​[127]​ In the case of Guelders, both problems triggered, and reinforced, the so-called ‘wording van de Gelderse Staten’.​[128]​ 
	The formation, consolidation and administration of the Guelders territory was, before the fifteenth century, in many ways the business of its prince, but nobles and – somewhat later – cities played their part.​[129]​ Traditionally, the count of Guelders and Zutphen​[130]​ convoked his nobles and vassals, when he needed their assistance, at a so-called dagvaart.​[131]​ Next to this, he reigned with a smaller council consisting of friends and relatives, mainly nobles.​[132]​ While (members of) the nobility already had some influence in government, the involvement of cities was triggered by a crisis. In 1288, the count waged, and lost, a costly war and got into heavy debts.​[133]​ As a consequence, nobles and cities started raising taxes to meet the pressing financial situation of their lord. He in turn started to involve them increasingly in government as counsellors; also because in this way he could try to get his hands on the municipal resources. 
Such participation in Guelders government, mainly based on financial aid, was still rather incidental before the 1340s,​[134]​ but dynastic crises and the internal formation of the territory reinforced it strongly. When duke Reinald III (r. 1343-1361) and his brother Edward (r. 1361-1371) fought each other for the throne, nobles, but most of all the cities, tried to mediate between them.​[135]​ While they were not successful in the long term, this did lead to close cooperation between the subjects. They even concluded formal unions amongst themselves; instigating a tradition that – as we shall see below – would colour the political history of Guelders for centuries to come. After the succession-troubles were over, and William I of Jülich (r. 1371-1402 (in Guelders)) had become the uncontested duke,​[136]​ a new phase in the cooperation between the prince and his subjects set in.​[137]​ The cities played their part mostly in the fiscal sphere and William I closely cooperated with the nobility in all kinds of matters. 
The cities, and sometimes the nobles, increasingly pulled towards each other during the tumultuous decades. This was reinforced by the internal structuring of the Guelders territory.​[138]​ Administration on the local level became instituted in the so-called ambt, the field of activity of a ducal official – the ambtman, usually a local noble – with judicial and political tasks.​[139]​ This working area slowly constituted itself as a geographical administrative entity. Within and above the ambten, cities and local nobles increasingly worked together, slowly forming the quarters.​[140]​ Such cooperation, also on the provincial level, was among other things facilitated by the relative short travelling distances within Guelders. 
These complex interrelated processes, for a part instigated by the developing cooperation, in the end reinforced this working together further. Assemblies of Quarter Estates became the prime forum for this, as well as a possibility for contact with the duke. However, the quarters were in the Middle Ages no administrative unit of the official government.​[141]​ The prince, and his council, conducted the governmental tasks and his local officials administrated within the ambten. The nobles and cities, united in the Quarter Estates, formed a counterweight to ducal rule and they supplied money, but they formed no shadow-government of their own.​[142]​
The quarters took matters in their own hands when a new dynastic crisis arose. The reign of Reinald IV (r. 1402-1423) was, far more than his brother Wiliam’s, marked by troubles with his subjects and when they started to fear that he would die without an heir, they concluded an Union in 1418.​[143]​ The allied nobles and cities declared they would stay together as duchy of Guelders and county of Zutphen. Furthermore, these representatives would stick together if any duke would want to harm their rights and privileges – as, they said implicitly, Reinald had done. Finally, they only wanted a prince that was approved by the majority of them. This came true when Reinald died five years later. The nobility and cities chose their new duke, Arnold of Egmond. He confirmed the Union in 1523, in fact he had to, for he depended on his subjects.​[144]​ Arnold possessed no power-base of his own in his newly-acquired duchy, his subjects had chosen him, and – to make matters worse – there were rival claimants to the ducal throne. 
It was in this climate the institutional base for the Estates of Guelders, as representative organ opposite to the prince, was finally established.​[145]​ The old dagvaart gradually became a Landdag, the more or less fixed assembly of the two Estates of the realm, to be convoked by the duke.​[146]​ This meeting did not supersede Kwartierdagen, however. Instead, the Landdag was a conference of the Estates of the four quarters and the semi-independent bannerets (bannerheren).​[147]​ It was therefore no unity; the assembly was often torn by conflicting interests between, and within, the quarters.​[148]​ The traditional deliberations between nobles and municipal representatives, or cities among themselves, also retained their importance, for example as preparatory meetings for a Landdag. The practice of subjects working as temporary counsellors of the duke was replaced by the appointment of delegates from the Estates to act at his side, when they considered this necessary.
The gradual involvement of nobles and cities in government, and their mutual cooperation on the local level, thus made institutionalization of the Landdag in the early fifteenth century possible. As a result, a kind of dualism between prince and the representative assembly emerged. This was reinforced by a related process. Because of their involvement in the government, the subjects, most notable in the cities, had began to identify themselves with the realm at large: they saw themselves as a part of the duchy of Guelders and the county of Zutphen as an unity.​[149]​ In a 1372 charter, the city of Arnhem declared, for example,  that it could not be separated from the other three capital cities of Guelders. This feeling became also evident from the text of the above-mentioned Union of 1418. The Estates ‘beschouwden zichzelf als de dragers van het Gelderse territorium, van de Gelderse eenheid en soevereiniteit; de hertog was in hun optiek de door hen aangestelde beschermer van het land, die bovendien als representant van de oude Gelderse dynastie de eenheid en soevereiniteit van dat land symboliseerde.’​[150]​ They assembled to defend their own concerns and wanted their duke to be prestigious and strong, but also relatively cheap to maintain.​[151]​ If he wanted money, the prince could content himself with the ducal domains; for taxes he needed the consent of the Estates and they did not give it lightly.​[152]​ 
Although the Estates – both in the quarters and on the central level –  had become an integral part of the Guelders government, and their relation with Arnold was conflict-ridden, they did not aim at governing themselves: that was the task of the duke and his council. Instead, their aims were limited to the defence of their interests and that of the land. In the conflicts with their prince, the subjects always referred to the Points of Union of 1418 and the charter of 1423, as a kind of “constitutions”. Nevertheless, from the 1440s onwards, they demanded, and in fact got, powers to monitor ducal finances to a great extent,​[153]​ but this was involvement in the administration rather than a take-over of government. In fact, the nobles and cities created no administrative institutions of their own; the assemblies sufficed for their aims. 
The Estates sometimes questioned the powers of their duke, but his legitimacy as their prince was never at stake; they had appointed him themselves.​[154]​ For the good of the realm then, the Estates – although increasingly divided – tried to mediate in the conflict between duke Arnold and his son Adolf.​[155]​ Matters were made worse by increasing interference of the duke of Burgundy, who wanted to extend his powers in the Low Countries. When in the 1460s and 1470s these attempts became stronger, the conflicts between Arnold and his son came to a head. Eventually, Arnold was imprisoned by his son in 1464, while Adolf was incarcerated by the Burgundians seven years later. Now the Estates had to take over government: they held their own meetings, collected taxes and prepared their defences.​[156]​ 
To no avail. Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, conquered the duchy in 1473. He was the rightful duke now, for Arnold had transferred his powers to him a year before. This would become the basis for future Burgundian-Habsburg claims on Guelders, but the Estates never supported these.​[157]​ They remained loyal to the Egmond dynasty and claimed it was their right to appoint a duke, so Arnold did not have the right to sell-out his duchy in this way. When Charles the Bold died in 1477 the power vacuum was quickly filled by the city-governments.​[158]​ Soon the Landdag accepted Adolf as a new duke on the now traditional conditions. Although the new prince did not live long enough to return to Guelders, the Estates did not govern the duchy themselves, his sister Catharina did.​[159]​ Nevertheless, strong involvement in government made the Estates only more self-conscious about their place in the political domain. However, in 1481 Burgundy profited from the chaos in the duchy and conquered Guelders again. An occupation that lasted to 1492. 
During both occupations the cities were thrown back on their own.​[160]​ Most of all during the first occupation (1573-1577), the conqueror broke the hold of the Ridderschap and cities on government.​[161]​ The municipal governments tried to further their interests on their own in this climate. This self-centred policy, with the powerful city of Nijmegen as a ringleader, would colour the acts of the Estates for decades to come. It complemented the habits of action developed in the first half of the fifteenth century: contact between the capital cities of Guelders about important matters, consulting of their respective quarters and finally – under the guidance of the capitals – putting the case before the duke, often in a Landdag.​[162]​ When in the early 1490s centralist interference on behalf of the conquerors led increasingly to frictions, the Estates turned again to their own ducal dynasty and decided to free Charles of Egmond (r. 1492-1538), the son of Adolf, who resided at the French court.​[163]​ 
The reign of the new duke was marked by the same problems his predecessors had faced – Burgundian-Habsburg interference and outside claimants of the ducal throne. Moreover, the dualism with the Estates, more self-conscious and powerful since the tumultuous decades between 1470 and 1492, set in for another round of friction. The two occupations of Guelders had left their marks in the field of administration. The new rulers had tried to professionalize government to Burgundian standards to a great extent. Moreover, the quarters, beforehand mainly representative entities, now had become part of the new official administration.​[164]​ While many innovations were discontinued when Burgundian-Habsburg government collapsed, Charles of Egmond – called Charles of Guelders by his adherents – took them as a good example and tried ‘to create some order in the financial and administrative chaos.’​[165]​ He had to, of course, for the contested nature of his reign would inevitably bring about war, and war was expensive. The duke tried to increase administrative efficiency.​[166]​ He ruled by the way of a council, with – after 1516 – its fixed seat in Arnhem.​[167]​ This raad fulfilled all the tasks concerning day-to-day administration, justice and financial management. Ducal officials – the richter (justice), drost (bailiff) and ambtman – worked in the cities and in the countryside. The power of the duke was, however, counterbalanced by the complex of local customary land and municipal rights, embodied by the Estates. 
To be able to field a capable mercenary army the duke needed money. As a result, he levied taxes in an extraordinary way.​[168]​ The main way to do this, was to request so-called extraordinary aides (bedes) from the Estates. These direct property-based taxes existed well before his reign, but were now conceded regularly and for years in succession. The Estates went along with the financial wishes of their prince, because he had to fight for an independent Guelders.​[169]​ Secondly, the quarters could collect the taxes themselves,​[170]​ and the aide was a tax that relatively favoured the rich – the nobles and burgers in the Landdag. Anyway, the new duke only received his money in exchange for remedying their grievances.​[171]​ In this way, the Estates could put forward new conditions with every requested tax. In this climate of – often fragile – cooperation, the frequency of Landdag became somewhat institutionalised: it usually met in the spring and the autumn,​[172]​ a rhythm that would be continued until far into the early modern era.​[173]​ 
	The cooperation eventually cracked under the weight of war and Guelders lost its independence once again at the moment the Estates had practically taken over government. In the 1530s, duke Charles and the Landdag increasingly collided over the costly warfare that impoverished the land and reinforced economic crisis.​[174]​ Succession was also a problem once again. Charles would probably die without a legitimate heir and wanted the king of France to succeed him. The Estates would have none of it and eventually chose William of Jülich (r. 1538-1543 (in Guelders)), whom duke Charles grudgingly accepted as heir. The newly-chosen duke needed a charter, and the Estates thus arranged a tract wherein the rules were stipulated. Maarten van Driel calls it: ‘een door de landdag aangelegd bit met teugels’.​[175]​ It contained some interesting features that would remain on the Estates’ agenda for some time to come and some old themes echoing earlier tracts as well. Most notable, according to article nineteen the Landdag would be given the right to function as a court of appeal in all legal cases, at the request of the aggrieved party. Article 34 is interesting as well, because the Estates demanded the duke to choose his future counsellors amongst the Guelders (born) inhabitants, preferably the nobility. 
At the whole, the interference of the Estates in government was very strong during William’s reign; not just in the field of finances, but in all kinds of military affairs and other pressing matters as well. For these purposes a permanent committee of Delegated States was instituted in 1539.​[176]​ Few is known about it, but it seems to have functioned for some time. The question why the Estates instituted the committee has not been asked until now, but it seems to have been no coincidence that it was instituted in 1539, the same year William became duke of Jülich-Cleves-Berg and count of Mark and Ravenstein.​[177]​ The Estates needed an institution that could deal with pressing (military) issues when the duke was absent; it was no longer enough to, like usual, put some delegates at his side. We shall see below that the Estates instituted such a committee of Delegated States in 1577 when central authority was likewise absent.​[178]​ Besides, under duke William, many important administrative matters were discussed within, and often even delegated to, the quarters.​[179]​ They collected the taxes – and even appointed delegates for this job – and each quarter appointed representatives to keep in touch with the duke and his commanders in 1542. Moreover, a year later the Estates wanted to re-institute the Delegated States – it had apparently been disbanded – to be able to act quickly in the face of the military threat of Emperor Charles V.​[180]​ It did not help: he ended the independence of Guelders the same year after a short campaign. Duke William subjected himself to Charles V and they concluded the so-called Peace of Venlo on September the 7th.  

Guelders under Habsburg rule: the basis
When Guelders lost its independence this had grave consequences for its subjects. The effects were felt in all kinds of matters, but very strongly in the institutional and political field. Many changes made in the Habsburg era would eventually be retained under the Republic.​[181]​ However, according to Aart Noordzij the medieval dualism between the duke and his Estates remained in existence.​[182]​ Indeed, Charles V and his subjects stipulated the rules of engagement in a tract, as tradition prescribed, and the Landdag continued to be convoked. The traditional dualism transformed after 1543, however. The balance of power between duke and Estates was altered in favour of the former. Besides, Charles V, who had a world-wide empire to run, was mostly absent, thus affecting the traditional personal relationship. As a consequence, a stadtholder and Hof, that took over most of the ducal tasks, took his place as an aim of the opposition of the Estates. To analyse this, Maris distinguishes between two distinct principles: the Court – as successor of the ducal council – represented the monarchic or curial principle, while the Estates embodied the customary, or landed law (landrecht), principle.​[183]​ The Estates wanted the Court to perform the old ducal tasks, but a drive for centralisation made the Hof encroach their domain – or so they felt. However, daily administration was left to the Court more or less unopposed. This makes sense, of course, for the Estates had, as we have seen, in the past made no attempts to take over the administrative field. They had tried to get a hold on government and only when faced with a power vacuum, like in the reign of William of Jülich, the Estates took over the administration to a greater extent. Now a powerful Hof was established their focus increasingly shifted to judicial matters, as we will see in paragraph three of this chapter. 
What kind of land did Charles V add to the Netherlands in 1543? For the measures of the Low Countries, Gelderland was a relatively big territory, but rather thinly populated.​[184]​ From all provinces Guelders’ total population came at about the seventh or eighth place.​[185]​ The percentage of urbanization was probably about 35%. The quarters differed markedly. The southern ones, Nijmegen and the Overkwartier, were rather densely populated, and had a somewhat more (industrial) market-orientated agriculture.​[186]​ On the sandy soils of the Zutphen and Veluwe quarters lived far fewer people. Moreover, the Overkwartier was traditionally somewhat different from the other quarters.​[187]​ We shall see below that this divide between the upper and lower quarters would develop sharply before and during the Revolt. 
The cities were not really big, with the exception of Nijmegen, boasting above 10.000 inhabitants.​[188]​ Due to its size, economic position and respectable status as imperial city, Nijmegen, primus inter pares among the cities of Guelders, traditionally acted like a city-state.​[189]​ Roermond and Venlo are estimated between 2.000 and 5.000 residents, although it seems that some other cities also topped two thousands in the sixteenth century.​[190]​ Most cities had a regional economic function as a market town, although some of them were also small industrial centres or engaged themselves in long-distance trade. This was, for instance, the case with Zutphen, member of the Hanseatic League, and Nijmegen. The four capital cities of the quarters, first designated in 1371, dominated their immediate surroundings.​[191]​ They held a special place in the Quarter Estates, whom they convoked, but could not automatically dictate their will on the assembly. 
The numerous nobility always formed a counterweight to be reckoned with; family prestige, extensive possessions, a position of power within their ambt and involvement in the magistrates of capital cities, played their part.​[192]​ The territory of Guelders included various seignories, where a local lord held the seigniorial rights instead of the duke.​[193]​ Most of them were integrated in the ducal administrative structure of Guelders, but the great bannerets – the lords of Berg, Bronkhorst, Bahr and Wisch – were still more or less autonomous.​[194]​ As equals to the count of Zutphen, their home region, they were present on the Landdag outside the quarter-structure, but Charles of Guelders, and Charles V after him, made convincingly clear they were an integral part of the duchy.  
The economic situation does also not present an unified image.​[195]​ The situation was certainly not very good in Guelders during the first half of the sixteenth century. The decades after 1470 had been too chaotic and full of warfare.​[196]​ Although matters were not as worse as they would be during the 1580s and 1590s, war had left its devastating effects. Most of all in financial affairs, because after 1528 the fighting had been mostly on foreign soil. Ducal taxes were a big problem for the common man, but – except for local resistance that could make it hard to collect the money – he does not seem to have been exhausted. The troubled time of the Guelders-Habsburg wars did also not affect cities in an even way: Zutphen declined, but Venlo did very well, for instance. 
The Peace of Venlo transferred Guelders from duke William, who retained his German possessions, to Charles V. The Emperor thus finally fulfilled the claims the Burgundian-Habsburg rulers had made since 1472. The transfer of princely power was an event of some importance for the Emperor. He attached a rather large territory to the personal union of the Netherlands, a region that had destabilized the Low Countries by constant warfare during the previous decades.​[197]​ This situation, to be sure, was triggered by the expansionist policy of the Burgundian-Habsburg rulers themselves. ‘While the Netherlanders experienced these wars [i.e. those waged by the duke of Guelders] as aggressive, they were really the duke’s defensive response to the doubtfully legal and certainly aggressive claims of the Habsburgs to his duchy.’​[198]​ Nevertheless, the importance of the event was still limited for Charles V and the Netherlands compared to the watershed it was for the duchy of Guelders.​[199]​ Strikingly, no official representatives of the Estates were present when the peace that sealed the fate of the proud duchy was concluded.​[200]​ Five days later, however, duke Charles concluded a separate treaty with his new subjects, the Tract of Venlo.
In Guelders, as we have seen, and in other parts of the Netherlands as well, it had been fairly normal to confirm a new duke by way of a charter between him and representatives of the inhabitants, but the Tract of Venlo differed markedly from the earlier agreements.​[201]​ Firstly, the Estates did not choose their duke this time: he was a foreign ruler, a conqueror, a son of the very dynasty that had brought such a hardship on Guelders.​[202]​ Nevertheless, the parties held on to tradition: the Estates expressly accepted Charles as their new duke.​[203]​ A score of representatives of the quarters, nobles and delegates of the cities, had come to Venlo to do this; although none of the Overkwartier were present. The tone of the document was also different; it was no bridle the Estates placed on the head of their duke, but it was no dictation of terms by a conqueror either. Instead, Charles V confirmed the Estates, as representatives of his subjects, as a contracting party.​[204]​ The tract echoes the desire of the new duke to start his reign in harmony with his subjects. He needed them to remain quiet and pay taxes. The Estates, on their part, wished to retain as much of their old independence as possible. The ties to the Netherlands would be loose and the members of the Estates desired to retain their administrative autonomy on the local and regional level.​[205]​ Another important claim was, however, not incorporated in the agreement. In spite of what the Estates wanted, Charles V did not promise to staff his corps of officials with Gelderlanders. Nevertheless, the subjects would try to use the tract for this purpose.
Indeed, the Peace and Tract of Venlo had grave consequences for the government of Guelders, both internally and towards the outside world. Externally, as part of the Habsburg Netherlands, Guelders had now to deal with the governess and the complex of Collateral Councils (Collaterale Raden) in Brussels.​[206]​ Furthermore, until 1559 the duchy stood financially under supervision of the Audit Office of Brabant.​[207]​ Conversely, the Great Council (Grote Raad) of Mechelen, the highest court of appeal in the Netherlands, had no formal jurisdiction in Gelderland, but aggrieved parties could turn to it if they desired.​[208]​ Another institute the Guelders’ elite did not like were the States General. Representatives of the duchy would be only sent a few times before 1576.​[209]​ For the Estates Charles V was their duke, not the overlord of other provinces. This does not mean, however, that Guelders did not contribute to the central purse. Three times it granted an aide – in 1547, 1558 and 1570. Moreover, the government received sums from the ducal domains for thirty years and mortgaged them heavily in 1575. From the non-patrimonial provinces Guelders even was, according to Van de Pas, the number one sponsor of central government.​[210]​ The Treaty of Augsburg (1548) and the Pragmatic Sanction (1549) also pulled Gelderland towards the other provinces, although the duchy would remain strongly Empire-orientated until well into the Revolt.​[211]​ 
Internally, the biggest transformation took place at the central level.​[212]​ The government of Charles of Guelders had, in spite of the attempts to professionalize, not been overwhelmingly effective; especially local administration was underdeveloped and erratic.​[213]​ The shift of emphasis from “Arnhem” to the Landdag and – mainly – the Quarter Estates, during the reign of duke William, had not helped efficiency either. Due to traditional structures, Charles V could not institute great changes in the localities. He probably did not want to alienate the members of the Landdag by harming their power bases either. In those years, Habsburg centralization was generally balanced by deconcentration at the local level – for example with regard to the collection of taxes – to let everything run as smoothly as possible.​[214]​ However, at the provincial level Charles V replaced the old ducal government with Burgundian-Habsburg institutions that provided greater administrative efficiency.​[215]​ 
First of all, because Charles V could not be present in the duchy very often, a stadtholder was appointed to replace him, like in the other Netherlands provinces.​[216]​ This official did not enjoy full ducal powers, however.​[217]​ He was mainly to be a commander-in-chief, responsible for the maintenance of law and order within the province. The stadtholder was strongly tied to Brussels; he had to refer back in important matters of war and peace and the central administration had the right to appoint key-officials in the province. The stadtholder had to further the interests of both the subjects and central government, so he often worked as a go-between. As a high noble, this replacement-duke also provided prestige to his province, especially, because the Estates got it settled that their stadtholder would only hold one such a commission.​[218]​  
	The stadtholder was assisted by a council, the Hof van Gelre en Zutphen.​[219]​ This successor of the old ducal raad resided in Arnhem and was assisted by a chancery, the administrative centre of Guelders. Like the old council, the Hof combined two main ducal tasks: administration and high justice. If everyone was present, the Court consisted of the stadtholder, who presided it, a chancellor and, initially, six counsellors (raadsheren). All important officials of the Hof and chancery were appointed by the duke, but the governess in Brussels did this for him most of the time. Their salaries, as those of all government officials, were paid from the income generated by the ducal domains. 
The competencies and way of work of the Hof were officially settled in 1547 by way of an instruction for the chancery, called kanselarij-ordonnantie. Below it will become clear that this instruction, because it was regarded as contrary to the Tract of Venlo, would be a source of conflict between the Court and the Estates. The Hof replaced the stadtholder if he was on a journey and would then be presided by the chancellor, who was also the head of the chancery. The stadtholder was responsible for the government, but he could not dictate the decision-making process; he held just one vote in the council. The counsellors were divided in two groups: trained jurists (two) and costumiere raden (four). The latter were nobles from Guelders, one for every quarter, men who knew – or were supposed to do so – the customary law of the duchy. The former mostly came from outside the province.​[220]​ Between 1549 and 1553 three extra law-professionals were added, thus upsetting the voting-balance. Moreover, an attorney general, called Momber, was added to the court in 1546; he appeared to also have acted as a counsellor sometimes.
	The twofold task of the Hof made it a powerful institution and a potential agent of centralization. At the one hand, it preformed the judicial tasks of the duke.​[221]​ The Hof was the sovereign court for Guelders, so outside interference was not possible and, just as the Estates had desired in 1543, inhabitants enjoyed the privilege of non evocando. The Tract of Venlo guaranteed the competence of local and municipal courts in criminal and civil cases. The Hof could therefore not act as a general court of appeal; only in some cases, as parties desired so. It had, however, a supervising task regarding the lower courts. Moreover, the Court ruled in matters outside the landed law (landrecht) in first instance. While the judicial competence of the Hof was limited by custom, its administrative tasks were far less.​[222]​ As a sedentary institution, it combined expertise, knowledge of the situation and permanence. The Hof was, even more than the stadtholder, an intermediate, a filter, between central government and its subjects; the spider in the institutional web. The chancery / Hof corresponded with all relevant persons and institutions, both inside Guelders and outside the duchy. The Court also had many other tasks. It executed, for instance, governmental placards, issued decrees in the name of the stadtholder and convoked the Estates. The Hof also provided advise in political matters to both the stadtholder and the central government. 
However, for financial matters concerning the domains, traditionally another task of the ducal council, a new institution was eventually envisaged.​[223]​ To create some order out of the financial chaos, Charles V sent an official from the Holland Audit Office to draw up an report on the ducal domains and their administration. He worked closely together with native officials who had been involved in domain matters before 1543. Nevertheless, the financial management came increasingly to stand under the competence of the Brussels Audit Office and most key officials involved were foreigners. Strong Guelders protests, with the Tract of Venlo in the hand, coupled to the high costs of travelling to Brussels, made the government establish a Guelders Rekenkamer in 1559. This was an aberration in the Habsburg centralization process, for usually newly incorporated regions came under the jurisdiction of one of the three Audit Offices of Netherlands. Instead, Gelderland held its domain matters now within the own province, as had been traditionally the case. The Audit Office, however, did not become a true Guelders institution in the Habsburg era, for most of its staff remained foreign.   

Guelders under Habsburg rule: conflicts 
Next to the official government, the Landdag remained active. However, instead of personal contact with the duke, it had to contend with the new institutions now. Points of political friction shifted accordingly. The Estates had traditionally desired to defend their privileges and, at the same time, to govern next to the duke when they saw that he did not act according to the best interest of the realm. If he wanted, he could supplement his income by way of aides the Landdag confirmed when it saw fit; often in exchange for the remittance of grieves. This did not essentially change under the new prince: the Tract of Venlo had confirmed it. Indeed, the taxes were still collected in the quarters​[224]​ without much interference on behalf of the government and local administration was in general left alone. The desire to have a bigger role in provincial government remained part of the new-style dualism.​[225]​ However, another matter became prominent. The Estates continuously strove to contain the judicial tasks of the Hof, representing the monarchical principle, most of all when they felt it encroached on their customary privileges. As a result, the kanselarij-ordonnantie, which stipulated the judicial duties of the Court, and which by the Estates was perceived to be contrary to the Tract of Venlo, was the main friction-point in the quarrels to come. Resistance, however, when it came about, still took place in traditional ways. Nevertheless, from the 1560s onwards, politics in Guelders were increasingly and irrevocably absorbed by the issue of religion and other general developments in the Netherlands. These eventually smothered the conflicts with the Hof for some time. 
The Estates employed their traditional habits of action during the duels with government. In the first place, the Landdag and the Quarter Estates remained vehicles of opposition. Negotiations about taxes provided excellent opportunities to present their grievances. However, exactly for this reason, Charles V and his successor Philip II were neither keen to ask for an aide, nor to convoke a Landdag too often.​[226]​ The government tried to deal with the local and regional powers separately and summoned the Estates after 1543 less often than before.​[227]​ This was possible, because the Landdag, and probably Quarter Estates as well, had to be convoked by the stadtholder, or the Hof in his name, with approval from Brussels.​[228]​ The declining frequency of meetings should not fool us, however, because the subjects continued to meet on their own. In line with tradition, quarters came together, and deliberations between capitals were still common as well. The union, another traditional instrument of opposition, was also used when necessary.​[229]​ Furthermore, just like the charters of 1418 and 1423, the Tract of Venlo – a constitution avant la lettere​[230]​ – soon became a cherished document to throw in the face of the government at critical times. Finally, the city of Nijmegen retained its pre-1543 position as leader, and often initiator, of the opposition by the Estates.​[231]​
The first years of the new reign passed fairly quietly, but relations went really downhill during the 1550s.​[232]​ Initially, Guelders slowly recuperated from the tumultuous last decades of independence and the new government brought money with it to cover its expenses starting up.​[233]​ In 1548 the first conflict broke out between the Hof and Nijmegen, always allergic to infringements on its judicial autonomy, about who was competent to make inquiries into heresy in the city.​[234]​ The following years witnessed growing irritation on behalf of the Guelders governing elite that had to deal with interference of the Hof  in many judicial matters. For this reason, the kanselarij-ordonnantie (1547), which had attracted few immediate resistance, soon became the core focus of protest.​[235]​ When in 1552 war flared up in the Empire, and the struggle with long-time enemy France was picked up as well, the government asked for an aide. The Estates, in turn, started to collect complaints in the quarters.​[236]​ These were numerous and mostly aimed at the judicial tasks of the Hof, as put forward by the kanselarij-ordonnantie. 
The complaints had two core issues that would resurface every time during the future conflicts: in the first place, the Estates saw the Hof steadily encroaching in their municipal and landed rights.​[237]​ This touched the hart of their independence, and even worse: their power, prestige and income. Members of the Estates were the richters and ambtmannen, who had judicial tasks but did not sentence, but also the rural judges themselves. Their power bases were under attack.​[238]​ The other major irritation was the appointment of non-natives in the Hof. The Estates claimed unjustly that this breached the tract of Venlo, but their concern was understandable. The Guelders political elite wanted some influence in the chancery. The four customary counsellors, Guelders noblemen, could serve this end, but the more foreign raadsheren were appointed, the more their relative power diminished. Most of the troubles came from the instruction for the chancery, so the Estates continuously agitated against this document. However, the grievances were not remitted satisfactory, but, after much delay, the aide was granted in 1558.
The early 1560s witnessed the revival of the traditional policy of concluding unions (verbondspolitiek), but matters were also increasingly taken outside of the province. Political and religious tensions, continuously interacting these days, were building up in the Netherlands and also affected the province of Gelderland.​[239]​ The king ordered the inhabitants of Guelders to obey and follow his policy with regard to heretics in 1559. The Hof was instructed to treat (municipal) judges, who behaved lenient in this matter, harshly. For the Estates, this sounded like an unwelcome interference in their own sphere of influence. And, as was the case in many towns throughout the Netherlands, the municipal magistrates in Guelders were more concerned with the maintenance of law and order and the defence of privilege, than to bring down the hammer on religious dissenters.​[240]​ The Estates succeeded, for instance, with the Tract of Venlo in the hand, in thwarting the introduction of the new bishoprics scheme until 1569.
Nijmegen and Arnhem, fed-up with government interference, initiated an Union of bannerets, nobles and cities in 1560.​[241]​ This alliance even instituted a permanent committee to make sure (judicial) privileges were not harmed further. The seventeen men strong body had all kinds of competencies; it could, for instance, convoke the Estates.​[242]​ Although differences of interests and the traditional slow practice of ruggespraak – many municipal representatives had to refer back to their principals in important matters​[243]​  – made decision-making difficult, the Union formed the blueprint for opposition for years to come.​[244]​ After yet a new round of conflicts – this time about rural courts – Nijmegen and Arnhem took the initiative for a Guelders deputation to Brussels.​[245]​ Moreover, the high-reputed law professor Elbertus Leoninus, a born Gelderlander, was mobilized to further the interests of the Estates there.​[246]​ It is hardly surprising that in this climate the governmental situation became increasingly confused and that the authority of the Hof weakened. 
The Estates initially profited from the unstable situation in Brussels after the departure of Philip II in 1559.​[247]​ The rule of governess Margaret of Parma (r. 1559-1567) suffered from financial difficulties and discontent among the high nobility, the groten. These gentlemen, united in a League, had, after a struggle for the political power,  succeeded to extend their hold on the government.​[248]​ Charles de Brimeu, count of Meghen, the stadtholder of Guelders, was one of these nobles and he had supported the Estates quietly against the Hof in many matters. The governess eventually decided to let a committee – chaired by Meghen – investigate the complaints of the Guelders political elite. Although eventually the grievances would not be fully remitted by this committee, it was a victory nonetheless: the sovereign Hof now faced a kind of institution of appeal.​[249]​ Its fierce protests against this, in 1565, did not help. This was probably the first time a possibility for revision against the Hof presented itself; it left an heavy allergy with the Court that would resurface, as we shall see below, again in the early 1580s.
Now this victory seemed to be in the pocket, the Estates sharpened their blades; some radical measures were put forward under the guidance of Arnhem and Nijmegen. At first the Union was renewed, on the basis of the 1560 one.​[250]​ Moreover, the Estates decided to boycott the Hof. The allied quarters also wanted foreign counsellors, including the chancellor, to be replaced by native ones and the number of jurists downsized in the process. Most importantly, the Estates decided to design a new kanselarij-ordonnantie themselves. A concept document was ready in the summer of 1565. It settled the (juridical) competencies of the Hof in a way the Estates, although not everyone agreed yet, considered best for the land, and themselves of course. This new instruction would, as we shall see below, eventually form the basis of the competencies of the Hof under the Republic. Leoninus, however, warned the Estates, because too much drive could irritate “Brussels”; and he could know for he resided there.
The Estates did indeed alienate the government and the stadtholder in the summer of 1565. The Landdag that from August the 24th  would discuss the new instruction, was also requested an aide. However, matters went terribly wrong. It is not entirely known why the meeting ended in conflict, but it seems that internal problems within the quarters blocked all decision-making.​[251]​ The ordonnantie was not discussed at all and the aide was rejected.​[252]​ The Estates forfeited the indispensable support of Meghen in this way and much good-will in Brussels as well. The tumultuous meeting foreshadows, in a way, the Landdag of 1582, because the ill-feelings of one quarter would also make this meeting explode. Anyway, the meeting of August 1565 marks a reorientation: the conflicts between the Estates and the Hof were now strongly intertwined with the general religious and political developments of the Netherlands that came to the forefront in the wonderjaar (year of wonders). 
Guelders had not been a hot-bed of heresy until the 1560s, but it surfaced nonetheless in 1566.​[253]​ Protestants – some Lutherans and mostly Anabaptists – could be found in Guelders, but ‘the growth of confessional consciousness was markedly slower here than in the provinces to the south and the west.’​[254]​ Calvinism only started to play its part in Gelderland in the 1560s, when exiles started to come in from the Rhineland. In Guelders, the year 1566 started relative calmly. Only in the summer and autumn Gelderland experienced public preaching and some iconoclastic riots (beeldenstorm).​[255]​ These were, however, mainly local; in some seignorities and in the cities of Elburg, Harderwijk, Roermond and Venlo. Some other cities – Nijmegen for example – also experienced turmoil, but at the whole the authorities, inhabitants and sometimes clergymen, acted resolutely. Nevertheless, just like in Holland, were the iconoclastic movement was fiercer, the affected Guelders cities experienced a wide variety of activity, inspired by all kinds of motives, during the beeldenstorm.​[256]​ 
Recent research makes clear that the developments in Guelders during the annus mirabilis were strongly political in nature.​[257]​ This becomes clear from the ongoing conflict between the Estates and the Hof. The issue, already apparent before 1566, of the anti-heresy placards, for example, was in Guelders far more political motivated than in other provinces; not the placards, but the very institution that issued them – the Court – was the main source of trouble.​[258]​ The Hof on its part sent a alarming letter to the central government in December 1565.​[259]​ Irritation about the continuous opposition of the Estates made it exaggerate both the political and, most of all, the religious situation. 
When, in April 1566, minor Netherlands noblemen, united in the famous Compromise (Compromis der Edelen), presented their Request for moderation of the placards and disbandment of the inquisition to Margaret, this was followed in Gelderland. The city of Nijmegen and Guelders members of the Compromise tried to use the Union for the same purpose, but below the surface the old themes were at stake. The main motivation here was therefore not so much a fear of the inquisition or irritation about the placards – both had de facto not functioned in Guelders up to 1566 –, but rather to drive the Hof and the central government apart.​[260]​ It was no great success; every quarter had its own interests and this gave, after the religious riots had broken loose, government the possibility to restore order.​[261]​ 
Meghen, who had already turned his back on the Estates the previous year, drifted away from the League of the high nobles at the same time.​[262]​ He felt uncomfortable about the Request of the lesser nobles and he disliked the radicalism of some of them.​[263]​ He remained eventually on the side of the government, while William of Orange (1533-1584) and his adherents drifted towards rebellion. Meghen craftily restored order in Guelders during the winter of 1566-1567.​[264]​ Arnhem and Zutphen had remained loyal.​[265]​ So when Meghen broke the resistance of Nijmegen, that had introduced its own religious accord, by way of infiltration, and even got a garrison within its walls, the opposition, that had already been divided, stood no chance. The government was in power again and it was not willing to give it away once more. So, in the winter of 1566, a Guelders requests for a Landdag to resolve the religious troubles was rejected, because the ongoing irritations about the Hof would also inevitably have figured on the agenda. The year of wonders brought about the temporarily end of the open conflicts between the Estates and the government.  
According to Van de Pas, the conflicts that had dominated the Guelders politics since 1547 receded to the background after 1566.​[266]​ The coming of Fernando Alverez de Toledo, duke of Alba, as a new governor and the dawning of Revolt were the reason for this. While this may be true, new research is needed. Historians often focus on moments of crisis, indeed my case-study is a case in point, and due to this practice we do know very little about the political and institutional history of Guelders between 1567 and 1576. 
The coming of Alba had important political repercussions for Guelders. The climate under his rule, and the scars left by the disunity and turmoil from the year of wonders, acted as a brake on decisive action from the part of the Estates,​[267]​ while the Hof came to be even more resented. Firstly, his Council of Troubles (Raad van Beroerten) sentenced more than 600 people in the duchy.​[268]​ Although this was no particularly high number compared to the southern Netherlands – in Antwerp alone 529 people were convicted by this court – it left its scars. The procedures of the Council overrode privilege and, just as worse, the Hof and Audit Office collaborated, as did many local officials.​[269]​ 
These traumatic experiences were made worse by further interference in Guelders’ own matters. The magistrate of Nijmegen had already suffered a purge, by its own subjects but instigated by Meghen, in 1566 and a year later the same happened again.​[270]​ The magistrate of Arnhem was also altered, on orders of Alba.​[271]​ He commanded the Hof to interrogate some magistrates, while it had no right to do so according to privilege.​[272]​ That a member of the Court eventually was installed in the purged municipal council did not do any good either. These alterations did not just have direct effects in the cities themselves, but also impacted on the Estates. With loyal representatives from these two capital cities – probably more cities experienced such purges – present in the quarter assemblies, the policy of both them and the Landdag were less radical, although the grievances towards the Hof and its instruction remained.​[273]​ 
In this climate the Estates could not get much done. Their opposition against Alba’s desire to uniform criminal justice, by way of the so-called Criminele Ordonnantiën, was no great succes.​[274]​ Even the assistance of Leoninus did not help much.​[275]​ Even worse, Alba turned his attention next to civil justice, to toll privileges and the sentencing of heretics; all matters the Estates – and most of all the cities – wanted to hold in their own hands. The Landdag could also not compleely twart Alba’s financial schemes.​[276]​ The notorious tenth and twentieth pennies were contested throughout the Netherlands​[277]​ and Gelderland defended itself with the Tract of Venlo against uncommon contributions. In turn, the province offered a four-year aide that was eventually accepted in 1570. Guelders could not have conceded less, for government had legitimate reasons to ask for money now. The revenue was not meant to sponsor foreign warfare, as had been the case in the 1550s and early 1560s, but to defend the realm against attacks; most of all campaigns waged by William of Orange.
Above was stated that the strategic position of Guelders made its involvement in the Revolt inevitable. This was confirmed in 1568 when the ill-fated expedition of William of Orange crossed Gelderland soil.​[278]​ From thence onwards the province was in a state of almost constant war – or subjected to ill-paid soldiers from both parties at least – that would last into the early seventeenth century. In this climate of military threat, some Guelders cities took a Spanish garrison, while others, like Arnhem, hired their own soldiers to prevent this.​[279]​ 
Orange invaded again in 1572.​[280]​ His assault was preceded by the capture of Brill by the sea beggars (watergeuzen) and while in Holland and Zeeland many cities opened their gates for them during the summer, the prince himself was less successful.​[281]​ The main cities of the Overkwartier were not inclined to go over to his side, but meanwhile Guelders banneret, and brother-in-law of Orange, Willem IV count van den Bergh (1537-1586) laid his hands on a string of cities in the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe, and the provinces of Overijssel and Utrecht.​[282]​ The successes did not last. Orange had to retreat when support from France did not materialise and Van den Bergh did the same, thus opening the way for Alba to force the cities in obedience. Zutphen would act as an example. Left with a garrison by the rebels, a Spanish army laid siege on the city and while ‘datmen aen ‘d eene poort handelde, overvielen de Spaenjaers ‘d andere, ende vergooten veel bloets.’ As an effect ‘die resterende [opstandige] steden in Over-IJssel, Veluwe ende Sticht brachten die sleutelen van selfs.’​[283]​ The city of Zaltbommel, however, was the most lasting success for the rebels in Gelderland. This town was surprised by a bunch of exiles when the magistrate was on its way to Arnhem. Too bad for Guelders, Zaltbommel – and the Tieler- and Bommelerwaard surrounding it – would from 1572 onwards associate itself with Holland and claim the protection of the prince. The Estates would struggle for decades to return it to their province.​[284]​ Most of all, because they could not miss its contributions to the provincial tax quota. 
	Although Guelders was subjected by Alba in the months following the tumultuous summer of 1572, the Revolt continued in Holland and Zeeland where the Iron Duke had to subject each city separately. The spin-offs of war, mostly marked by guerrilla-style skirmishes,​[285]​ were a huge irritation in Guelders. Uncertainty was rife, cities changed sometimes several times and the invasion of Louis and Henry of Nassau in 1574 ended dramatically on Guelders soil.​[286]​ Moreover, raids from Zaltbommel, that considered loyal Guelders as the enemy, together with other beggar actions, ravaged and impoverished the countryside.​[287]​ Spanish troops, to be sure, disturbed the rural economy as well. As a result, farmers could not pay their taxes out of poverty and desperation was common.​[288]​ The situation was not much better in the cities, which were continuously extorted by their own garrisons.​[289]​ Furthermore, the roads were often insecure, so members of the Estates complained, for instance, that they could hardly meet this way.​[290]​ 
It was this mounting discontent that made Guelders reach out to the other provinces in 1576, when it joined the Pacification of Ghent.​[291]​ After the peace-conference in Breda had failed in 1575, government power collapsed. The king had to suspend payment of interest on his debts in September and no money could be sent to the Netherlands. So, when Alba’s successor, governor Don Luis de Zuñiga y Requesens, died in the spring of the next year, the unpaid troops started to loot. In this power-vacuum the Estates of Brabant convoked the States General.​[292]​ At the same time, Guelders took one further step out of its traditional isolation and asked Holland and Utrecht for support against the mutinous troops.​[293]​ Orange and Holland simultaneously asked the four capitals to let Gelderland join some sort of union with them to get rid of the (Spanish) troubles of war – although they wanted the duchy most of all to act as a buffer where the war, instead as on their soil, could be waged.​[294]​ Eventually, Guelders accepted the invitation and sent delegates to the States General, something heavily resented beforehand. A month after the Pacification had been concluded, Gelderland finally joined it. This move marks a turning-point in the history of Guelders: the traditionally inward-looking duchy became more and more absorbed in the Netherlands. 

In this chapter has been demonstrated that the duchy of Guelders developed its own particular tradition of representation during the Middle Ages. During the fifteenth century this culminated in the emergence of the Estates of Guelders, beside representation on the quarter level. The political elite developed habits of action that proved lasting until well into the sixteenth century. Political action focussed strongly on the duke, but in this dualistic relation the Estates did not aim at governing themselves, they wanted to influence his rule. When, after the conquest of the duchy by Charles V, the stadtholder, and most of all, the Hof took the place of the duke and his council in the province, the object of dualism shifted towards the chancery. The Hof would, in the eyes of the Estates, to perform the functions of the duke, within the boundaries of the Tract of Venlo, but it did not. The Court, or so they felt, encroached upon their local power bases, most of all in the judicial field. So, it was there that they collided. The Estates eventually composed a new instruction for the chancery that should settle matters. The political tasks of the chancery had traditionally been performed by the duke and his council and the Estates had neither the experience, nor the organization to take them over. So, this part of the tasks of the Hof was not so highly contested; it was almost absent form the instruction. Nevertheless the Estates wanted to control the Court to some extent, hence the irritation about foreign counsellors.












III. Gelderland during the Revolt

‘(…) dat ‘t sedert de beëediginghe vanden here stadtholder de remonstranten zijn overvallen met verscheyden eorbitante niewicheyden, die soo lancx soo grooter zijn ghewassen, ende van daghe te daghe met vermeerderinghe worden ghecontinueert’.​[295]​

Such was the reaction of the quarters of Roermond and Zutphen at the reign of the first stadtholder Guelders had chosen itself. John of Nassau, brother of William of Orange, worked in Gelderland from 1578 to 1581 and made himself unpopular among many members of the Estates. As we will see in paragraph one, count John roughly altered the confessional and political balance in Guelders. In connection with this, the stadtholder also reshuffled the institutional cards: Hof and Rekenkamer became institutions that really served the interests of the province.​[296]​ The loyalist personnel of these institutions was replaced, like the magistrate of Arnhem for example, with Calvinists and adherents of the Revolt. Such a purge was also conducted in other provinces, but in Guelders this was done by the stadtholder high-handedly while the Estates hesitated. He did not break with tradition completely, however; the Hof retained much of its traditional competencies. 
In hindsight, the stadtholderate of count John marks a turning point in the relation between the Estates and the chancery. He laid the foundations for the symbiosis between the Hof, the city of Arnhem and the standing committee of the Veluwe quarter that would grow in the 1580s; a working arrangement that would make the establishment of a provincial standing committee less necessary in the long term. This was a cooperation of men of the Calvinist religion and strongly committed to the Revolt. Indeed, after 1579 Protestants had effectively taken over the lead of the rebellion in the Northern Netherlands.​[297]​ At the other hand, the Pacification had been the work of a heterogeneous centre-party of moderate men, the so-called middle groups. This were men like Leoninus, who looked for the compromise between king and rebels and tried to maintain the privileges and identity of the various territories as good as possible.​[298]​ Most of them were not Protestant, but were prepared to find a modus vivendi on the subject of religion.​[299]​ However, the years between 1576 and 1580 saw the attempts at moderation and compromise, on the political and religious level, slowly come crashing down.​[300]​ The middle groups eventually ended up in either the loyalist camp, or on the side of the Revolt. These men had, at that moment, often not chosen out of political or principal convictions.​[301]​ So, when circumstances changed, moderates could change sides if necessary. Many men of the Guelders governing elite were such moderates.​[302]​ The choices they made were most of all determined by their personal interests, or what they regarded best for their province, quarter or city. The case study in the next chapter, the Landdag in 1582, also will confirm this. 
	The situation was far from stable in the 1580s. We will see in paragraph two that the steadily worsening conditions of the war were an important reason for this: of all the provinces, warfare was most heavily waged in Guelders.​[303]​ The Netherlands in revolt were split in 1579, when the Pacification de facto collapsed, first by separate unions, then by the fortunes of war. Eventually, the northern provinces abjured Philip II and went their own way. Count John of Nassau, more than anyone else, can be credited for dragging Guelders to their side, the side of the Revolt, and keeping the province there in the long term. However, times were uncertain; many a man was in doubt about the future, about his loyalty to the king and to the old religion.​[304]​ When the fortunes of war seemed increasingly bleak, moderates, above all, came to reconsider their conviction to the rebellion. The first decades of Guelders under the Republic were therefore plagued by three interrelated problems: religion, loyalty and war. During these tumultuous years the Estates of Guelders and the quarter of Veluwe also took some steps in the direction of self-government. 
Count John of Nassau and the purge of the Hof
The Pacification had not done much good for the situation in Guelders. Stadtholder Gilles de Berlaymont, baron of Hierges, left within a month to join Don John of Austria, the newly-appointed governor of the Habsburg Netherlands.​[305]​ This left a power-vacuum in the province.​[306]​ In the face of the Spanish military threat, Guelders suffered from soldiers rampaging the countryside and a chronic lack of money. The administration was in a chaotic condition: the quarters were not able to take decisive action and there was no government on the provincial level other than the chancery that had collaborated with Alba and stayed loyal to the king. 
In the previous decades, the Estates had not been compelled to create a government of their own.​[307]​  Administrative affairs on the provincial level were taken care of by the chancery and judicial issues could dealt with in traditional customary structures, although, as we have seen, the Hof and the Estates quarrelled over boundaries. The Estates had no personnel, not even a secretary, in their service. Everything was arranged in a decentralized way; although the quarters employed no officials of their own either. However, in November 1576 a committee of thirteen delegates was instituted to assist stadtholder Hierges to recruit soldiers and the collect money for the States General.​[308]​ 
Matters became far more complicated after Hierges had left and there was no new stadtholder. The loyal Hof was not trusted, so the Estates did everything themselves: to keep correspondence with other provinces, to recruit soldiers, to send delegates to the Generality et cetera.​[309]​ The Landdag met more often and a new committee of delegates was instituted to cope with the situation.​[310]​ This functioned now, for the first time, not next to the (absent) duke or stadtholder but in his place. The committee, at least thirteen man strong, had a fairly extended instruction. It conducted, in fact, most administrative matters the chancery was usually occupied with. However, the committee was typically in its sort. Just like the earlier attempts in this direction – under duke William of Jülich or in the early years 1560s for instance – the standing committee filled a power vacuum and did not last.  
The vacuum had eventually to be filled with a new stadtholder; the pressing military situation after the lost battle of Gembloux made this even more acute.​[311]​ The prince of Orange declined for the post, but he proposed his brother John instead. He had been present on a Landdag in 1577 on behalf of the rebel government and seems to have made quite an impression. Indeed, when Matthias, archduke of Austria and the newly-appointed – by the States General – governor of the Netherlands, recommended John as a stadtholder, the Landdag accepted him unanimously. The arrival of count John saw the disbandment of the committee of delegates, although he did not work with the loyalist Hof either.​[312]​ The new stadholder was assisted by some delegates of the Estates and his own counsellors. Protestant men like the later historian Van Reyd, and Jacob van Ommeren and Gerhard Voeth.​[313]​ They would play their part in Guelders politics for years to come.
Many historians wondered why a Catholic province like Guelders chose a Calvinist stadtholder.​[314]​ However, if we think of the moderates, it makes more sense. Guelders did not choose for the Revolt out of conviction.​[315]​ Personal considerations and the chaotic circumstances had made the men in power decide for the Pacification. Most members of the Estates were still of the old religion. According to Van Reyd ‘den Provinciaelen Raet [i.e. het Hof] was beter gesint totten coninck, als totte vryheydt van ‘t vaderlant; als ooc de meeste magistraten, sonderling in die hooft-steden. Ende over al was noch de misse ende pausdom in swanc.’​[316]​ However, while the Hof was firmly loyalist, many magistrates appear to have been moderates. They were unsuspected Catholics, appointed by Alba, but opted for the Pacification for the sake of their cities and province. This was a traditional policy: the maintenance of privilege and defence of the interests of the realm. It was in their – and everybody’s – interest to end the chaos caused by the Spanish troops. The Pacification indeed guaranteed the maintenance of Catholicism outside of Holland and Zeeland.​[317]​ The same kind of considerations motivated them to accept John of Nassau. His religion was no obstacle to the Estates, because they needed a strong stadtholder and he held a good reputation in Guelders.​[318]​ Little did they know, that he would be far more than these moderates had wished for.
	Three interrelated processes dominated the stadtholderate of count John and brought him increasingly in conflict with the interests of the Catholic members of the Estates. Firstly, they were not happy with his strivings to institute a kind of religious peace in Guelders (religievrede), so Calvinists would enjoy freedom of worship.​[319]​ The religievrede had in the cities of Holland and Zeeland been a prelude to Calvinist dominance and suppression of the mass: ‘the breakdown of religious peace followed by the abolition of Catholic worship was a familiar pattern in the Netherlands during the early years of the Revolt.’​[320]​ The Estates saw this.​[321]​ Secondly, the stadtholder and his brother tried to include Gelderland in a closer union, that would supersede the Pacification, with Holland and Zeeland and other provinces in the Northern Netherlands. However, a closer union with the proponents of Calvinism seemed to promise religious troubles in their province. The image of Guelders as a buffer for Holland did also not appeal to the Landdag. Lastly, John’s projected elimination of loyalists from government threatened the Catholics in power. 
So, when he stadtholder wanted to make a move against the Court, at a Landdag in Arnhem, early September 1578, the Estates hesitated. Although they had sworn-in count John on the conditions that, among other things, the Hof would be staffed with Geldersmen, who had taken an oath before the Landdag, and that the old instruction would be replaced by a new one,​[322]​ they wanted to discuss matters first. Before the official Landdag began, the capital met privately to discuss both the planned alteration of the Hof and their grievances.​[323]​ The stadtholder had, at the same time, invited delegates from Holland and other provinces to proceed towards the closer union. He began increasingly to fear that the deliberations among the Geldersmen could take ages, so count John used his soldiers to intimidate the representatives. And, when this did not work, he took matters in his own hands and closed the Hof – the Rekenkamer followed some weeks later – on his own. To make matters worse, a local Calvinist minority started to hold services in the city and a mob purged a Catholic church. In this climate, the Landdag did not want to cooperate at all with the projected union-talks. The Estates could not be bullied in submission so easily.
	The closing of the Hof and Rekenkamer was a turning-point for the government of Guelders. Everywhere in the Northern Netherlands the Habsburg courts were curtailed early in the Revolt,​[324]​ But in Guelders the administrative functions were not taken away. The crux here is that for the Estates, who still saw themselves as defenders of privilege rather than a new government, the alteration of the Hof was a matter of the government (hoge overheid).​[325]​ The newly-appointed Court would still act as a replacement of the stadtholder and ‘in Sijn G. plaitz die administratie hebben sullen nae den alden gebruick.’​[326]​ So, they did not protest very heavily, although the stadtholder had acted ‘te haestich ende ylich’,​[327]​ for the monarchical polity could alter its own institutions: it was not their task. The purged Court was shortly afterwards accepted by the hoge overheid, the States General and governor Matthias; all of them retaining the fiction that they were acting in the name of the king.​[328]​ 
The Estates did also not object heavily, because they got their way and could control the Hof to some extent. Count John chose eight new raadsheren out of their nominations.​[329]​ Five nobles were appointed, as well as two law professionals.​[330]​ Three old members returned to service,​[331]​ although the old distinction between customary and ordinary counsellors disappeared. The capital cities could also choose a raadsheer each, although Zutphen and Venlo (capital ad interim) did not. Finally, Joost van Cranevelt, also a suspended raadsheer, was appointed provisional chancellor. Apart from the three re-appointees, the counsellors were Calvinists. The Estates also got their 1565 kanselarij-ordonnantie – that, as we saw, mainly arranged judicial matters – accepted as a new (provisional) instruction.​[332]​ The new-style Hof was now no longer an arm of Habsburg government, but an institution in the service of the land and dependent on the Estates: they nominated candidates for new members and those took their oath before them.​[333]​ The name of the king was even absent from the vow. The Rekenkamer was purged in much the same vein, although it would remain closed until 1580; the Hof fulfilled its tasks in-between.​[334]​ So, in 1578 day-to-day government was entrusted to the reborn Hof, because it did not belong to the traditional occupations of the Estates. They wanted to control the institution to a great extent, it is true, but it would have been strange to take over its political tasks without institutions or funds of their own. The Estates authorized the Hof to run the administration and – if necessary – to settle pressing matters in the presence of some nobles or magistrates living in or around to Arnhem.​[335]​
	The victory over the Court after decades of struggle did, however, not end the conflicts between the Estates and the Hof. Just as before 1566, the instruction would initially be a prime point of friction.​[336]​ The Court desired a new and more clear kanselarij-ordonnantie. The provisory one, a ‘bloote copie’ of the text of 1565,​[337]​ was too vague on some points. Therefore, a heavy committee, appointed by the Landdag in the spring of 1580 to dispense with all kinds of matters, dealt with this issue after earlier complaints by the Hof, ‘beswarende puncten ende artikelen’.​[338]​ The Court wanted, among other things, a new instruction for the closed Audit Office. Moreover, the Hof objected to the idea that its sentences should be executed according to customary law, and – above all – the plans for an institution to revise its verdicts. The committee, however, ruled that the provisory instruction would be maintained until the quarters had decided on it.​[339]​ They even made-up a plan for the institution of appeal: if the parties involved wanted a revision of a sentence of the Court, the Landdag could delegate eight to ten men to deal with this.​[340]​ The Hof protested to the stadtholder sharply, but he could not persuade the committee a few days later.​[341]​ The matter was quietly dropped afterwards,​[342]​ probably due to the pressing conditions of warfare and the departure of count John, only to resurface again in 1582 – as we shall see in the next chapter.   
	In the mean time, the stadtholder worked on his other projects: the union and the furthering of the Calvinist cause. The latter aim came increasingly closer after the tumultuous Landdag of September 1578.​[343]​ In Nijmegen, and other cities as well, Protestant minorities began to employ strong initiatives towards church-organization. They also bombarded count John with petitions for religious concessions. At the same time, in November, the other provinces worked towards a closer union, but the Gueldersmen could, at the Landdagen in November 1578 and January 1579, not become enthusiastic at all for the ‘Hollandse Union’.​[344]​ The mutual irritations were already far beyond mending; the Overkwartier and the quarter of Zutphen even petitioned the States General with complaints about their stadtholder. They shed some crocodile’s tears about the purge of the Hof, but also made clear how count John encouraged Calvinist activity. In the cities where he had placed garrisons, the stadtholder permitted local Protestants to attend the services of the soldiers’ chaplains.​[345]​ 
In this climate of mounting discontent between (often) moderate city magistrates and Calvinist minorities, the military threat in the Overkwartier, where Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma and newly-appointed royal governor of the Netherlands, laid his eyes on some cities, seems to have topped the scales.​[346]​ In the first months of 1579, count John succeeded in altering the magistrates of important cities.​[347]​ In Arnhem and Nijmegen many a victim of Alba’s purge came into power again. Calvinists now peopled the magistrates and, in effect, also the Estates. This did not mean that count John would have an easy time, however. The Estates still worked for the good of the province, rather than the projects of their stadtholder. Moreover, as the developments in the coming years would show, the magistrates that came to power in many cities, notably Nijmegen – where the pre-1566 city council appears to have been moderate and aimed at compromise​[348]​ – and Zutphen, were not die-hard adherents of the Revolt. Only in Arnhem, as we will see below, such a group came on the plush. Therefore, the process to involve Guelders in the now official Union of Utrecht still dragged on.
	The year 1579 would be decisive for the Revolt,​[349]​ although the rifts became very well visible beforehand. The rule of the moderates in the States General had begun to show some serious cracks from 1578 onwards, and the leadership of the prince of Orange increasingly started to crumble.​[350]​ After Don John had taken Namur and the rebel army was defeated at Gembloux, distrust, mainly the fear of loyalists, started to tear the monstrous alliance of Catholics and Protestants apart. Many interrelated processes played their part: social tensions in many cities, the steady advance of Calvinism, the behaviour of radical Protestants, a lack of funds, the unruly behaviour of (foreign) troops and the hesitation of many against war. After the conclusion of the Union of Utrecht, January 1579, the attempts of Orange to contain the rift did no good; malcontents from the southern provinces had united themselves at the same time in Arras.​[351]​ 
The advance of Parma’s army and his diplomatic victories – he conducted a treaty with the malcontent provinces in May – also made clear the divisions within the rebel-party. Certainly after the peace negotiations with representatives of the king, conducted in Cologne, collapsed in the fall of 1579, the moderates had to choose. Would they remain in Revolt under increasing Protestant leadership, or would they stay neutral and in the near future reconcile with the king? Leoninus eventually chose for the first option after the ill-fated negotiations: ‘(…) nae die tijd [de onderhandelingen te Keulen] heb ik alle hoope van versoeninge, die ik te vooren soo vast gesteld had, van mij weggeworpen. Daer over heb ik meenigmael geklaegd aen mijne vrienden; en ’t heeft mij ten uijterste verdrooten, dat alle deese ongemakken den Koning overgekomen waeren, hoewel het meest syn eijge schuld geweest is.’​[352]​ 
	The inclusion of Guelders in the Union of Utrecht laid, in hindsight, the fundament for its enduring place in the Republic.​[353]​ When stadholder John of Nassau signed the Union on behalf of his province, he was not authorized to do this, and neither were the four delegates of the Ridderschap who did the same. It took the stadtholder a lot of pressure to persuade the capitals, even though their magistrates had been purged.​[354]​ The military pressure on the Overkwartier made them slowly realise that war was on their doorstep and that Guelders could not wage it alone. However, when the stadtholder wanted to garrison cities in the face of the threat, the ones outside the upper quarter refused.​[355]​ Eventually, the capitals, and their quarters with them, joined the Union in the spring of 1579 under the explicit conditions that their privileges and rights would not be harmed. Zutphen, where the magistrate was very conservative until well into the 1580s,​[356]​ joined a year later. Count John left Guelders a few months afterwards and he did not return.​[357]​ The stadtholder was tired of the affairs of Gelderland – he called them a labyrinth; he was often not paid on time and other personal and political motivations played their part. John of Nassau did not know, however, that he laid the foundations that would keep the province in the Revolt.

Guelders in the early 1580s
The years between 1580 and 1590 were very heavy for Guelders, although the situation had already been bad previously.​[358]​ The cities of Zutphen (1583-1591) and Nijmegen (1585-1591) were temporary occupied by the enemy and the Overkwartier was definitively lost in this decade.​[359]​ The hardship made many a moderate doubt if he had chosen the right side. Perhaps surprisingly, these developments did not make the Estates return to their lawful sovereign: the political and religious basis count John had laid, prevented it in the long run, but it was a close call. During the tumultuous years of the 1580s, Guelders remained definitively within the orbit of the Revolt.​[360]​ The Abjuration of Philip II was accepted in Gelderland and the province took the duke of Anjou as its new head. The abjuration was an important step in the long process that saw sovereignty slowly become vested in the provincial Estates of the Republic. In these circumstances, the Landdag – or better: the quarters – took, within the frames of tradition, careful first steps in the direction of self-government, although without building much of an institutional framework. In Arnhem an alliance of Protestants and committed adherents of the Revolt developed in the process; an important reason for the strange institutional development in the late sixteenth century. In the province at large three interrelated processes – loyalty, religion and warfare –  were at work. These themes constantly interacted during the early 1580s; they form the background for the Landdag of 1582, analysed in the next chapter.
The abjuration of Philip II had become necessary in 1581. After the abortive peace negotiations and the successes of Parma, the rebels needed protection from abroad.​[361]​ The prince of Orange opted for François of Valois, duke of Anjou and Alançon (1555-1584), brother of the king of France. Although most provincial Estates were not keen on accepting this ambitious man, who doubtlessly would not be satisfied with the limited role they had in mind for him, Orange finally convinced them.​[362]​ When the new sovereign was to be sworn-in, the old one should be abjured. This indeed happened on July the 26th 1581 by way of the Plakkaat van Verlatinghe. Anjou had already been accepted five months before. On the basis of its ties with the Empire, Guelders did not accept him so easily.​[363]​ The province would, as we shall see below, finally do this after more than a year, in 1582. 
According to De Meester after the abjuration ‘de Koning [was] van zijne regten vervallen verklaard en Gelderland zonder heer. Der Staten werk was dus thans afgeloopen. Zij waren daargesteld als tegenwigt van den heer, zijne magt kwam aan hen.’​[364]​ The issue of sovereignty was, however, not settled so easily. The power constellation of the Republic was still in formation in the late sixteenth century. The Generality needed a leader, although only on the basis of limited sovereignty.​[365]​ Anjou was sworn in this way. He would be the last duke of Guelders. After his short and dismal reign, the States General first looked at Orange as new head of state, but he was assassinated in 1584. Eventually Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, became Governor-General in 1585, again on limited conditions. Only after Leicester had left, in the winter of 1587, the issue of sovereignty became slowly instituted in the provincial Estates. This was the outcome of a process, at work from the mid-1570s onwards, eventually determined by the absence of a strong central authority in the Republic and the balance of power, both between and within the provinces.​[366]​ In Guelders, the real authority laid with the quarters; the convoked Ridderschappen and voting cities. Although the Landdag had legislative power itself, the Quarter Estates slowly took over the absolute ducal authority in the province.​[367]​ 
After the departure of John of Nassau, Guelders was for more than a year (July 1580 – October 1581) stadtholderless. This power vacuum was, however, not filled by a committee of Delegated States from the Landdag, although the assembly gathered often in 1581.​[368]​ At first, the Hof was left with the matters of government. Apparently, the Estates could entrust this business to the Court without close supervision. The Landdag can, at the other hand, have been paralysed by the conflicts of religion and loyalty. The loyalty of the Court could be trusted now. The institution had lost its three Catholic counsellors in February 1580, when Parma ordered the Guelders Chancery to move to Roermond.​[369]​ Van Craneveld, Stalbergen and Van Berck followed this order and left Arnhem. In the summer of 1580 the number of counsellors of the Arnhem-based Hof stood at ten: one from the Overkwartier and three from every other quarter,​[370]​ all of them members trusted adherents of the Revolt. The counsellors held a position of power within the province: they were involved in all matters of government and some of them sat in the Landdag, most as members of the Ridderschap.​[371]​ These men, like Bartholdt van Gendt came to dominate the political scene in the years to come. Leoninus was appointed chancellor about a year later.​[372]​ His presence certainly gave the Estates extra confidence in the Hof, for he had always been ready to help Guelders and continued to do so until his death. His appointment somewhat assured the States General and Orange that Guelders would remain in the Revolt at the same time.​[373]​ 
In 1580 another branch of government was instituted next to the Hof; October the 5th the Quarter Estates of Veluwe established a standing committee.​[374]​ This marked a new step in the process of development of the quarters; a development from entities with a traditional mostly representative purpose to administrative institutions that retained their old representative function. To cover the expenses, and to meet their provincial quota, the quarters had to start cooperating internally. The erection of a committee of Delegated Quarter Estates can be seen in the light of a desire to better monitor the collection of taxes in the days of mounting (costs of) warfare.​[375]​ The development also indicates the desires, on behalf of the Quarter Estates, to keep track of the daily business when they were not together and to diminish the number of their own meetings.​[376]​ The committee was composed of two members of the Ridderschap, Carl van Arnhem and Herman van der Hell, and the city-based noble Carl van Gelder on behalf of Arnhem.​[377]​ They had to communicate with the Hof in matters of war and the delegates had the right to act in pressing matters, although the most important decisions could not be taken without approval of the full quarter assembly. 
According to K.W.J. Peeneman the Delegate Quarter Estates – Zutphen and Nijmegen would develop such committees in respectively 1592 and 1605 – were no institutions for day-to day administration, at least not according to their instructions.​[378]​ The Standing Committee of the Veluwe did, however, not immediately get a clear written instruction. Probably because their tasks were only vaguely set-out, and due to the crisis situation, they could act almost as an executive. This becomes clear from the sources (of 1582): they conducted correspondence with the outside world on behalf of the quarter, for instance.​[379]​ The committee also acted as an intermediate between the quarters and the Hof and as an institution that was – next to the chancery – addressed in important matters.​[380]​ In fact, the delegates, although they usually sat for about a year, were like the Hof very well informed in quarter and provincial matters. They were also often recruited out of the same small pool of men living in or around Arnhem and who were present at quarter meetings often.​[381]​ If these men were not members of the permanent commission, they often fulfilled ad hoc tasks for the quarter. Over the years the Delegated Quarter Estates were entrusted with all kind of other tasks: execution of quarter resolutions, dealing with routine business at Kwartierdagen, all matters concerning the Generale Middelen (General Means), paying soldiers on the quarter’s repartition and judicial tasks in the latter two areas.​[382]​ The image of the early 1580s is one of close cooperation between the Hof, the Delegated Quarter Estates of Veluwe and the Arnhem magistrate; all Protestants committed to the Revolt.​[383]​ These bonds grew even stronger when Hof, Rekenkamer and the Veluwe Standing Committee began working together in the field of the confiscated church property (geestelijke goederen) of the quarter in the 1590s.​[384]​ 
	The Landdag eventually chose a new stadtholder, Willem IV count van den Bergh, on October 7th 1581.​[385]​ His election was a sign that many members of the Estates were not happy with the unbridled rise of Calvinism that has been instigated by John of Nassau. The other candidate, Adolf count of Nieuwenaar, Meurs and Limburg (1545-1589), was a staunch German Protestant, while Van den Bergh was a far less fanatic Calvinist.​[386]​ The choice was therefore a signal from the Guelders middle groups towards the Protestant Arnhem-clique, who had opted for Willem Lodewijk of Nassau a son of count John.​[387]​ The moderates were undoubtedly encouraged by the support Leoninus gave to van den Bergh, while the prince of Orange also – lukewarmly – recommended his brother-in-law.​[388]​  
His reign was no strong one. According to Van Reyd, the inhabitants did not take him too seriously as a stadtholder.​[389]​ Arend van Slichtenhorst describes him as a stadtholder ‘(…) die noch het verstand noch de wille had om de geneene zaek in dese zorghelijke tijden wijsselijken te bestuyren.’​[390]​ Anyway, he was mostly occupied with the warfare in the province, so the Hof ran the daily administration. A “weak” stadtholder did mean that the Quarter Estates and the cities remained involved in government. Van den Bergh was, however, no loyal adherent of the Revolt. He tried to get Guelders to make peace with the king in 1583, but he did not succeed. Powerful interference of Leoninus and the Hof, in accordance with the magistrate of Arnhem, who arrested the stadtholder, held Guelders in the Revolt.​[391]​
The story of Van den Bergh’s stadtholderate was interwoven with the three main troubles in Guelders in the 1580s. Firstly, the loyalty of the province, an important concern of the Generality. The revolt of George de Lalaing, count of Rennenberg, and stadtholder of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, Lingen and Overijssel, opened a second front in the north-east in 1580.​[392]​ Military threat made Guelders vulnerable, especially during the power vaccuum. The States General had sent Leoninus to inquire ‘oft zy simpelijck met ganscher herten zonder simulatie ende metter wercke de gemeyne saecke van de Generale Staten willen assisteren ende helpen met raet, lijff ende goet als goede patriotten.’​[393]​ His undertaking was certainly necessary, because the province was torn by conflicts. Catholics and Calvinists collided on the streets, and in the Estates as well, as did loyalists and men fully committed to the Revolt.​[394]​ Mistrust was very common within both the local communities and the quarters, and as a consequence also in the Estates. The city of Tiel, for instance, had been altered in 1579 but would be suspected of loyalist sympathies for years.​[395]​ Furthermore, the abjuration made it necessary for all officials to swear an oath of fidelity to the new rule of the States General.​[396]​ Soon, the Landdag authorized a committee to take care of this. This placed many men, certainly not just the loyalists, for a conflict of conscience, because it was a big and emotional step. It was, however, necessary if one wanted to remain active in government. This had as a result that many moderates took the vow, but, if personal or military matters shifted their interests, they would not always keep it.​[397]​ 
Local or regional interests, strengthened by the fear of warfare, could make loyalties shift. The case of Nijmegen is a good example of this: in the early 1580s, the city became increasingly disappointed with the situation.​[398]​ The Union did not seem to serve its interests and peace was not forthcoming. There was also a strong Catholic majority present within the walls. The Calvinist, but moderate, magistrate was therefore mainly concerned with the interests of the city when Nijmegen opened its gates to the forces of Parma in 1585. Even the Calvinist city councils were not automatically fanatically loyal to the Revolt: the best interests of the community came first.​[399]​ Nevertheless, the core-group of Calvinist magistrates and Protestant nobles,​[400]​ especially around Arnhem, continued to support the Revolt within the Estates during these tumultuous years.
Secondly, the religious issues strengthened instability. In all important Guelders cities the pattern the old magistrate had feared – religievrede ending in suppression of Catholicism – came true.​[401]​ In Arnhem, a reactionary attempt to overthrow the new magistrate – provisional chancellor Van Craneveld was even involved – ruined the Catholic perspectives; the papists did not even have a church left in 1580. In Nijmegen the mass was banned in the same year. The Reformation of the countryside took far more time, however; not in the last place due to the fortunes of war.​[402]​ Spanish occupation meant suppression of the new religion. Moreover, Protestants were in danger when such an event occurred. In relatively stable times municipal magistrates led the way in the Reformation of the countryside.​[403]​ At the same time, church property was confiscated everywhere. The Estates began also to interfere with confessional matters from 1580 onwards: they published placards against the old religion (first in 1582) and decided about the confiscated church property. The first Guelders synod met already in August 1579. Another one – gathered in June 1582 – preached that God’s wrath would come down on Guelders even more than already was the case.​[404]​ Indeed, the horrors of war would vastly increase in the coming years. 
The continuous warfare, the third key problem, reinforced the above-mentioned processes. Two fronts, in north-east after the revolt of Rennenberg and in the south after Parma took Maastricht (1579), closed in on Guelders.​[405]​ The Overkwartier suffered, while the quarter of Zutphen was also invaded. The situation differed from month to month and from one place to another, but it was nowhere good.​[406]​ Troops from both sides were almost chronically underpaid and enforced their wages from local peasants. The cities also had to pay in order to have their countryside spared. Moreover, garrisons were a heavy burden for the burghers; Venlo even ousted its troops in 1581.​[407]​ All this hardship encouraged economic crisis,​[408]​ so it became very hard for the quarters to pay their quotas to the Generality. The money was badly needed in order to pay these unruly troops, however.​[409]​ One solution was to let the soldiers collect contributions themselves.​[410]​ This way of taxation became common in the frontier-regions in the 1580s, but it meant still an extra burden for the population. Residents of some regions fled to neutral ground or towns. The ambt of Epe in 1582 provides a sad example: ‘Het ambt Eep wort heel desolaet (…) alsoe datter nicht oder gans weinich in denselven heelen ambt Eepe geseit en wordt.’​[411]​ It is not surprising that in such circumstances local government tried to keep troops out if possible – in the next chapter such a case will be discussed. When the burden of war became too heavy for the local population they could also revolt. Indeed, in March 1580 peasants in the Zutphen quarter, encouraged by malcontent nobles, turned on the Generality troops and were defeated.​[412]​ 
These uncertain conditions made the issue of loyalty more acute; it was sometimes better to step to the other side, as was the case with Nijmegen in 1585, and Zutphen as well two years earlier. Cities sometimes changed hands multiple times. For example, Hattem in the quarter of Veluwe was betrayed to Rennenberg by a local official. Surrounding cities immediately started a siege and liberated the town a few days later. The perpetrator and his son were imprisoned: ‘daerna de Staten van Gelderlant sijn process hebben gemaeckt, en hem met sijnen soone Willem doen onthalsen ende quartieren, uyt oorsaecken dat sy vooren den Staten Eedt van getrouwicheyt gedaen hadden.’​[413]​ In these turbulent times justice could be harsh, but expeditiously.



















IV. The Landdag of 1582

‘die vanden quartier van Nijmegen [hebben] (…) etzlijke vuele nyeuwe articulen (…) vuergebracht, willende niet toe laten, dat id recess gesloten werdt, vuer ende aleer dieselve punten (…) mede afgedean ende geresolviert zijn.’​[414]​

These are the words of secretary Wetthen, part of the delegation of the city of Arnhem at the Landdag of 1582. He was shocked, as doubtlessly many others were. A group of men from the quarter of Nijmegen roughly broke with custom in order to discuss some rather radical points, and quarter matters as well. After this intermission, the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe refused to attend and decide on the new agenda. The Overkwartier stayed, however, to resolve matters together. The two indignant quarters, and the Hof, protested again afterwards and eventually the resolutions of the “illegal” Landdag were not put into effect.​[415]​ 
The reactions, however, provide a unique insight in the opinions of the various quarters. These will be analysed with a focus on matters concerning the Hof and the Delegate States; fundamental issues regarding the institutional history of Guelders in these formative years. Local and regional interests played a vital part in the decision-making process and the points at the “unlawful” agenda, but the matter also recalls the dualism between Estates and chancery. The three general themes of the Revolt in Guelders – loyalty, religion and war – interacted with these provincial conflicts. But most importantly, the men behind the “illegal” Landdag can be identified as moderates trying to thwart the influence of the fanatic adherents of the Revolt, the Hof and city of Arnhem. 
At the same time, this case study will show that it is possible, to a good extent, to reconstruct a meeting of the Estates on the basis of various sources. In this way, the Landdag becomes more than a rather abstract meeting we only know on the basis of its resolutions: we catch a glimpse of real men who sat, drank and discussed with one another. To provide some background, the working of the Landdag in the late sixteenth century in general will be presented on the basis of the scarce literature and my findings. The prelude to the 1582 meeting will be discussed thereafter; herein we can already find some seeds of discontent. In paragraph three and four the actual Landdag will be analysed, with an emphasis on the “illegal” part. Although it is not entirely possible to identify the interest groups behind the new agenda, their motives can be made clear to a good extent. For the parties both general and local interests played their part. This had implications for the projected position of the Hof and the establishing of a standing committee, but they were also an integral part of Guelders political culture. The last paragraph discusses the aftermath of the explosive meetings.  

How did a  Landdag work?                        
‘(…) we still need to have at our disposal more elementary data than we have about the actual activities of assemblies.’​[416]​ Blockmans wrote this in 1998, but for Guelders this is still true. Almost nothing is known about actual activities, and the related issue of organization, of the Landdag before the eighteenth century. Therefore broad sketches remain, short overviews often analyze the complete ancien régime, as if the meetings of the Estates were a static institution.​[417]​ The ‘groote soepelheid onzer staatsinstellingen in die dagen’ is overlooked in this way.​[418]​ The Estates became the sovereign de facto in 1581 and had to develop their organization to meet new administrative requirements. The Landdag slowly formed its procedures between 1581 and 1643.​[419]​ If we want to know more about this, research in instructions and correspondence, and most of all the Landdagsrecessen, over a long stretch of time is necessary: ‘de formele werkwijze van de Staten [van Gelre] kan men nauwkeurig leren kennen uit de Landdagsrecessen’.​[420]​ To create some background to the case-study this topic will be assessed, on the basis of the scarce literature and some of my findings, for the early 1580s. 
The Landdag under the Republic is often regarded as an (increasingly) unworkable, slow and tardy institution, where decision-making was confused and dominated by the nobility.​[421]​ I agree with Tracy, however, that ‘the mere fact that an opinion is (…) often repeated is perhaps enough reason for calling it into question.’​[422]​ Especially, if it is not firmly based on primary sources. Nevertheless, there is doubtless some truth in such statements. Stadtholder John of Nassau complained, for instance, in 1580 that ‘nit fruchtbarlichs resoliert is worden’.​[423]​ In the early 1580s the Hof lamented that ‘op vele gehaldene lantdagen seer wenich tot vordell deser lantschaften uutgericht [is]’ and that discussions there were rather conducted with ‘onlustige herten en scherpe woorden dan met goeden raad en vriendelijk bericht’.​[424]​ The institutional development of the Estates in this time of reorientation should, however, be carefully put in the context of the tumultuous times of revolt.​[425]​ 
In essence, the Landdag was a conference of the three Quarter Estates,​[426]​ so an analysis of the Estates should start there. The assemblies of the various quarters resembled each other strongly: each meeting had two votes, one for the Ridderschap and one for the cities.​[427]​ Only the quarter meeting of Zutphen had, until well into the 1580s, three, because the bannerets, mentioned in the previous chapter, were present there as a group of autonomous lords. The Quarter Estates came together both during the Landdag and on their own.​[428]​ The capital cities convoked, and hosted, the meetings as often as the parties felt necessary.​[429]​ 
Few research has been conducted into quarter assemblies; only for the Veluwe is clear what the Kwartierdag actually did.​[430]​ After a convocation, nobles –often attending in disappointingly small numbers – and city delegates came to Arnhem. They had to decide about all kinds of issues, relevant for the quarter. The Quarter Estates had legislative, executive and supervisory tasks. Representatives of the cities sometimes held preparatory meetings before the quarter assembled. The oldest mayor of the hosting city chaired the meeting, but the nobility dominated it.​[431]​ The two estates deliberated separately about the issues at hand and, after having decided by vote, they communicated their opinion with the other. The resolutions of the Kwartierdag were written down in the recessen. The Estates met about seven times a year and when they were not together important tasks were delegated to unsalaried ad hoc committees, chosen from their midst. These continued to function next to the, in 1580 instituted, Delegated Quarter Estates. 
The Landdag resembled the quarter assemblies in many respects; this makes sense, of course, because it was an assembly of their meetings. Governing was the art of balancing in Guelders. In almost all committees, delegations and boards a meticulous equilibrium was kept between the quarters, members of the nobility and city representatives.​[432]​ There was no capital city, no fixed meeting-place, almost no central institutions or revenues and no archive. The structure of the Landdag developed slowly in the late sixteenth century, mostly based on the traditional procedures.
Under Habsburg rule two sorts of meetings existed. The duke sometimes convoked the Estates to ask for money, but the frequency was low because the government wanted to prevent the formulation of grievances. The other traditional kind of meeting was more common. The Estates, or some members like the capitals, met at their own behalf when they considered it to be in their best interests.​[433]​ Although such unregulated forms of contact doubtlessly persisted under the Republic, the difference receded to the background. The Landdag became some sort of mix of both traditions of representation. 
The Landdag was convoked according to necessity and the frequency differed per year.​[434]​ The Estates met, for instance, six times in 1581, but just once in 1582. The spring and autumn meetings had become somewhat standard, but not completely fixed. The parties involved wanted to keep the number of meetings limited, because it cost them money and time, and traveling was dangerous in times of war. Traditionally, members received no attendance fee, but the duke paid the expenses of the organization.​[435]​ Under the Republic, the Estates had at first neither a financial administration of their own, nor an income. However, soon the revenues from the ducal domains were used to meet expenses of provincial government, but they were not employed to cover the expenses of the Landdag.​[436]​ The members of the Estates were nobles and city magistrates, men of means. It seems therefore likely that after 1581 – at least at first – still no attendance fees were paid and that the city hosting the Landdag paid its expenses.​[437]​ 
The stadtholder, or the Hof on his behalf, convoked the Landdag like under Habsburg government, but single quarters could now request a meeting at the chancery.​[438]​ The cities with a vote and all members of the Ridderschap received an official invitation.​[439]​ After 1591, the capitals hosted the meetings in turn, but between 1543 and 1591 the Estates met in Arnhem about half of the time.​[440]​ Sometimes, as had been the case traditionally, delegates of the capitals or other members met before the official meeting. From the 1590s onwards the Landdag lost some of its members: the bannerets – because they remained loyal to the king – and the representatives of the Overkwartier, that was lost in the war, did not come any more. Already from 1580 onwards less and less delegates from the quarter of Roermond came due to the dangerous and unstable situation.​[441]​ Smaller cities did often not send representatives to the meetings – mainly because the expenses were too high – and authorized their capital.  
The agenda of the meeting of the Estates was composed by the Hof, as an executive on top of all important provincial business. Traditionally, a representative of the duke had presented a list of requests, but now the chancellor, or in his absence the oldest counselor, addressed the assembly and read out the propositie (list of propositions, the agenda).​[442]​ The Landdag decided – or tried to do so – on the proposals. Its competence stretched over a range of issues: reports from delegates residing in Generality institutions, the appointment of new representatives in their place, documents composed by outside parties like the Audit Office, all kinds of issues and requests of provincial or local importance (pensions for example) et cetera.​[443]​ 
Some practices, not completely institutionalized in the late sixteenth century, slowly became fixed habits.​[444]​ The meeting was opened with a prayer.​[445]​ Thereafter, the chancellor addressed the representatives and read out the propositions. This was done in full session.​[446]​ Not for every meeting in the early years a propositie is left – or there was no-one at all – but the document was included with the recessen later on. The same applies for a list of attendants (comparantenlijst), although it is doubtful that, even when there is one left, all the representatives stayed the entire Landdag. Their presence was costly, most of all for nobles who could also not be missed at their power base. Furthermore, city delegates had often to refer back (ruggespraak) to their principals in important matters. People could also be late. The members of the Court left the meeting after the address and proposition, although a counselor could stay if he was also a member of the Ridderschap or a magistrate. In general no-one outside the members of the Estates could take part in their meetings unless he was invited. Representatives of the cities needed letters of commission, that were read out at the start of the meeting, and it also seems that everyone who came in had to take an oath.​[447]​ 
How the quarters exactly deliberated together in the 1580s is not known (yet). Somewhat later it became normal to appoint six delegates per quarter (gedeputeerden ad causas), who sat at the central table, the landschapstafel, while the others stood around.​[448]​ The sessions were probably not chaired by the stadtholder.​[449]​ Instead, or so it would institutionalize itself over the years, the Estates chose three directors (directeuren), to speak for the quarters; the viscount of Nijmegen would preside the meeting.​[450]​ John of Nassau may have laid the foundations for this tradition. April 20th 1580, the stadtholder proposed that the Landdag should nominate five men – one for every quarter and one for the bannerets – to speak for the quarters and to preside the meeting in turn.​[451]​ All matters of importance were first discussed by the quarters among themselves. For this purpose, every town hall had separate rooms for their private deliberations. Thereafter spokesmen brought about the opinion at the central table where the quarters discussed together. Every quarter had one vote. It is not entirely clear whether all matters were decided by majority-vote,​[452]​ although this would become standard in the seventeenth century – except for matters of taxation. 
The decision-making process could be very diverse. If the Estates did not deal with an issue at the table directly, they could compose a committee ad hoc to work matters out, or pass it through to “specialists” like the Hof or Audit office. The Landdag could also ask outside parties, or quarter assemblies, for advice. Furthermore, a small group of delegates could be authorized to deal with standard matters. When the Estates decided on a matter, this was written-down by the secretary in loco, the primary scribe of the hosting town; he compiled the recessen. Eventually, when every issue was dealt with in one way or another – this does not mean there was agreement on everything – the recessen were read out, so everyone could agree with their contents.​[453]​ This was sometimes done in the last but one session. In that case, the Estates authorized some men, or the hosting quarter, to deal with routine matters. The last day was then also used for quarter matters.​[454]​ Finally, the resolutions were closed and signed by the secretary in loco. Thereafter the Estates receded and the meeting was over. Secretaries of the other quarters then copied the resolutions, and later on these were copied for cities and institutions like the Hof.​[455]​ The duration of the meetings differed according to the number of points under discussion and the extent of the differences between the quarters; some lasted ten days or more, while others were settled in just one.
The decision-making process could be very slow and frustrating, especially if city-delegates had to refer-back often. However, especially in the light of the chaotic circumstances of the 1580s, good measures were taken these days.​[456]​ The Estates also tried to deal with organizational points of friction. In 1581, they introduced a timeframe: meetings would start at 8.30 and end at 16.00, with a break between 11:00 and 13:30.​[457]​ Everyone who showed-up late had to provide a jar of wine. Moreover, some propositions made on behalf of the Nijmegen quarter on the Landdag of 1582 point at the desire to cure organizational problems. First of all, the recessen would only be legitimate as they were signed by all members of the Estates or marked with a seal of the host city. Moreover, attendants had to come to the Landdag the night before, so the meeting could start the next morning and (hopefully) lest only three or four days. For the same reason, and to reduce the practice of ruggespraak, fixed preparatory meetings about the agenda among representatives of the quarters were proposed; the Hof had to send the proposition in advance to the capitals. Finally, members of the Ridderschap had to show-up in person, under the condition that their possessions would not suffer from billeting. If a nobleman should decide not to come, he would be fined and, if it happened twice in succession, he would be dropped from the Ridderschap.​[458]​ These points, although probably not put into effect because of the disputed nature of the Landdag, indicate some points of friction felt by contemporaries. They provide therefore some information about the practice of the Estates. Now we will turn to the interesting meeting in the summer of 1582.

The Landdag delayed 
In the first months of 1582 two interrelated issues dominated the political scene of Gelderland: the introduction of General Means or Consumptions (Generale Middelen, Consumptiën) and the presence of English mercenaries under the command of Sir John Norris. These problems bothered the Landdag in different ways. Both issues created ill feelings between the Hof and the Nijmegen quarter, and the presence of the troops also delayed the meeting. The chancery acted as an intermediate between the Landraad (Council of the Lands) and the quarters and this did its popularity few good.​[459]​ At the background, we should not forget, the Spanish threat continued to play an important role. These were tumultuous and uncertain times, made worse by the plague that hit Arnhem, and probably other cities as well.​[460]​ 
At the previous Landdag, held in November and December 1581, the quarter of Nijmegen had finally agreed with the collection of the Generale Middelen in its area.​[461]​ These consisted of a set of excise taxes on a number of consumer goods and means of production, livestock for example. The Generality preferred these taxes to fulfil provincial quotas. Their introduction in Guelders had been tiresome, but in the winter of 1581 the die seems to have been cast. The quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe were also working on it and the Overkwartier declared itself willing to do the same when the worst troubles of war were over.​[462]​ To introduce the means in the Nijmegen quarter, the Estates delegated three raadsheren –  Barthold van Gendt, lord of Loenen, Jelis Pieck, lord of Enspijk and Arndt van Boonenburch named Honstein, lord of Ubbergen. In the process, they had to administer the oath of fidelity to the new Republic, that all government officials had to take after the abjuration.​[463]​ The big trouble-maker in these matters was – quite unsurprisingly – the town of Zaltbommel, that from 1572 onwards stood directly under the prince of Orange. The magistrate used this position mainly to show that the city should not be included in the provincial contribution – so, by implication the others had to pay more – and that it did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Court and Audit Office.​[464]​ The Estates therefore appointed the aforementioned delegates, all members of the Hof, expressly in their own name.​[465]​ The commission failed, nonetheless. The cities of Zaltbommel and Tiel, that became also increasingly unruly, first stalled matters and eventually refused the introduction of the means until the soldiers in the area were gone.​[466]​ Little did they know, these soldiers were peanuts compared to the Norris’ troops.
The failed commission brought about nasty complications. As long as the officials in the quarter did not swear the oath, mutual mistrust would grow. Moreover, faced with the obstinate behaviour of Zaltbommel and Tiel, the city Nijmegen also hesitated about the oath and the new taxes; it did not want to pay and find out afterwards the rest had not chipped in.​[467]​ Trouble was that the proud imperial city acted as an example for the whole of Guelders. If it did not take the oath, Arnhem and Zutphen refrained from doing it, and towns like Tiel would also refuse because their capital had not yet done it.​[468]​ So, the Hof pressed the city to swear the oath. Fortunately, the Quarter Estates of Veluwe decided to introduce the Means per April 23rd.​[469]​ However, the Overkwartier and the quarter of Zutphen did not yet take further steps in the same direction. A new delegation into the Nijmegen quarter was also not forthcoming, because Van Gendt refused to be part of it.​[470]​ The introduction of the means thus seemed to be deadlocked now and the raadsheren had suffered loss of face in their “own” quarter. 
The discontent and mistrust was strengthened by the increasingly deteriorating military situation.​[471]​ In the Overkwartier problems were most pressing; without help the quarter would ‘in die uyterste verdeffnus und undergang gebracht worde.’​[472]​ The Spanish threat was heavy and provisions and, most of all, money were necessary to satisfy the underpaid Generality-troops. The Veluwe also was in turmoil. Roads were unsafe, because of roaming troops from both sides. Matters even got so far, that the delegates of the town of Elburg, on their way to a Veluwe quarter meeting, were kidnapped on April 8th.​[473]​ The band of soldiers captured them, demanded a ransom, but, because there was confusion about who would pay it, they were still imprisoned in December!​[474]​ The population of the city of Zutphen, fed up with soldiers who stole their cattle, revolted against the local garrison.​[475]​ Most hardship, however, came from the troops of Norris, who fought for the Republic at the north-eastern front. Because provinces like Guelders did not pay their quotas in time, underpaid troops were to get it themselves. This is exactly what happened on the Veluwe in the spring of 1582.​[476]​ The Landraad had warned beforehand that if taxes would not be paid on time it ‘niet mogelijc en sal wesen desen aenstaenden somer niet alleen jegens den vijandt iet vorderlix te doen uytrichten; maer (…) dat ‘d ene provicie der Bondgenoten voor, ende de andere nae tot haaren grooten leetwesen van haere eijgen ruijteren ende knechten verwoost ende grondelijc bedorven sullen worden’.​[477]​ It did not help much, so the Council eventually came up with the idea to send Norris and his soldiers to Brabant to assist Anjou with a future offensive.​[478]​ Before the troops could leave they had to be paid, however.
The payment of the English soldiers took precious time and their eventual retreat irritated the Nijmegen quarter strongly. The quarter of Veluwe did its best to obtain money to get rid of the troops; the Hof approved the mortgaging of domains or church property, but eventually the matter was arranged by way of a loan.​[479]​ Nevertheless, the other quarters also had to pay, because nobody had met his quota beforehand. The Chancery was the intermediate between the Landraad and the defaulters in this process. On the 4th of May the Hof put the pressure on Nijmegen to get the quarter to pay 5500 guilders above their monthly contribution, otherwise the troops of Norris would come and get it themselves.​[480]​ It was pure, although not uncommon, blackmail; if the local ambten paid-up and the quarter met its quota, the soldiers would not pass through the area. Therefore, when the regions did not seem keen on paying, the chancery bombarded them with letters to make haste, because otherwise the English would come and create ‘thot duysentmaligen meerderen verderff dan dese geforderde penninghen bedreagen.’​[481]​ There was a good reason to hurry, because on May 14th the stadtholder announced a Landdag.​[482]​ The meeting had to take place in Nijmegen at the 3rd of June and important matters were on the agenda: the report of the Guelders delegates with the States General, tax matters and (finally) the acceptation of the duke of Anjou. 
However, soon it became clear that the issue of the English troops would hamper the projected meeting of the Estates. The money did not come in as soon as the Hof hoped and the city of Nijmegen was even pressed to raise an extra sum of 6000 guilders to get rid of them quickly.​[483]​ When, on May 18th, it became clear that the soldiers were leaving the Veluwe, the quarter of Nijmegen was struck with panic: they were heading for their area.​[484]​ The magistrate of Tiel was infuriated: they had paid the extra amount in order to be secured from the passing mercenaries and now it seemed if they still would fall victim to them.​[485]​ In anger, the city magistrates declared that they would not be able to pay future contributions if Norris’ men ravaged their lands. They also refused to come to the Landdag. In the mean time, some small towns on the Veluwe – Wageningen, Hattem and Elburg – had let Arnhem know they would not come to the meeting of the Estates of Guelders, because it was too unsafe to travel while the last English troops were still bumming around.​[486]​
So, when the Estates would have met, on the 3rd of June, there was no gathering. The next day, probably in Arnhem, the Hof and members of the Estates discussed the problem of the English troops with the Landraad.​[487]​ The representatives of the province were rather unanimous: the troops had to go as soon as possible. The Council agreed and apparently decided to send them to Brabant via the Betuwe. On the 8th, the Hof sent a optimist letter to the city of Arnhem. Now the troops had left the area, the Landdag could go ahead in four days.​[488]​ However, they probably forgot to fill in the stadtholder about the route the English troops would take, for he wrote an alarming letter to the chancery.​[489]​ The soldiers were ready to cross the Rhine at IJsseloord – they had confiscated a peat ship – and wanted to enter the Over-Betuwe. When they did so, a new round of irritation started. Now the town of Zaltbommel and the nobles from the Tieler- and Bommelwaard and Beesd en Rhenoy were furious at the Hof.​[490]​ They declared that monthly quotas would not ever be paid again if matters were to be like this. Moreover, the Landdag would be boycotted – until the troops would be gone anyway. 
As a result the Estates did not meet on the 12th either. Representatives already gathered in Nijmegen had to wait. Among them was a four men strong delegation of the Arnhem magistrate and probably also some representatives of the Veluwe quarter.​[491]​ The delay was annoying and very costly;​[492]​ most of all for the nobles who came on their own expenses and missed out on the business at home. On the 16th, the stadtholder, as impatient as everyone else, urged the nobles from various ambten in the quarter of Nijmegen, and the town Zaltbommel as well, to come to the Landdag.​[493]​ Their presence was highly necessary, because matters of taxation had to be agreed on in the biggest assembly as possible; even chronic absentees as unruly Zaltbommel had to come.​[494]​ It was, at the other hand, in their own interests to attend, to anticipate a fait accompli. Chancellor Leoninus was also present in Nijmegen. Although, during the early 1580s, he resided with the Generality most of the time, Leoninus had made some room in his busy schedule and came to Guelders.​[495]​ This was highly necessary, because the raadsheren had let him know that the situation in the province was bad – politically and military.​[496]​ He probably arrived around the 10th; five days later he wrote the Hof to come to Nijmegen and bring old Landdagsrecessen, placards and letters from the prince of Orange to Zaltbommel.​[497]​ Leoninus apparently expected trouble from that side. It was in this climate of mutual irritation and mistrust that the Estates finally started their business on June 17th, when the English troops had left. 

The first two sessions (June 17th – July 2nd)
It is not easy to date exactly the various sessions of the Landdag on the basis of the recessen. In the first place, the resolutions are not dated per day, as would be common later on. As a result, we do not know what was done on which day. This problem can be solved for some part with the other available sources. The various sessions provide the second puzzle. According to the recessen four things were discussed during the Landdag: the propositie (27 points; June 18th – July 2nd), the proposals of the quarter of Nijmegen (23; July 4th), the “illegal” Landdag, the agenda put forward by the Landraad, discussed again in full session (28; July 5th), and new points added later on, on behalf of the Nijmegen quarter, discussed in another “unlawful” session (28; July 6th).​[498]​ On the basis of the resolutions, the sessions can be reconstructed in this order. However, it seems strange that the quarters of Zutphen and Arnhem stayed in Nijmegen, waited a day while boycotting the first “illegal” session, and eventually re-appeared on July 5th to discuss the proposals of the Landraad. Indeed, this research project led to new insight in this matter on the basis of other sources. The actual sequence of events will be outlined below.     
First of all we have to establish who were precisely present at the Landdag. Unfortunately no list of attendance (comparantenlijst) is left. Other sources were combined to reconstruct who were present. The results of this are visible in the appendix of this thesis; 41 attendants were located, although certainly more men were present. After the stadtholder urged the nobility of the Nijmegen quarter to come, some of them will have showed up after the English soldiers had gone. It is also clear that Zaltbommel sent delegates,​[499]​ more men than the ambtman alone. The number of attendants from Zutphen could have been greater, although the quarter was war-ridden like the Overkwartier. Maybe some smaller cities of the Veluwe sent representatives; only Elburg authorized Arnhem to look after its interests.​[500]​ According to the minutenboeck of Veluwe, on the other hand, only few nobles attended the Landdag.​[501]​ It seems also surprising that only four raadsheren were present, especially because Leoninus had asked them to come.​[502]​ However, more could have attended at the first day, but afterwards the Hof had to leave.​[503]​ The same goes for the stadtholder, who was present in Nijmegen, but only took part in the meeting on the first day.​[504]​ Whatever was the case, the number of people was not necessarily equal every day. 
	On June the 17th the chancellor addressed stadtholder, Hof and Estates.​[505]​ Leoninus lamented the present condition the province was in and he urged the Landdag to do the utmost to improve the chaotic situation. Thereafter, he shifted his focus to matters concerning the acceptance of Anjou as a new sovereign. Since the winter of 1581, Guelders delegates had negotiated with the duke about the conditions he would be accepted upon.​[506]​ On April 1st they came to an agreement. Now the Estates had to confirm the tract concluded with the duke. To make them enthusiastic, Leoninus – together with viscount Gerard van Ooy recommended by Anjou to discuss matters on his behalf – stated that the duke wanted to help and protect the poor province. The Guelders delegates with the Generality had even made up conditions for (military) support with him. Anjou had also ordered Norris to leave for Flanders. This order came too late, of course, just as his authorization of the chancellor and the viscount to riposte the English commander for his behaviour. Moreover, the duke wanted Zaltbommel to return under Guelders government; it was one of the points he was accepted on. This may have led to some cheers among the attendants, most certainly because, according to the chancellor, the prince of Orange and the States General backed this measure as well.​[507]​ When Leoninus asked the Landdag when they wanted to hear the report of the Guelders delegates at the States General, they said enthusiastically: right now. Afterwards, another report, on the deliberations with the prince of Orange about the acceptance of Anjou, was read out. It was doubtless comforting to hear that the prince still firmly backed Anjou, and that he was recovering from the attempt on his life of March 18th.​[508]​ Finally, Leoninus read out the tract made up with Anjou, and an assurance of the king of France as well. The Estates did, however, not accept the duke immediately.
	In the morning hours of the next day, the actual start of the Landdag according to the recessen, the resolutions of the States General were read out. On the basis of these, a propositie of 27 points had been composed.​[509]​ Thereafter stadtholder, chancellor and Hof left the assembly. The rest of June the 18th was used to discuss the accord with Anjou and, most of all, the issue of the aide.​[510]​  In his negotiations with the Generality the duke had been told that the Republic could provide around three million guiders per year, but in effect 200.000 per month was grudgingly paid.​[511]​ Guelders has to pay 100.000 per year to fulfil its part in this aide.
	Tuesday the 19th was spent in quarter meetings to discuss the proposed articles.​[512]​ The deputation of Arnhem composed a note, to deliver to their principles at home, with their opinion on some matters.​[513]​ They were rather critical concerning the acceptance of Anjou. According to them, the king of France, Henry III (r. 1574-1589), should accept the accord and promise to support the duke and his heirs – and therefore the Republic – against all enemies, including Spain. Eventually the Landdag would decide the same, and even go further and demand the king of France to declare war on Philip II immediately.​[514]​ Just as the Estates would do later, Arnhem rejected the projected erection of a Council of Justice for the whole Republic. They referred to their right of non evecando, as stated in the Tract of Venlo, and declared that Guelders had its own sovereign Court.​[515]​ At the same time new delegates continued to drop in. Johan Hackfoert van Twell, Van Essen the younger – both Veluwe nobles – and Jan Vermoelen, mayor of Wageningen took the oath before the Landdag. Lastly, delegates of the quarter of Veluwe went to the stadtholder to speak about war-related issues.​[516]​  
	A very common problem of representative activity surfaced the following day.​[517]​ The counsellors of the Hof were visited by stadtholder, chancellor and the magistrate of Nijmegen, who told them that most city delegates only had a mandate to listen to the propositie. Thereafter, they had to refer back to their principals. One can imagine the irritation of count Van den Bergh and Leoninus, who had been so patient already. They wanted to achieve something to impress the Generality and Anjou with. Indeed, the Zaltbommel delegation did – not totally unexpected if we think of their independent behaviour since 1572 – not have the mandate to resolve anything in matters of taxation.​[518]​ The representatives of Tiel also had a very limited commission, just as the Arnhemmers had to refer back in important matters.​[519]​ For this kind of issues they had a messenger, Arndt Oernick, in their company.​[520]​ He rode fastly to Arnhem and delivered a letter with the question: what can we concede regarding taxation?​[521]​ They requested the magistrate to consult the representatives of the burghers in this important matter. In the same vein, the delegation from Tiel, put under pressure by the Nijmegen magistrate, asked home what to do, and whether they – as was fairly common for smaller cities – should stick with Nijmegen in important matters.​[522]​ 
These things led to great delay and mutual irritation. Every day the delegates resided with the Landdag cost money; in the words of the men from Tiel: ‘dat wij hier lange liggen tot groote costen vande stadt’.​[523]​ Wetthen wrote his colleague-secretary Johan van Dans, on the 20th, that in this way matters could go on for quite some time.​[524]​ Between the deliberations, other matters were settled as well between the people gathered in Nijmegen. The delegates from Tiel, for instance, paid an old debt to Gerhard Hackfoert.​[525]​ They also got an audience with the stadtholder and pleaded for their ambtman Derick Vijgh in an unknown matter. Finally, the men tried to resolve a quarrel between Tiel and Nijmegen – about the issue of previous quarter quota? – but they had no mandate to proceed far enough…
	It is not clear how the next days were spent, but on the 25th of June a strange but important conflict surfaced. The day began fairly peaceful with a plenary session on war-related issues.​[526]​ Later that day, however, the acceptance of Anjou came on the agenda. The recessen do not say much about it; only that the Estates wanted their accord to be confirmed by Henry III and that he should declare war on Spain.​[527]​ The eventual charter does also not show discontent.​[528]​ However, when the Landdag was asked if they agreed with the accord the Guelders delegates had concluded with Anjou early April, the quarter of Veluwe refused and began to leave.​[529]​ When viscount Van Ooy asked for a reason, the men claimed that they could not agree with the tract, because some people had already officially accepted the duke as their prince. They could show evidence: a document made up by Jan van Asseliers, audienceur to the duke, wherein a charter of acceptation for the Hof was ordered immediately. The Veluwe delegates thus suggested that chancellor and counsellors had already accepted Anjou before the Estates was asked anything! Although the sovereignty of the province was not yet clearly developed in this time, it was still clear that the acceptation of a new prince was, as it always had been, a prerogative of the Estates. This was a very sensitive point; ‘everyone in the sixteenth century thought in legal terms’.​[530]​ The shocked raadsheren, present in the meeting, said no such thing had happened. Thereafter, the attendants asked Johan Kelffken and Otto van Heteren, who had both been present at the negotiations with Anjou, whether they had noticed anything of the sort.​[531]​ Leoninus was even brought into the meeting and he also denied the incident. At the end of the day, the chancellor departed from the Landdag and returned to the States General in Antwerp.​[532]​ The raadsheren Van Gendt, Van Boonenburch and Pieck also left. 
The matter was not over yet. The next day Gerrit Ingen Nuland, a nobleman from the Nijmegen quarter, remarked that “their” counsellors had apologized for the matter.​[533]​ He demanded the others likewise to do so, otherwise the recessen could not be closed. Eventually, the differences between the quarters were buried and Anjou was accepted later that day, but this episode did the position of the Hof few good; especially, because in the not-too-distant past the chancery had been a pet of the sovereign. In the next days, the counsellors wrote a remonstrance to protest to the Landdag; it was accepted on July 4th. 
	What are we to make of the incident? Did the raadsheren indeed accept Anjou secretly or was this some kind of set up? Everything seems to point at the last possibility. First of all, the Hof had no obvious reason to act prematurely. Leoninus was right in his analysis that Anjou could give tracts of acceptance when he eventually would be confirmed by the Estates and there was no reason to doubt that he would.​[534]​ Moreover, seen in the perspective of the “unlawful” actions of the quarter of Nijmegen later on, and its proposals to curtail the chancery, this seems to have been a preparatory action to incriminate the Hof. If this was the case, it is unsurprising that Ingen Nuland, an Over-Betuwe nobleman,​[535]​ stirred up the fire. The region he lived in had suffered from the passage of the English soldiers, something for which the Chancery was seen as responsible. As we will see below, nobles from the Nijmegen quarter had other good reasons to be angry with the counsellors and it is very well possible they planted the “evidence” with the Veluwe delegation. Even more so, because one of these noblemen, Reijnier van Stephrade, had been present at the negotiations with Anjou;​[536]​ he could have requested the document. The only representative of Veluwe who had been there, Alexander Bentinck, had died recently, so nobody could check the matter with him. The fact that the witnesses from Nijmegen – Kelffken and van Heteren – did not confirm the incident, also indicates that it had not happened and that the city was not in on the scheme. Finally, the remonstrance made by the Hof also points in the direction of a set-up.​[537]​ The counsellors suspected that the (anonymous) instigator of it all had bluffed. They dared him to let the evidence be investigated and to subject the outcome to a proper judicial procedure. The raadsheren also asked to incorporate the incident in the recessen. The fact that both initiatives were not carried out, indicates an uncertainty on behalf of the party that implicated the Court. Nevertheless, the seed of distrust was sown.
	Few is known about the days between the 26th of June and July 3rd. The Hof wrote the noble lords of Hernen, Batenburg, Persingen and Ooijen to fulfil finally their quota – i.e. that of the ambt of Maas en Waal – regarding the troops of Norris.​[538]​ These had left already, but the region had been very slack up till now while others had paid up. The chancery even threatened the lords with future passages of soldiers through their area. Besides, the Landdag decided to honour Anjou with gifts (‘vereringhe’); a traditional habit when a new prince assumed the government.​[539]​ Somewhat later, the Veluwe quarter decided to give him wine, ten medallions, two fat oxen and (money for a) silver beaker.​[540]​ In the mean time, the Landdag decided on the proposition and quarter meetings were held about regional matters.​[541]​ 
The resolutions on the propositie contain many important elements; for this thesis two categories of subjects are of most interest.​[542]​ First of all there were some institutional points. Here the Guelders’ sense of independence surfaced. The Landdag was not keen on the establishment, for the entire Republic, of either a Council of Justice, or a Camer van de Beden (Chamber for the aides), that should collect the provincial contributions.​[543]​ It would be unnecessary expensive, and the Landraad could perform the judicial tasks of the former institution. Moreover, the quarters did not want other provinces browsing through their internal finances. In the same vein, they objected the appointment of officials to deal with complaints about the confiscation and sale of church property, because, if there would be complaints, the aggrieved would turn to their common – i.e. local or quarter – government.​[544]​ At the other hand, the Estates were perfectly aware that in matters of war the regional considerations did not come first. The four Guelders members with the Landraad, although paid from their quarter’s contribution, were expressively instructed to represent the province as a whole; so they would not serve local interests and harm others.​[545]​ 
Secondly, in financial matters, the Landdag held firm to its own prerogatives. Guelders would only pay its war costs and quotas by way of the General Means and customs (Convooijen en Licenten). Just like in the past, no new taxes could be introduced without approval of the Estates.​[546]​ The collected money should also be kept in the own region as much as was necessary; garrisons and troops in the province had to be paid first. Beside the quotes, Guelders would contribute in an extra (temporary) levy to maintain Anjou’s troops. The duke could not, however, count on extra income from the confiscated goods, he had to content himself with the taxes and the domains. Not much had changed since the days of duke Arnold. 
After the points had been decided on, the recessen were read out and closed on July 2nd. At the same time – or possibly somewhat earlier, but this is not clear – three representatives of the Landraad put forward their list of proposals and asked the Estates to decide on it.​[547]​ The Landdag also resolved in these matters before the end of the 2nd of July, but the recessen were not closed until the 5th.​[548]​ For this reason, historians assumed incorrecty that these points were deliberated on the latter day,​[549]​ but the quarters of Zutphen and Arnhem had packed their bags and gone home by then. 
The proposals from the Landraad embodied in essence two strongly interrelated subjects: the contributions of Guelders to the (war) treasury of the Generality and the establishmnt of a committee that could take daily, most of all financial, matters in its hands.​[550]​ After all the discussion about the money for Anjou and his staff, the Landraad thus wanted to get down to business. The Council pointed out subtly that most troubles the war brought about originated with provinces that did not pay their quota on time.​[551]​ The Estates replied sharply that their arrears were not so great as the Generality thought; when all the accounts were settled this would become clear.​[552]​ The Landraad could demand whatever it wanted, for now Guelders, thoroughly ruined by English soldiers and  warfare, could provide only 50.000 guilders once and 20.000 a month during a six-month period.​[553]​ With regard to the arrears of payment over 1581 and the first months of 1582, the Estates showed themselves willing to pay the full bill, as long as the other provinces would do the same.​[554]​ The Landdag wanted to contribute to the war effort as long as the sufferings of the province were taken in account.​[555]​ While Guelders excused its irregularly contributions mainly on account of the warfare, the Landraad did not buy this. The Council rather blamed the situation on the lack of organization in the duchy. Therefore they proposed the establishment of a permanent standing committee, a States Executive.
This phenomenon was, as we have seen, not completely unknown in Guelders, although the proposal of the Landraad was revolutionary in some ways. Duke William of Jülich had, for some time during his absence, been assisted by such a committee from the Landdag. It was also not uncommon to assign a duke or stadtholder some members of the Estates. Indeed, Van den Bergh was added, at his own request, twelve delegates of the Estates as counsellors in war matters (krijgsraden).​[556]​ Moreover, in the power vacuum of 1577 a short-lived standing committee had existed. It was also not uncommon for the Landdag to delegate a group of men to deal with routine matters, as had been the case in the spring of 1580. Nevertheless, the Landraad proposed something more far-reaching: a permanent institution. 
The Council put a score of arguments forward to convince the Estates.​[557]​ In the first place, it was necessary to have an institution to execute the resolutions of the Landdag and to handle day-to-day business, especially when unforeseen issues presented itself. It would make matters easier for outside parties, if there was one institution they could turn to when necessary. In fact, almost every province had such a committee – Holland even two – and the Generality as well. Indeed, ‘die voerseide provintien hebben hoere Provinciale Raeden ende souden die kosten van heure Gedeputierden oeck wel willen spaeren so het eenichsints sonder perykell van de landen doenlick ware.’​[558]​ According to the Landraad, the costs of a standing committee would be money well spent, because a province without one would inevitably suffer far more hardship. Was this a subtle reference to the heavy warfare in Guelders? The Council finally pointed out that the chancery was not the right institution to handle such matters: ‘dat men dit al mijn heeren van der Provintiael Raeden opleggen wil, is niet practicable, behalven dat deeze mit heure beroepinge genoech te doen hebben.’​[559]​ By implication, the standing committee should be permanent, distinct from the Hof and have fairly broad administrative competencies. Moreover, utterly important for the aims of the Landraad, it would reduce the prevailing chaos in the governmental field, and ‘sunderlingh op de geldsaeken.’​[560]​
Although confronted with such novelties the Estates went along with the proposal and decided to establish a standing committee, but on their own terms. The Landdag projected to appoint nine members; one for the bannerets, one for each quarter and four raadsheren.​[561]​ This latter intention reveals how normal it had become that the Hof conducted the administration at the central level. The committee would be in function for a year and have a secretary, messenger and usher (deurwaarder) at its service. It would be maintained from the revenues of the domains.​[562]​ The tasks of the new committee would in essence be threefold: execution of the resolutions of the Estates, administration of simple day-to-day business and convocation of the Landdag to deal with important matters. These intentions fitted the Guelders political habits rather well. Such a standing committee also resembled its Veluwe counterpart strongly.
The resolution was soon put into effect with a provisional instruction.​[563]​ In this document, probably composed around July the 5th by the quarters of Nijmegen and Roermond,​[564]​ the competencies of the Delegate States were specified much more and even extended to the financial field.​[565]​ The committee had to recover arrears in the payment with regard to the quotas and lease out the collection of the contributions. The document echoes an atmosphere of projected cooperation and it was clearly inspired by the examples in other provinces.​[566]​ The Estates were careful, however; they would study its working until the next Landdag, when its commission ended.​[567]​ 
Two remarkable matters surround the projected establishment of the standing committee. Firstly, when the Estates decided to appoint a States Executive the quarter of Nijmegen did probably not agree. According to the recessen the actual decision was taken by the bannerets and the nobles and cities – under the condition that the latter would first speak about this with their principals – of the Overkwartier and the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe. Nijmegen was not mentioned.​[568]​ This can have been a slip of the pen. However, if this was not the case, why did the Nijmegen quarter not subscribe to the resolution? In my view, it is unlikely that the quarter did not agree with the idea of a standing committee. Such an institution fitted the propositions against the power of the Hof that the quarter would do a few days later. These “unlawful” proposals also did not try to cancel the standing committee.​[569]​ I think that the quarter was not happy with the measure to include four members of the Hof in the States Executive. In fact, this clause, that had been included in the recessen when the Estates decided on the committee, was missing from the provisional instruction composed some days later.​[570]​ This indicates that the provisional instruction was composed, by the Overkwartier and the Nijmegen quarter, during – or just after – the “illegal” meetings. Indeed, the quarter of Veluwe only received it July the 13th by way of the Nijmegen magistrate.​[571]​ 
Secondly, although the delegates of the Landraad pressed the Estates ‘niet te scheiden van den Lantdag sonder eerst gedeputierden (…) gecommittiert te hebben’,​[572]​ the Landdag ended before members for the standing committee were appointed. They agreed with the plan for a States Executive, and composed an instruction later on, the Estates did not yet appoint its members.​[573]​ This is not so surprising as it seems, because the city delegates needed to refer back in this important matter. The committee was accepted on a provisional basis. It could only function if the important cities had officially agreed. However, the developments in the following days deteriorated the atmosphere to such an extent that nothing came of it. Moreover, the “unlawful” Landdag closed the recessen regarding the points of the Landraad in the absence of two quarters, so their legal validity may have been doubtful. The eventual instruction was also of a doubtful nature, because it was (probably) composed by the quarters of Nijmegen and Roermond. Indeed, in March 1583 a new commission was made up by the full Landdag and on this basis the committee would eventually function.​[574]​ 
After the business with the Landraad was settled, and the standing committee seemed to be in the making, the Estates wanted to close the recessen and call it a day.​[575]​ Before this could be done, however, the quarter of Nijmegen conducted its coup: it came up with new points the Landdag had to decide about. The cities of Arnhem and Zutphen promptly declared they had no mandate to do such a thing. They wanted to leave, but viscount Van Ooy went to get the stadtholder who urged them to stay. Intimidated and afraid to lose the favour of count Van den Bergh, the delegates complied and probably heard the proposals. When the session ended, the representatives of Arnhem wrote their principals an alarming letter, hoping ‘omb eenmael van hier te kommen.’​[576]​ They wanted to let the decision-making to the other quarters – the Overkwartier and Zutphen could look after their interests – and leave. 
	Apparently the Arnhem delegates consulted their quarter and Zutphen did the same. On the 3rd they wrote an indignant letter together and protested verbally as well.​[577]​ Both quarters would not attend any more, because the cities had no proper mandate. They were commissioned to decide on the propositie and the proposals of the Landraad, but no more.​[578]​ Traditionally, they could not even be convoked above their mandate. Moreover, if things were to go this way, other cities also had some points of their own; those had also to be discussed. Anyway, they wanted to leave and any harm that would be done to the common cause would not be their fault.​[579]​

The “unlawful” Landdag 
After the departure of the two quarters, the Ridderschap and cities of the quarter of Nijmegen discussed the propositions at July 4th with the bannerets – i.e. Herman van den Bergh, son of the stadtholder – and the nobles from the Overkwartier and representatives of the town of Geldern.​[580]​ The abovementioned remonstrance from the Hof, about the conflict surrounding the (premature) acceptance of Anjou, was also accepted, but – quite unsurprisingly – not mentioned in the recessen. The next day the book of resolutions concerning the proposals of the Landraad was closed. The issue of the contribution was also discussed, although it was no part of the “illegal” proposals.​[581]​ Afterwards, it is not clear if this began on the 5th or the next day, a list of later added new articles was resolved upon; the ‘nije articulen naderhandt daer bij gestelt’.​[582]​ The last recessen were closed on the 6th of July. When the meeting ended the perpetrators did provide the absentees with copies of the resolutions, so they would know what had been decided on. This gave them the opportunity to react; as they did in angry letters.​[583]​ The quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe worked together on this project; the nobles and city of Zutphen wrote their reactions after a quarter meeting. On the Veluwe, the reactions were composed by the cities alone; as a result the opinion was mainly that of Arnhem.​[584]​ Eventually, both parties matched their objections.​[585]​ The whole affair indicates that, although the meeting was regarded as illegal, some of the points under review were seen as very important.​[586]​
We will see below that – next to many other matters often of most relevance for the quarter of Nijmegen – interesting issues regarding the role of the chancery in Guelders politics came forward and were accepted during this “unlawful” Landdag. The sources do not expressively mention the persons responsible for these radical actions. It is possible, however, to identify four parties that all had their reasons to conduct the coup: the nobility of the ambten respectively of Over-Betuwe and Maas en Waal, the towns of Zaltbommel and Tiel and their surroundings and the city of Nijmegen. All of these parties had motives to make a move against the Hof and to reduce its political power. It was, however, not their object to disband the Court altogether, or to confine its tasks to the judicial field only. Men from the Nijmegen quarter wanted rather to limit its competencies to those of the old ducal council. It seems to have been their object to remodel the Hof to the rules stipulated in the Tract of Venlo – the way they interpreted it, of course. The pereptrators wanted the chancery to stop interfering with matters of the Estates and they aimed to control the raadsheren to a greater extent; in both their judicial tasks and political activities. 
In the following pages I will identify the parties that were responsible for this “unlawful” Landdag and I shall try to reconstruct their aims, most of all in the matters relevant for this thesis. This will be mainly done on the basis of points from the two lists of propositions and the reactions of the quarters of Veluwe and Zutphen. The role of the Overkwartier in the “illegal” deliberations remains somewhat out of sight in the sources. It seems that the quarter went along with most measures.​[587]​ The reactions of the Zutphen quarter, that we know from its letters, were often mild,​[588]​ while those the Veluwe composed were far more fierce. The latter wanted often to stick to traditional habits. Indeed, the most important conflict of interests concerned the Nijmegen and Arnhem quarters. 
This is quite unsurprising, for it will become clear that many men who can be held responsible for the radical points on behalf of the Nijmegen quarter were moderates, members of the “middle groups”. Such persons, it has been stated above, had often not chosen for the Revolt out of conviction or political preference, but rather out of a mix of personal and regional considerations and interests. Now the conditions of the war steadily worsened – Parma’s successes in the south and pressure from the north – many of them were probably not so happy any more with a Hof composed of loyal adherents of the Revolt, cooperating with the Arnhem magistrate and the Veluwe quarter executive, that were composed of the same sort of men. This was a clash between the radical Revolt and moderates. The fact that the stadtholder, an opportunist and most certainly not strongly committed to the rebellion, seemed to have been involved in the coup – he urged the other quarters to stay – , seems to be a case in point. We shall see that many matters had considered local and regional interests at heart. It would therefore be wrong, and anachronistic, to dismiss them simply as “particularist”. Nevertheless, it will become clear that the key-problems of the Revolt in Guelders – loyalty, religion and war –played an important part.
The sources do not explicitly mention the men who were responsible for the “unlawful” propositions, but they do indicate that it was not the quarter as a whole that was responsible. The eyewitness account written by the delegates of Arnhem declared that the “illegal” proposals came from ‘die vanden Quartier van Nijmegen’.​[589]​ This should not should not fool us too much. In my opinion, they were described this way, because the proposition was presented on behalf of the quarter; probably by the viscount. The deliberations of the “unlawful” Landdag make clear, however, that there was no complete agreement about every point within the quarter. Sometimes a party, the city of Nijmegen for example,​[590]​ made sure its deviate opinion was noted. Moreover, the first list of proposals, presented on behalf of the quarter, is titled ‘articulen bij etlicke besondere personen uuith den Nijmeegschen quartier (…) geproponiert’​[591]​ Those persons were, as the document makes clear, ‘den Ridderschappen’. However, some articles seem to have been composed by other parties. The city of Nijmegen, for example, proposed a point about the projected inspection of the instructions of government officials.​[592]​ Many proposals, most of them on the second list, were of regional importance. A protest against the projected damming up of a river was, for instance, put forward by delegates from the ambt of the Tieler- and Bommelerwaard.​[593]​ The propositions were therefore not made by a single group within the Nijmegen quarter. A group of discontented nobles probably took the initiative, drew up a list and shared it with the quarter assembly. Thereafter, everyone could add his particular points. 
In fact, many of the points on the first list clearly served the interests of nobles.​[594]​ Point four, for instance, aimed to limit the duration of Landdagen, because it was often too expensive for them to stay the whole meeting. Under the veil of diminishing the costs, for all parties of course, the nobles tried to strengthen their position of power by sneaking in a clause that recessen would be only legitimate if the Ridderschappen were present when they were closed. The Veluwe cities did not buy it, however.​[595]​ The first of the new articles, moreover, wanted to compel the capitals to hold minimal one quarter meeting per year.​[596]​ If they did not, the Ridderschap would convene by itself. This enraged the cities of the Veluwe: did the quarter not meet various times a year, and were it not the nobles who did not show up in acceptable numbers?​[597]​ Article 16, wherein was proposed to let ambtmannen – i.e. nobles – perform their judicial tasks in the city they resided in during the dangerous times of war, is also a case in point.​[598]​ 
Apart from such obvious Ridderschap-orientated matters, the “unlawful” Landdag discussed other subjects. Some points aimed at a better organization of the meetings, as we have seen above. The seventh point, for example, echoed the great irritation about the practice of ruggespraak. This had annoyed many about two weeks earlier, but in their reaction the cities of Veluwe backed away from the proposed full mandates.​[599]​ Other articles had to do with financial matters or war related troubles. A proposal was made, for instance, to let peasants patrol the countryside.​[600]​ Many points were of regional interest, like a projected compensation for the lord of Doddendael to cover the expenses he had made when his castle was garrisoned.​[601]​ In general, Zutphen was rather moderate on such points, while the reactions of the Veluwe quarter were much more irritated. In matters of war it referred to the Generality that arranged these things by way of the Landraad.​[602]​ The Estates should not concern themselves with it too much. However, when financial matters, often related to the war effort, were under discussion, Veluwe was nevertheless ready to cooperate for the sake of the realm, while Zutphen pleaded poverty.​[603]​
The – for this research – most interesting points are 16 to 20 and 23, all from the first list of propositions, because these show a strong incentive to curtail the power of the Hof. The counsellors themselves also saw this; the whole action had originated from the ‘privaet diffidentz ende archwoon, soo sij [het Kwartier van Nijmegen] tegens canceler ende raden gevat’.​[604]​ Indeed, many men in the quarter of Nijmegen, most of all the local nobility,  had good reasons to despise the chancery and its personnel. 
The episode with the English soldiers had enraged the Over-Betuwe, and Tiel and Zaltbommel and their surroundings as well. The Hof had asked for an extra levy and blackmailed them in the process, but they had all paid up. Nevertheless, the troops were sent south across their lands. It is therefore not surprising that the incident around the acceptation of Anjou had been fuelled by a noble from the Over-Betuwe. These noblemen primarily blamed the Hof for the matter, but the Landraad was not forgotten either. This institution had, together with the raadsheren, while few members of the Estates had been present, made the actual decision about the route of the English on the 4th of June. In short, the Hof had not furthered the interests of the Nijmegen quarter in this case. This disappointment, coupled with a sense of war-weariness, explains the proposal – number 27 of the new articles –to no longer accept the Landraad, that had put the quarter through such difficulties, as an authority.​[605]​ The Council would be less necessary anyway when the Guelders Delegated States saw the light. Guelders should only acknowledge Anjou, the Council of State, the stadtholder, the Hof or the standing committee of the Landdag as government, so the proposal read. This idea must have come from the discontented nobles, because the city of Nijmegen stated that it wanted to remain loyal to the Landraad – on the condition that the Council would no longer order billeting and the passage of troops on Guelders soil without the approval of the Delegated States or the Hof. This also indicates that Nijmegen did not want to get rid of the chancery as a form of authority, but rather contain its sphere of influence. The quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe did not agree, however: they wanted to maintain the Landraad.​[606]​ 
The Ridderschappen of the ambt of Maas en Waal, that had not been crossed by Norris’ men, had a related (financial) motive. They had paid the extra sum very slowly – at the end of May the local lords claimed to have collected only half, due to enemy raids, but a month later still almost nothing had been brought in.​[607]​ From article 17 of the new points it becomes evident why.​[608]​ The chancery had ordered that men who possessed land in the region of Maas en Waal, but did not live there, had to pay a year of rent to meet the extra levy. The ones hardest hit by this measure were not so much foreigners, as could have been intended, but the local gentry, that lived in the city of Nijmegen for a part of the year, itself.​[609]​ Such nobles, men like Johan van Gendt and the lord of Batenburg, had therefore good financial reasons to be angry. Especially, because the counsellors had threatened them with passages of troops in the future, if they did not pay up soon.​[610]​ 
The counsellors from the Nijmegen quarter had also made themselves unpopular beforehand. We saw above that the raadsheren charged with the introduction of the General Means, and administering of the oath of loyalty, had stirred-up ill feeling. Although necessary for the war effort, the taxes were resented, most of all in Tiel and Zaltbommel. Moreover, when the raadsheren had tried to administer the oath, they had started in the hornets nest of Tiel. This town was dominated by regional gentry, and most of all by the local ambtman. Claes “the king of Tiel” Vijgh had ruled the city as a potentate and his son Derick, from the 1570s onwards in charge, was not much better.​[611]​ Tiel steadily followed the example of Zaltbommel and showed itself increasingly independent. The town was also suspect of loyalist sympathies, as were doubtless also many  nobles in these times of mutual distrust.​[612]​ It was hard to administer an oath of loyalty, that already placed many men for a conflict of conscience, in such a climate. Van Gendt indeed acknowledged this when he rejected a second commission.​[613]​ Moreover, it is possible that the raadsheren went too far with regard to the oath. Nijmegen richter Van Lennep declared in 1585 that the Court had threatened to fine, sack and drive him from his city if he would not take it. So, he eventually did what they wished out of  ‘vrese en de schrick’.​[614]​
Ridderschappen from the Nijmegen quarter could also have been irritated by the position of power the counsellors were in. As members of the Hof, although their job was a heavy one, they were the spider in the web of all Guelders affairs. In this way they could also dominate the Landdag.​[615]​ Many important ad hoc tasks were indeed commissioned on them. The cities of Veluwe rightly stated that it were especially these reputed noble counsellors who out of  ‘besonderen vertrouwen krijgen (…) de meest belangrijke zaken toevertrouwd.’​[616]​ The place of residence of the chancery did not help either. The magistrate of Arnhem was, compared to all Guelders capitals, most committed to the Revolt.​[617]​ The close cooperation between Arnhem magistrate, the Hof – raadsheer Van den Zande was even a member of the magistrate​[618]​ – and the standing committee of the Veluwe was a close alliance between Calvinists and adherents of the Revolt. Many moderates were not comfortable with this. It is therefore no coincidence that the quarter of Nijmegen interfered in the Landdag when its counsellors had left the meeting.​[619]​
These disappointments with both the Hof, and their own raadsheren, reflected in two proposals. Van Gendt, Van Boonenburch and Pieck had not made themselves very popular in the Nijmegen quarter during the first months of 1582, and this came back with a vengeance. First of all, with point 20, the quarter wanted to exclude officials and counsellors from the meetings of the Estates, unless they would be invited.​[620]​ This had been the case in the past, it was claimed, but then the personnel of the chancery had been mostly foreign. Now, the officials were inhabitants of Guelders. Indeed, at the Landdag – before June 25th – had at least seven people that worked fot Court or Audit Office been present. The other point on the list (number 23) was an old one. When John of Nassau had purged the Hof, there had been talk of a yearly replacement of half of the raadsheren.​[621]​ This had not been put in effect for unknown reasons, but the Nijmegen quarter now proposed to limit tenure in office to two years.​[622]​ In this way the quarters would control their counsellors to a great extent, because they could hold them accountable for their acts at the end of their tenure. 
The Nijmegen quarter could count on a rude awakening in these matters. Zutphen and Veluwe did not fancy the ideas, because they did not want one quarter to tell the others how to deal with their raadsheren.​[623]​ Veluwe noticed about point 20: ‘dat zij uuith diffidenten ende mistrouwen gegen die hern rhede wie idt schijnt hercomme’.​[624]​ Anyway, there already was a possibility for quarters to replace their counsellors. The tract concluded with Anjou stipulated that they could remove them and nominate other candidates for the central government (hoge overheid) to appoint. It was not practical, anyway; finding new officials for this heavy job would not be easy. That the Hof was not replenished after 1583, confirms this:​[625]​ only four counsellors were left by 1590 – the rest had died or quitted – and it was not until 1594 two new ones started their work. This kind of problem was very common in Guelders of the 1580s. The standing committee of the Veluwe suffered from it​[626]​ and it would also bother the States Executive in 1583.​[627]​ 
Besides the indignant gentry, the city of Nijmegen had its own reasons to be unhappy with the Hof. First of all, the quarter had been in turmoil, because of Norris’ soldiers. This was an unwelcome disturbance; and then the Hof even dared to ask the city for an extra sum of 6000 guiders above its part in the extra levy.​[628]​ After all the dealings, since 1572, with professional defaulter Zaltbommel, Nijmegen was not eager to pay more again, because others paid too slowly. All of this for soldiers who had done nothing worthwhile for the quarter. The expenses were extra unwelcome now the traditional trade of the city, over the river Waal, was hampered by the war.​[629]​ This was not the fault of the Hof, but another disturbance of the Waal-trade was: the chancery had allowed the Chapter of St. Mary from Utrecht to relocate its toll from Emmerich to Tiel.​[630]​ This led ships, in order to evade the toll, to use the Rhine – and therefore pass Arnhem – rather than the Waal. Such a measure, moreover, affected the collection of customs in Nijmegen in a negative way; the same means the city wanted to use to collect extra money for the war effort.​[631]​ This decision will doubtlessly have enraged Derick Vijgh in Tiel too, for outsiders would collect customs in his city now. At the same time, the Hof interfered with judicial matters in Nijmegen. The local richter, judge in the service of the government, had in conjunction with the Court executed some criminals ‘mit den strop’ without a sentence of the magistrate.​[632]​ Richter Werner van Lennep himself even felt that this was not right and Nijmegen, traditionally allergic to infringements on its legal autonomy, was doubtlessly aggrieved. 
The city instigated an article, number 16, that fitted its traditional role of opponent of the government in Guelders. Nijmegen had always been at the forefront during the quarrels between the Estates and the chancery. The kanselarij-ordonnantie had been the core of these conflicts. Now, Nijmegen was again devoted to the issue of a renewed instruction. The city proposed to inspect the instructions and commissions for members of the Hof and Audit Office.​[633]​ Afterwards the Landdag would – in the best interests of the province – have to decide what to do with them if the officials did not behave accordingly to their instructions. Point 17 – about cuts in the chancery personnel – already assumed that the institution would receive a renewed ordonnantie.​[634]​ The Hof indeed still functioned on the basis of the provisional instruction, made up in 1565.
This old instruction also contained a clause the Chancery had not been happy with at all: the possibility of appeal from its sentences. We saw that the Landdag envisaged a committee to deal with this in 1580. The Hof had been furious then, because it was a sovereign court and it wanted to stay that way. Afterwards the matter was dropped. Now, in 1582, the “illegal” meeting dealt with it again. Article 19 proposed that aggrieved parties could demand a revision of a sentence by the Hof with the Estates, to be conducted at a Landdag or by delegates from it.​[635]​ Interestingly, while the measure was finally accepted by the “unlawful” assembly, the city of Nijmegen did not deem it necessary. This is a strange matter, because after decades of struggle the victory in this field laid for grabs. At the other hand, Nijmegen did probably not want to get the worlds of the monarchical and customary polity mixed up: the sovereign court should stay the way it was. The Hof embodied traditional ducal justice and appeal from ducal justice by the Landdag never been possible before. Nijmegen seems to have wanted to restore the status quo ante. An initiative to investigate the initial organization of the chancery in the days of Charles V also points in this direction.​[636]​ The Hof would retain its old judicial competencies, based on the Tract of Venlo and traditional tasks of the ducal council, as long as it would not interfere with local justice.​[637]​ 
Whatever the matter, the Hof was not happy at all with the idea of an institution of appeal.​[638]​ The counsellors felt that the initiatives to renew their instruction were an act of revenge from people who despised them. If the Landdag wanted to perform the function of a court of appeal, it would harm the stature of absolute authority. This matter would not just grieve the Court, but Anjou, the new sovereign, as well. Probably the practical argument would have impressed the Estates even more: such an institution was costly. The quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe disapproved of the idea anyway.​[639]​ The cities of the quarter of Arnhem wanted to stick with the old custom ‘unde kunnen in sulcken nijerung, die gegen recht unde redden strijdet, nit bewilligen’.​[640]​
The articles 17 and 18 reveal again the point of friction that strongly bothered the city of Nijmegen and many others: the close cooperation between the chancery, the Delegated States of Veluwe and the Arnhem magistrate. In the Veluwe capital a group of men, bonded by their religion, loyalty to the Revolt and bands of blood, sat on the plush. Carl van Gelder was a notorious example. This Arnhem-based nobleman had always been a proponent of the Protestant religion – ‘onseres amptz [van dominee] und kercken trouwen voirstander’​[641]​ – and he had played a key role in the alteration of the Arnhem magistrate in 1579.​[642]​ Afterwards, he accepted a position in the city council and became an active member of the standing committee of the Veluwe. Van Gelder, since 1581 also landrentmeester-generaal was a nephew of the raadsheer Voeth and a brother-in-law of the deceased ex-mayor and counsellor Alexander Bentinck.​[643]​ At the same time, Voeth was a nephew of Van Ommeren,​[644]​ also a magistrate, an employee of the Audit Office and, in 1582, also a member of the Delegated States of the Veluwe. There he functioned beside his nephew Willem Bentinck, steward of the Veluwe.​[645]​ Arnhem profited from the academically trained raadsheren Voeth and Van den Zande in the magistrate, while – beside Van Ommeren – rekenmeester Rutger Tulleken was also a member. Nijmegen did not profit from the spin-offs of a chancery within its walls. The city was probably also jealous, because Arnhem slowly became the centre of the province instead of its most prestigious city. In a way, the government in Arnhem was an old boys network. The “illegal” Landdag seemed keen on breaking it.
The initiative was two-sided. In the first place a cut-back in the number of counsellors and rekenmeesters was proposed, mainly to reduce costs.​[646]​ The Hof should be brought back to eight raadsheren and a chancellor; every quarter had to give up one. However, in practice the Court had just eight members at the time and, what is more, the quarters of Nijmegen and Zutphen had to sack one for this idea. With the distrust of the former quarter against its own counsellors in mind, this point is not as strange as it seems – certainly not from the perspective of the initiative to limit their term in office. The Audit Office could also do with less rekenmeesters, two to be exact. These measures were at odds with the heavy workload the Hof was already burdened with, but this could be remedied by the new standing committee. Moreover, the second initiative also alleviated their tasks. Article 18 proposed to forbid members of the Chancery to accept other employment.​[647]​ This was a clear blow aimed at the Arnhem-clique. It is therefore not surprising Arnhem would have none of it, although Zutphen reacted rather mildly.​[648]​ The cities of the quarter of Veluwe reacted with a proposal to ban everybody retaining ties with the enemy from offices. Moreover, why should all attendants of Landdagen not swear an oath on this? Such matters would be very unwelcome with the many moderates in the Estates and especially the Nijmegen quarter. 
One of these moderates was the Holland-born rekenmeester Thomas Gramaye.​[649]​ From 1548 onwards he had worked in Guelders in various fiscal functions and was eventually sacked by John of Nassau. After a short tenure with the (republican) Council of Finance in Antwerp, he returned to Gelderland and his work at the Audit Office. Now, when the quarter of Nijmegen proposed to economize at the personnel of the chancery, it – together with the Overkwartier – chose him as one of the two new rekenmeesters.​[650]​ The other one could be chosen by Zutphen and Veluwe, in concert with the bannerets. This meant that one of the two Arnhem magistrates working there – Van Ommeren or Tulleken – had to resign.​[651]​ Gramaye was unpopular at the chancery: he had worked for the Alba regime and his colleagues also disliked him for personal reasons.​[652]​ However, the Nijmegen quarter commissioned him to compose two documents meant for the Landraad: an account for the quarter and an overview of the contribution Guelders had paid since joining the Union of Utrecht. Moreover, the “illegal” Landdag wanted him to investigate the state of the ducal domains and the organization of the chancery under Charles V.​[653]​ This made sense, for Gramaye had worked for the government for decades.
However, Veluwe did not agree at all.​[654]​ The cities could not understand why Nijmegen opted for the ‘uuithhemischen’ Gramaye, whom they did not trust.​[655]​ They did not want him to interfere with important matters like the domains. This could be left to the trusted landrentmeester-generaal Carl van Gelder. Had the Estates not always resisted foreigners in office? Had John of Nassau, Willem van den Bergh and Anjou not sworn to stick to Gueldersmen? 
‘wat (…) der Cantzlie gelegenheit als bij Caroli quinti tijden ingesteld berust, is gants spottelijk sich daer van bij Grameijen toe informieren, diewiel allen houft unde cleinen steden nit onbewust, wie viel idt der Landschaft domaels gecostet der Landschaft vrijheid unde privilegien gegen die uuitheimschen retthe en andere officieren toe defendieren.’​[656]​ 
While the cities had a point in this matter, the qualification foreign was a mere mask for other considerations.​[657]​ Gramaye was unpopular and his loyalty was not beyond suspicion; he was probably still a Catholic. Where the overview of the contributions was concerned, Zutphen agreed with Nijmegen, but the cities of Veluwe stated that the entire Audit Office should do the job. However, the two quarters gathered in Nijmegen immediately composed a provisional instruction for Gramaye, because, so it says, they trusted his capacities.​[658]​ 
	Eventually there was one important issue that did not make it into the recessen: a new division of the Contribution – i.e. the monthly quota of 20.000 guilders. According to the delegates of Arnhem this had been the main point behind the action by the quarter of Nijmegen on July 2nd.​[659]​ The quotas had kept the quarters busy before the Landdag and would continue to do so afterwards. Although the collection of the General Means was nowhere introduced properly, the division mostly bothered the quarters. The Overkwartier and Zutphen suffered heavily from the war and needed to be spared somewhat. The abovementioned observation of the Arnhem delegates indicates that the Estates already had spoken about the subject informally. However, probably nothing was decided when the Zutphen and Veluwe quarters left in reaction to the coup of Nijmegen. As a result, Nijmegen did a reasonable fair proposal at the 5th: the quotas of the two war-ridden quarters were to be downsized, the other two would have to pay more.​[660]​  However, the contribution of the ravaged Veluwe would increase relatively much more than the quota of Nijmegen. This was far less fair.​[661]​ Nevertheless, the proposal proves that the quarters looked after their own interests, but were not blind to the troubles of others and the general welfare of the province.
	Finally, after about two and a half weeks of deliberation the last two quarters could part company on the 6th of July. The last recessen were closed and sent to the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe. It was Gramaye, of all people, who wrote the Arnhem magistrate about the new division of the Contribution on the day the “illegal” Landdag receded.​[662]​ This matter concerned the other quarters as well, so he wanted to let them know. We can imagine this high-handed alteration in the quotas did not help to cool off the minds of the already angry quarters.     

The aftermath
If the Landdag was an extraordinary event, its aftermath was surprising as well. Most interesting is that the first month was stormy and feelings ran high sometimes, but the storm laid down soon. Then the matter disappears from the sources, because it was overcome by all kinds of other, most of all war-related, developments. This does not make the whole episode insignificant, however. Contemporaries attached too much value to it and it is a illuminating example of the diverging interests that could constrain the decision-making process. At the same time, the same developments overtook the initiatives towards a standing committee.
	The first week after the tumultuous Landdag not much seems to have happened, but then the angry correspondence began. Arnhem convoked a Kwartierdag on the 7th; it met seven days later.​[663]​ It is not clear when the city exactly received the recessen from Nijmegen, but the quarter meeting was intended to, beside the projected liberation of the Veluwe from soldiers, discuss the points discussed at the Landdag.​[664]​ The town of Elburg wrote it would be absent from the meeting, but asked: ‘wijlt ons doch bij brengere deses die articulen offte dat gene, so tho Nijmmegen proponirt und affgehandlet ist, oversenden’.​[665]​ At the 13th, the magistrate of Arnhem sent messengers to Nijmegen and Zutphen.​[666]​ The former carried a letter about the articles of the “illegal” Landdag; it is possible that Arnhem requested a copy of them. Jan Hoemaecker, the messenger, also delivered a letter of protest about the new division of the Contribution from the Delegated Quarter Estates of Veluwe.​[667]​ The messenger to Zutphen doubtlessly carried a letter about the events.​[668]​ The Kwartierdag was attended by about 25 men, mainly nobles, and it discussed many matters.​[669]​ Warfare and related fiscal measures dominate the recessen – the quarter accepted the introduction of the General Means, starting in August – but the issues of the Nijmegen Landdag did not surface. This does not mean, of course, the “unlawful” meeting was not discussed; it just did not make it into the resolutions.
The protest of Arnhem to the new Contribution proves the point.​[670]​ This letter is dated at the 15th, when the Quarter Estates were in session. Because the quotas were an essential quarter matter; this point must have been discussed, but it is not mentioned. Veluwe was not happy with the new model. Firstly, it had been decided on in its absence; this made the scheme worthless. Moreover, it was at odds with the old division, so the quarter had to protest against such a novelty. Nevertheless, the Veluwe understood the need to diminish the quotas of the Overkwartier and Zutphen. They could not accept, however, that their Contribution had to rise with almost 1500 guilders and that of Nijmegen with a mere 500. So, they devised a new one.​[671]​ Matters were made somewhat more equal by way of this proposal, but Nijmegen did not agree of course. 
During a meeting of its Quarter Estates, the city of Nijmegen let the Hof know it could not pay its quota.​[672]​ There was again a problem with soldiers in the area, probably its own garrison. The quarter complained about its raised share – initiated itself! – and declared it would pay in the old way. However, if Anjou or the prince of Orange kindly asked, the quarter could maybe pay 7000 guilders. The money had to be spent primarily in the own area and the small cities had to pay up for their share. They – Tiel and Zaltbommel – were not present at the meeting. So, all the efforts of the Landraad had resolved nothing; the financial squabbling continued.
Before Arnhem had reacted to the new quotas, the Hof had already complained about the Landdag with the quarters.​[673]​ The main point of friction for the counsellors was, as we saw above, the planned alteration of their instruction, and most of all the projected erection of an institution of appeal. The counsellors enclosed the letter of protest they had sent to count John of Nassau in 1580, when this problem also had surfaced, as a reminder. The Court asked the quarters to discuss matters during a Kwartierdag. It must have grasped, however, that the atmosphere was different now; the raadsheren did not ask for a revision of their instruction. As long as the matter would disappear from the agenda eventually they seemed content.
Arnhem and Zutphen were less content. After their verbal and written protests at the meeting itself, they went on to concert their complaints. The aforementioned messenger, sent from Arnhem to Zutphen on the 13th, returned two days later. He brought a letter wherein the IJssel city magistrate asked to cooperate in their protests. Municipal secretary Van Lennep came to Arnhem to communicate the reactions of Zutphen. In these days the official letter of protest was probably written.​[674]​ This epistle was a protest ‘gegen die in werenden Lantdage toe Niemegen, onbehoirlicker wijs durch etlick bezondere personen uuith den Niemegschen quartier des Lantschaft opgedrungen propositiones’.​[675]​ 
All possible arguments were brought into action: traditional organization, the difficult times and the content of the propositions. In the first place, the Landdag had to be convoked by the stadtholder or Hof, who supplied a proper proposition. Moreover, the quarters were used to discuss the matter amongst themselves to speak with one voice at the meeting. This was, and had to be, done with the common good in mind ‘sonder reguard toe nemen op oere privaet saecken, noch daer durch die gemeine saecken toe retardieren.’​[676]​ The quarter of Nijmegen did the opposite. Instead of strengthening the resistance against the enemy, it tried to burden the Estates with its private interests. As a result it delayed the Landdag unnecessarily. Even worse, the perpetrators had tried to overrule previous decisions, both of earlier meetings and of the present one. When the quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe had left, the others tried to outvote them and place them for a fait accompli. Furthermore, some of the articles were of no provincial importance, others were contradictory with the rest, or unreasonable anyway. The points that mattered, however, had to be carefully discussed and deliberated by all quarters. In sum, no blame could be attached to the cities of the Zutphen and Veluwe quarters when the illegal recessen were concerned. 
The letter was probably delivered in Nijmegen at July 25th.​[677]​ Before the reactions at the resolutions could be made up, the capitals had, like in old times, to consult their quarters. Zutphen, occupied with the Spanish siege of Lochem, still had to convoke a Kwartierdag.​[678]​ Eventually at August 3rd the capital and the Ridderschap of the quarter made up their complaints and matched them to those of Veluwe.​[679]​ It could also have been the other way around, i.e. that the Veluwe cities – Arnhem did not discuss the points at a quarter meeting because it had just ended – synchronized their answers to the ones of Zutphen. Anyway, the reactions from Veluwe were sent to Nijmegen on July 31st or August 4th, those of Zutphen after the 3rd.​[680]​ Arnhem magistrate Engelbertus van den Burgh was in Nijmegen at that time, together with secretary Wetthen, probably to discuss the matter with the municipal government.​[681]​
After this, the storm dropped. Financial issues and warfare took over the minds of the governing elite. The quarters of Nijmegen and Arnhem continued to squabble about the Contribution.​[682]​ Finally, delegates of Veluwe and the Nijmegen Kwartierdag met to collect money in the face of the Spanish threat on Lochem; this was to be done by way of customs.​[683]​ At the same time, the introduction of the General Means on the Veluwe made still slow headway.​[684]​ The Hof did all it could, but the financial issues did not clear up and this had consequences for the war effort. Francisco Verdugo had started to besiege the town of Lochem in the quarter of Zutphen in July, and this event would absorb the minds of the Gelderlanders, for two months.​[685]​ The success of the republican army depended on the inflow of money and this retarded the relief of the town.​[686]​ When it was finally secure, a conflict between Veluwe and the province of Overijssel broke out over Contribution matters.​[687]​ The last Landdag disappeared from the agenda, although some points – like the Contributie – lingered on. The resolutions other quarter meetings of Veluwe in 1582 do not speak of it.​[688]​ In the letter of convocation for the next Landdag, that was scheduled for January 6th 1583, the “illegal” resolutions were not mentioned either.​[689]​ When the Estates finally met again, on January 9th and between the 12th and 26th of March, the troubles of the previous meeting were not discussed.​[690]​ Leoninus just spoke in his address to the Estates of mutual mistrust and discord that crippled all initiatives towards fruitful decisions.​[691]​ He also concluded that Guelders was discredited and mistrusted everywhere because of such excesses. The chancellor did not, however, refer to the previous Landdag directly.
When in this climate the “unlawful” Landdag shifted to the background, so did the issue of the standing committee. No members had been appointed in early July, but there seems to have been hope. On August 15th, the Quarter Estates of Nijmegen composed an instruction for Gramaye, so he could start to work on the survey of the Guelders contributions since the Union.​[692]​ Because the quarter of Veluwe had objected to the sole nomination of Gramaye, to him was now added a number of delegates, still to be appointed. The instruction was sent to Arnhem and if the Veluwe quarter did not agree with it the Delegated States of Guelders should be contacted; the same committee had the right to revise the document. Is this a sign that they had actually been instituted? It was probably wishful thinking, because Nijmegen sent a disappointed letter to the standing committee of the Veluwe on December 10th.​[693]​ The magistrate complained that the instruction for Gramaye was still not inspected, because there were no Delegated States to do this. As long as these delegates were not appointed, so concluded Gramaye and his principals, the Hof had to inspect the instruction together with the standing committee of the Veluwe.​[694]​ The existing working order was thus eventually respected, because there was nothing else. 
The proper institution of the standing committee had to wait until the next Landdag. Eventually, delegates were chosen on March 28th 1583.​[695]​ However, it was clearly hard to find candidates for the job, because only four were grudgingly appointed.​[696]​ The Delegated States functioned for about a year. This had much to do with a new power vacuum in the province. In November 1583, after the loss of Zutphen, stadtholder William count van den Bergh planned to convince the Landdag to open peace negotiations with the enemy.​[697]​ He was not the only one with such ideas; many moderates would have agreed. However, the day before the Estates would meet, Leoninus and the Hof, with the help of the Arnhem magistrate, arrested him. Guelders lost its stadtholder again and it would only appoint a new one in May 1584. When the power vacuum ended with the appointment of Adolf of Nieuwenaar, the States Executive was not re-invested. Just as had been the case in 1577-1578, the presence of a strong stadtholder did not make a standing committee necessary.     

The Landdag of 1582 solved few matters. The General Means would not be properly introduced for some time, the contributions were still be paid with few enthusiasm and even less punctuality and diverging interests would keep on determining Guelders politics.​[698]​ The meeting learns us, however, that such interests did not preclude a notice of the greater good. The quarters wanted to contribute to the war effort, but they found themselves unable due to the fighting, and – the Landraad was right about that – poor organization. These matters would develop further in the next decades. Interests could be local, like the irritation of the gentry of the ambt Maas en Waal, or regional, as the disturbance the troops of Norris brought to the quarter of Nijmegen. 
The Landdag also shows that bigger issues coloured the Guelders political arena. Warfare we have mentioned, and religion divided the cities and the Estates. Many moderates had ended up at the side of the Revolt in Gelderland. In the quarter of Nijmegen such men had become disappointed with the Hof and they wanted to reduce its influence to its original competencies as (successor of the) ducal council and its basis stipulated by the Tract of Venlo. The adherents of the Revolt, in charge in Arnhem, made, to their taste, a far too strong imprint on Guelders government. However, the discontent, instigated by their coup, ruined the primary aims of their projected Landdag. After matters had calmed down somewhat, the usual troubles – disputes about taxes and warfare – took over the minds of the governing elite. The events surrounding the surrender of Zutphen and Nijmegen would show in the future that moderates within their walls would change sides if they considered it in the best interests of their towns. The most important conclusion from this case study is therefore that it was, among other things, a failed attempt of moderates to break the power of the radical republicans in Guelders politics. The men from Nijmegen were sick and tired of their influence on politics, finance and religion. The failure of the “illegal” Landdag, in this respect, made possible the stabilization of the role of the Hof on the long term. The last paragraph of the next chapter will show this.



























V. The development of Guelders government in a comparative perspective

‘With the partial exception of Gelderland, then, the provincial high courts were 
deprived of their previous political functions’.​[699]​

Indeed, in every province the Habsburg court was curtailed in its tasks early in the Revolt, or even disbanded altogether. The fact that the Hof in Guelders retained its administrative occupations had, as we have seen, mainly to do with political tradition. The Estates had neither the desire to take over that part of government, nor the institutions to do so. As long as the Court functioned according to its new instruction and served the province, and the Estates thus had some influence over the institution, they were happy. The instruction mainly arranged judicial matters, because those had been points of friction in the past. We shall see in paragraph one that in Holland, Utrecht and Overijssel the provincial Estates, for different reasons, had built-up experience in the administrative field during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This explains that these functions were taken away from the provincial courts after they were altered. Every Hof functioned in its particular provincial context. 
Paragraph two will deal with the way the other provinces curtailed the competencies of their Hof. Indeed, just like in Guelders, Calvinists had started to show up in the Estates of the other provinces in revolt; although this was a slow process everywhere. This did, as we have seen, not automatically mean that the men in power were fanatically dedicated to the Union and the Revolt. The case of Overijssel will underline this. Moreover, everywhere native men were put in charge in provincial institutions and new counsellors were nominated by the Estates themselves. The representative assemblies gained influence over their court.
The curtailment of the court was one thing, the establishment of a standing committee was another matter. This will be highlighted in paragraph three. The form these institutions would take, had again to do with political tradition, but also with interference from other parties outside the Estates and the political and military course of the Revolt. It was a process of trial and error with no fixed outcome. The case of Overijssel will make this most of all clear. In Guelders, the status quo that emerged at the end of the sixteenth century was mostly determined by the fortunes of war: the Spanish occupation of Nijmegen and Zutphen. The institutional balance that had taken shape in and around Arnhem, where the fierce adherents of the Revolt of chancery, Veluwe quarter and municipal magistrate worked together, could make a strong mark on the provincial situation this way. After 1591, altered magistrates came to power in the two temporarily occupied cities and put their mark on the Estates. 

The burden of tradition
In the first chapter of this paper I mentioned the problem of “hollandocentrism” that distorts the image of Dutch history. This part of the thesis will show that every province developed in its own way. They all deserve historiographical interest. In fact, the success story of Holland, the most interesting case according to Tracy,​[700]​ was exceptional to such an extent that it would be strange to take it as an inspiration for developments elsewhere. For this reason, I start by discussing the situation in Overijssel. This region resembled Gelderland, in many ways, most of the three provinces under review. At the same time, differences between the regions remained considerable.   
	In the Middle Ages Overijssel was part of the personal union of the bishopric of Utrecht, the Sticht. The territory was divided in an upper and a lower part. The latter eventually became known as the province of Utrecht, which will be discussed below. The upper part, the Oversticht or Overijssel, consisted of three quarters: Twenthe, Salland and Vollenhove.​[701]​ In contrast to Gelderland, the quarters seem already to have been used as administrative units of the government in the fourteenth century. Every region was commanded by a drost (bailiff), a local magnate, who supervised the lower administrative units, the ambten.​[702]​ At the other hand, the quarters did not develop real quarter assemblies.​[703]​ Only in Salland cities of considerable size existed: the IJssel cities Deventer, Kampen and Zwolle, members of the Hansaetic League. 
The Estates of Overijssel had originated from meetings of landowners during the Middle Ages.​[704]​ The institution developed itself into an assembly of nobles and representatives of the three cities, convoked by the bishop. Both estates held three votes: the cities one each and the nobles three in total, although they did not vote per quarter.​[705]​ The meetings took place about two times a year in the sixteenth century and were dominated by the cities. They usually met before the Landdag began and determined the policy. As long as they were united there was always a noble who could be persuaded to take their side to outvote the rest. Ties between the Salland nobility and city magistrates were close anyway. Ridderschappen from the other quarters attended Landdagen less often  and in smaller numbers. The bishop was a rather weak prince for the Oversticht. The legislative and judicial power, as a high court of appeal (klaring), laid with the Landdag – and therefore the cities. These also supervised the appointment of the powerful drosten, although government officials. In effect, ‘the cities had de facto, if not de jure, legislative, judicial and administrative power’ over the province.​[706]​ 
The Estates of Overijssel did not create institutions to support their rule; they did not need to. The cities had their own municipal organization. Supported by temporarily committees from the Landdag,​[707]​ these were capable to deal with provincial administrative matters. So, in contrast to Guelders, these Estates did rule the realm. This province knew a special tradition of self-government, by way of traditional institutions. A clear-cut difference between monarchical and customary polities cannot be found here, because princely power was fragile.  
When, in 1528, Charles V took over the sovereignty of the bishop change was not drastic.​[708]​ The Emperor appointed a stadtholder, but this official was absent most of the time and not interested in Overijssel affairs.​[709]​ The projected chancery for the province, meant to curtail the power of the cities in judicial and administrative matters, was frustrated by the Estates.​[710]​ The Court could only start to function in 1553, but just worked effectively between 1568 and 1574. It never had much administrative powers and only contested judicial prerogatives. The only really effective attack at the rule of the Estates was the suspension of the klaring.​[711]​ Nevertheless, Charles V and his son were much stronger rulers than the bishop and Overijssel had to pay for their expenses. The granted aides were, however, disappointing. The system of tax collecting in the localities, used beforehand to collect money for the expenses of the Estates, was slow, expensive and sensitive to fraud.​[712]​ There was no incentive to change it, for the cities were exempt from most taxes and the province did not want to contribute much anyway. The government doubtlessly wanted to see things change, but could not do much in the face of fierce resistance of the subjects. The Estates frustrated almost every attempt to change anything; only Alba was more or less successful in breaking it.​[713]​ 
In 1575-1576, however, Spanish power collapsed everywhere in the Netherlands. While the power vacuum and the presence of unruly Spanish troops made many provinces join the pacification – Guelders did so to further its own interests – Overijssel retained an isolationist policy until 1581.​[714]​ Alba had altered the magistrates of Zwolle and Kampen after their temporally capture by the rebels in 1572. Although the council of Zwolle was cleansed of loyalists in 1579, the Estates were made-up out moderates and these men shied away from war and, most of all, permanent taxes. They wanted to return to the pre-1528 status-quo of self government and held to employ centuries-old habits of action.​[715]​ Indeed, the Estates ruled themselves and were almost permanently together in the first half of 1581.​[716]​ After the purge of the Kampen magistrate, where later that year Union-minded Calvinist magistrates came to power, the traditional cooperation snapped. This created a political vacuum, as we shall see in paragraph three, that only was resolved by the Council of state years later.
How different was the institutional situation in Utrecht. Compared to Overijssel and Guelders, the province was far more united. With only one big city, Utrecht, where the bishop resided, there was a clear political and administrative centre.​[717]​ Utrecht was also divided in quarters, but these were purely rural administrative units and had few to do with representation.​[718]​ The bishop had more power in his Nedersticht, but he depended on his subjects, most of all because he was an appointed non-hereditary ruler and always in need of money.​[719]​ The Estates, dominated by the five ecclesiastical chapters and the capital city, effectively ruled the province. Within the assembly three estates – clergy, nobility and cities – had one vote each. In fact, Ridderschap and smaller cities were mostly present to lend a broad base to the policy, not to decide it themselves.​[720]​ 
Compared to Guelders and Overijssel, the Estates of Utrecht were a totally different representative assembly. They met about 86 times per year.​[721]​ The meeting could be held on request. The dean of the cathedral arranged this, although the bishop also convoked the Estates, and chaired the meetings.​[722]​ However, as everywhere else, the assembly claimed to further the interests of the subjects, but did not create its own institutions to achieve this. The chapters provided the organization; they already met anyway, so the Estates could fit in the traditional pattern. Administrative matters were, or so it seems, done by the Estates – for many matters ad hoc committees were appointed –,  the chapters and the city.​[723]​
Charles V ended this traditional form of representation when he replaced the bishop as sovereign in 1528. The Estates were severely curtailed and the power of both the chapters and the city of Utrecht was broken, but the three estates retained their single vote and the dean remained president.​[724]​ However, instead of all canons, only about ten delegates were admitted now. Moreover, the Estates had to be convoked by the newly-appointed stadtholder or the Court. This new institution administered justice and ran day-to-day government, instead of the Estates. They employed, however, their own official: the Advocate of the State (landsadvocaat) to further their interests with the Hof.​[725]​ It seems that the Estates did not collide very heavily with the government; this makes sense, because the Emperor had filled the municipal magistrate with his clients.​[726]​ Nevertheless, under the rule of Alba more frictions surfaced. The Estates did not want to pay his permanent taxes, for instance. In 1570 matters got even so far that the Council of Troubles took away the votes of clergy and Ridderschap and withdrew the municipal privileges of Utrecht. In this climate, the Estates, who remained in function nonetheless, established a standing committee.​[727]​  
The case of Utrecht, where as in Overijssel, the Estates had a historical-developed tradition of semi self-government, most strongly confirms my hypothesis that traditional structures guided the behavior of the Estates when they had to create a government themselves. According to J.H. Bannatyne the Estates had a built-in habit of resistance towards change, but they had to survive.​[728]​ In the power vacuum after 1575 they slowly took matters in their own hands.​[729]​ In the following years, the Estates of Utrecht joined the Pacification, appointed their own stadtholder, William of Orange, and curtailed the Hof. The Estates reverted to self-government in the well known way. Firstly, the dean of the cathedral was again authorized to convoke them. Moreover, it seems that the canons re-gained the right to attend the assembly personally. The meetings were again held in the traditional Hall of the Cathedral Chapter. Furthermore, the number of ad hoc committees also grew markedly. 
The extremely early establishment of a standing committee fitted the tradition of self-government as well. It was a novelty compared to the pre-1528 situation, but the principle itself was not new. Traditionally the well-organized chapters and the municipal magistrate of Utrecht had formed the core of the Estates. No States Executive had been necessary with a rather good organization at hand. However, in the turmoil of 1570, the Estates could not fall back on the traditional chapter-organization, because the clergy was deeply divided.​[730]​ Nevertheless, it was possible to establish a committee, based in the organizational center of the province, which included delegates of all estates, to look after their interests. In the political tradition of Guelders, and that of Overijssel with no culture of institutional organization, such an idea would have never been put into effect; the provinces did neither have a clear center, nor a ruling class with experience in day-to-day government. 
However, soon the pressure of religion and revolt began to give its own direction to the process. Protestant preaching was allowed in the city in 1579 and soon the prerogatives of the clergy were stripped.​[731]​ The citizenry, or rather their representatives, the hoplieden, sacked the churches; they hated the power of the chapters. Eventually the magistrate was purged too.​[732]​ Mistrust of clergymen made the Estates, among other things, diminish their role in the standing committee, appoint – Protestant – canons themselves and eventually replace the first estate. In the new situation, the city of Utrecht nominated candidates wherefrom eight new-style canons, the Geëligeerden, were elected by the nobles and small cities. The Estates maintained their three Standen, with their respective votes, but lost the representatives of the clergy. Traditions, associated with the rule of the chapters were discontinued in this climate: the dean of the cathedral eventually lost his right of convocation to the states executive, the secretary of the cathedral chapter was no longer the scribe of the Estates and the traditional meeting place was left for a neutral one.​[733]​ However, the Estates remained a relatively stable – especially compared to Guelders! – and political moderate institution, fully committed to the Revolt.​[734]​
	Unlike the other provinces under review, Holland had been a patrimonial province in the Burgundian-Habsburg Netherlands. It was, together with Zeeland, already incorporated in 1433. In the fifteenth century, under Burgundian rule, the Estates of Holland developed themselves into a real representative assembly.​[735]​ During the years of political crisis between 1477 and 1494, the Estates, just like the States General, manifested themselves as an institution that demanded increased competencies, but remained basically loyal to the dynasty at the same time.​[736]​ In Holland, cities worked together in an unprecedented way during the late 1480s. This laid a basis for the dominance of the six major cities – Dordrecht, Haarlem, Delft, Leiden, Amsterdam and Gouda – within the Estates up to the Revolt.​[737]​ They held one vote each in the assembly, the nobility just one. The government depended financially on these wealthy cities and the subjects profited from cooperation with their rulers. Simply put, the relation was marked by cooperation and negotiation.​[738]​ 
	The Habsburg era was the real watershed for the Estates of Holland. During the reigns of Charles V and his son they developed ‘important habits of cooperation’.​[739]​ Nobles and cities had to work together in many fields. Just like in other provinces, the Estates furthered the interests of the inhabitants and protected the privileges.​[740]​ They did far more, however; involvement with the army, fiscal tasks and economic matters – most of all in their own interests – dominated their agenda. The warfare in the Netherlands, most of all against Guelders, and the Baltic trade were occupations wherein the Estates grew toward each other and learned to speak for the province with one voice.​[741]​ 
They also developed new institutions. Already in 1480, the Estates felt the need to appoint an Advocate of the State, to represent them outwardly, offer judicial council and help with the organization of meetings.​[742]​ Together with his small office, he became the pivot of the representative organization during the sixteenth century. At the other hand, the government appointed an official to assist the Estates financially.​[743]​ This Receiver for the Common Lands (gemenelandsontvanger) collected the levy to cover the costs of representation and some other sums. However, the mounting costs of warfare induced new tax measures from the 1550s onwards.​[744]​ Some of these were collected by the Estates themselves, with the help of the receiver. His office rose to great importance, but he became increasingly incorporated in the structure of the Estates in the process. Holland was thus, because of the broad range of activities the Estates were involved in, the only province under review where the representative assembly created some institutional framework before the Revolt. Nevertheless, most tasks were met with committees ad hoc: no standing committee was deemed necessary.​[745]​
	Daily administration laid, as elsewhere, in the hands of a Hof that had also judicial tasks and convoked the Estates.​[746]​ The Audit Office in The Hague arranged fiscal matters in Holland and Zeeland, and all other provinces in the Northern Netherlands, except Guelders. The relation between the Estates and the Court was bad. However, unlike in Gelderland, it was mainly the Hof that complained about the behavior of the Estates instead of the other way around. Their activities in the financial field and the high-handed meetings irritated the counselors, who, in turn, sometimes negatively advised the government about requests of the Estates. Nevertheless, the Staten retained a rather good relation with the government in Brussels and their popular stadtholder, William of Orange.​[747]​ 
Holland and Zeeland became the bearers of the Revolt after 1572 and this influenced the composition of the Estates. Firstly, the voting base within the assembly was altered. The Ridderschap retained its first vote, but smaller cities gained also entrance to the Estates and brought the number of city votes at eighteen.​[748]​ At the other hand, cities like Amsterdam, that stayed loyal, and Haarlem, lost in 1573, temporarily disappeared from the assembly. Very generally spoken, the membership of the Estates changed fairly radical during the Revolt.​[749]​ The Ridderschap saw many new faces, although Catholics could still attend. In the city delegations there was much variation between old members and novices, but everywhere Calvinists showed up; sometimes (younger) members of the traditional families, sometimes new men. Until 1576, Orange ruled together with the Estates.​[750]​ The Hof had taken refuge in Utrecht and almost immediately the gap was filled by the re-appointed stadtholder and some counselors. The Estates of Holland were, of all the assemblies under review, best equipped to take over government, because they had an established tradition in many fields. In the field of organization, they could build on their experiences before 1572.​[751]​ Nevertheless, the process would be one of trial and error. 
	
Curtailment of the Courts
In Guelders, and the three provinces under review, involvement in the Revolt was accompanied by a power vacuum. The Landdag of Gelderland saw its stadtholder Hierges join Don John early 1577 and reacted by appointing a temporary standing committee, because they did not trust the loyalist Hof. It took some time, however, before the Court was altered. The initiative had to come from the new stadtholder, John of Nassau. Only in Guelders the Hof got back some of its political powers after the alteration. In the other provinces the Estates took away its administrative functions and took them over themselves.
December 1574, the government wrote Overijssel chancery to suspend its activities for some time.​[752]​ It would not open its doors again to rule the province – or better: half of it, because Overijssel was, in the 1580s and early 1590s, divided in a Spanish and Staats (member of the Republic) part.​[753]​ Military developments would eventually bring Overijssel in the Union entirely. The Estates, longing for the pre-1528 status-quo, did not need the chancery anyway, although most of the counsellors had been residents of the province. Justice had traditionally been administered on the local level with the Landdag as high court; this could now be resumed. Most provincial administration was already done by the Estates – i.e. the cities – so this did not need to change either. However, when Rennenberg, then stadtholder of Overijssel, defected the cause of the Revolt in 1580, the Estates soon became divided.​[754]​ Their isolationist course of the second half of the 1570s was no longer tenable after Kampen was altered by its own citizens and supporters of the Revolt came in power there. The cities were no longer unified in their aims now one of them was pro-rebellion. The unity of the Estates broke and the assembly became increasingly ungovernable.​[755]​ A power vacuum was the result.
	The court in Utrecht was retained after 1575, but the administration was taken over by the standing committee, that functioned better after 1576.​[756]​ The Hof had apparently become an integral part of the institutional structure of Utrecht for the Estates had no desire to disband it altogether. Indeed, their mutual relationship had not been as bad as elsewhere it seems. Nevertheless, the traditional rule of the Estates was resumed in 1575-1577. In 1583, the Hof got a new instruction that formally confirmed its tasks in the field of justice; a rather broad judicial competence, but without the right to question resolutions of the Estates.​[757]​ It is not clear if the Utrecht Hof was purged at any moment, but its new members were doubtlessly nominated by the Estates. The Court had accepted the Pacification of Ghent and can be considered a part of the moderate wing of the Revolt;​[758]​ so it was probably not purged early on.
The case of the Audit Office indicates that the Utrecht republican government was – before 1585 anyway – relatively moderate. In the Habsburg era, the province fell under the Rekenkamer of Holland and when this institution fled to Utrecht in 1572 it started to function there.​[759]​ After the Pacification, the Audit Office became part of the moderate regime of the States General, but the conclusion of the Union of Utrecht sealed its faith. The allied provinces started to sail on a more radical course and they needed their own institutions. As a result, the resort of the Utrecht based Audit Office shrunk to that province alone in 1581. Nevertheless, it remained in function until at least 1585. Not long afterwards radical citizens drove many tolerant and moderate regents from the city and governor Leicester purged the magistrate.​[760]​ His regime also witnessed a short revival of the – now doubtlessly altered – Hof; he wanted it to reclaim its political powers.​[761]​ Eventually, nothing came of it.
In Holland, the Court fled from The Hague, July 1572.​[762]​ It was ‘seen as an agent of the now hated central government.’​[763]​ A power vacuum in the judicial and administrative fields was the result. Soon, the Estates asked the counsellors to return, but they declined. As a result, a new Hof was instituted, a sign that the Habsburg institutional framework was well entrenched in Holland political culture. The new counsellors were mostly also members of the Estates, who nominated them. The stadtholder had the right to appoint them. Political tasks were taken away and commissioned on a council beside the new stadtholder. The Hof became a judicial institution that also gave political advise. It was also entrusted with the appointment of some municipal magistrates, like it had done before. The Audit Office was re-instituted in the same vein. 
The Estates of Holland desired, now the bonds with the central high court in Mechelen were broken, their own institution of appeal.​[764]​ At first the stadtholder, or a committee elected from the Estates in his place, was burdened with the revision of sentences. However, a court of appeal (Hoge Raad) was instituted in 1582. Four years later, Zeeland also came within its jurisdiction. The Estates of Utrecht erected a court of appeal in 1584, but the local Hof made so much fuzz about it, that it was cancelled after fifteen years of service.​[765]​ These matters had, as we have seen, also surfaced in Guelders, where no institution of appeal was instituted eventually. What can the reasons have been to institute a court of appeal? Holland had been accustomed to the possibility of appeal with the Grote Raad in Mechelen. Now this was no longer possible it was not unnatural to provide the service within the province; this was also cheaper. Moreover, a high court of appeal provided prestige, also towards other provinces. In this light we can see the initiative of Utrecht, traditionally outside the jurisdiction of the Great Council, in this way. The province distrusted Holland, just like Guelders did.​[766]​ Maybe Holland and Utrecht wanted to supervise their own courts this way, in Gelderland, where the issue had been put forward already before the Revolt, this was certainly the case. Unsurprisingly, the courts of these three provinces all strongly objected the idea of appeal. 
	The process of curtailing competencies of the courts was different everywhere. Only in Guelders there had been a real purge, although it can also have been this way in Utrecht. Gelderland was also the only province where a new instruction was put in effect immediately. This should not surprise us, for the conflicts between the Hof and the Estates were mostly of a judicial nature, while Utrecht seems to have known few such quarrels and the mutual irritations in Holland were mainly in the fiscal and political fields. Although the provincial courts resembled each other, the contexts wherein they had to operate were radically different.  

Towards a committee of Delegated States?
‘(…) the institutional development of the Estates could not take place in its own time; instead, circumstances forced them to undergo piecemeal change, at a perhaps unnaturally accelerated pace. Nevertheless, in the years under review the Estates visibly changed from a part-time institution with a varying membership to a permanent governmental organisation, with its own executive committee, made up of much more experienced administrators.’​[767]​ This observation of Bannatyne about the Estates of Utrecht can be applied to all provinces under review, for the late sixteenth century. It is even true for Guelders, except for the executive committee part. Indeed, from the taming of the loyalist courts did not directly follow the establishment of a Delegated States. Institutional traditions and political culture played a big part, but did not tell the whole tale. The development of the Revolt, at the political level and on the battle fields, also determined the outcome of these processes.​[768]​ This sometimes led to interference from parties outside the provincial Estates. In Guelders and Overijssel this was most markedly visible. At the other hand, Utrecht and Holland developed standing committees first, so with them we will start.
	In Utrecht the executive committee seems to have been relatively stable after 1576, but the committees ad hoc also rose in importance due to the ever mounting load of work.​[769]​ Its nine members were equally chosen out of the three estates and refreshed every three months. The committee had a broad range of tasks: conducting day-to-day administration, convoking the Estates, composing the agenda for the meeting, supervising the confiscated church property and arranging many financial matters. It is not exactly clear what the Audit Office did. It was probably most of responsible for administering the domains.​[770]​ The Estates appointed a receiver, with an office, to supervise taxation in the province.​[771]​ However, the most important officials in the permanent service were the Advocate of the State and the secretary.​[772]​ The former – highly reputed Floris Thin made the office rise in power – represented the Estates outwardly. He did also all kinds of tasks in Utrecht like composing a new instruction for the Hof and supervising the committees of the Estates. The secretary conducted correspondence and kept all kinds of registers. Both officials were in the middle of all business of state, just like the standing committee; only they could stay at their posts for years instead of three months.  
	In Holland the history of the States Executive was, certainly before 1581, more troubled.​[773]​ Before the Revolt the Estates had not needed any: the pre-1572 habits of action, and most of all the committees ad hoc, sufficed to deal with all matters. However, after the Hof left, the Estates had to do much more work, although later on activities like foreign representation and warfare would be partially delegated to the Generality. In 1572 the new stadtholder got a council of representatives of nobles and cities beside him. Traditionally, the Estates of Holland had worked closely with the groten, and most of all stadtholder William of Orange.​[774]​ The step was thus no uncommon one. Moreover, Holland was in great turmoil before the Pacification, because war was mostly waged within the province. In such a situation, it was better to entrust the leader of the Revolt, who was almost continually in the province, with the daily government. 
After the Union with Zeeland in 1575, a Landraad was installed to replace the council. This institution never worked effectively. It was too big –  every city had to have a place in it and the nobles as well – and the tumultuous war-ridden time played its part. The so-called Noorderkwartier (Northern quarter), roughly the area north of Amsterdam and Haarlem, was cut of from the rest of the province by Spanish troops between 1572 and 1576.​[775]​ This situation strongly reinforced its sense of independence. The Northern quarter wanted to be no part of the Landraad and worked against it. This part of the province founded its own executive in 1573 and retained it, notwithstanding initiatives in the south.​[776]​ Moreover, Amsterdam held the side of the government and Haarlem was Spanish-occupied; Holland was certainly no unity. After the collapse of the Landraad it took some time before new initiatives would be deployed.
	After 1577 Orange resided mostly in the south​[777]​ and the Estates of Holland therefore needed to create some sort of executive. The task was not an easy one. An ambitious initiative to erect committees for five fields of government collapsed, because the province had to cut back the budget. A new college was erected in 1581. Holland got its own Councils of State, Finance and naval matters. Although the province was now free from warfare and all cities had joined the Revolt, it did not function properly; probably most of all due to the hesitance among regents to be part of it. 
These Gecommitteerde Raden were reanimated after the death of William of Orange, but the same problem continued to bother it. Moreover, the loss of the great leader created a power vacuum and political instability. In this climate, many men did probably shy away from governmental activities.​[778]​ Nevertheless, the council gradually became an executive with mainly administrative tasks. Its history was at least until 1590 marked by problems that hampered the work, but the institution remained in function because it was necessary. 
Fortunately, other forms of government kept the Holland administration working. The landsadvocaat rose in prominence.​[779]​ Powerful personalities like Paulus Buys and, most of all, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt made him into a central figure in Holland politics – active in many committees and the States Executive – and a minister of foreign affairs at the same time. Soon, a secretary was added to the office. He conducted much correspondence and became, as was the case in Utrecht, a second pivot in provincial politics. Moreover, Holland had a strong tradition in the field of committees ad hoc and the Estates, who had to do much work after the Revolt, appointed many more than before.​[780]​ Many of these occupied themselves with financial matters and organization of government; military affairs also stood on the agenda regularly. For financial matters, Holland could use the Receiver of the Common Lands.​[781]​ However, the man who came in office in 1574, Jacob Muys van Holy, got himself involved in so many conflicts that he did much harm to the stature of his office. The Estates also appointed regional receivers to facilitate the collection of taxes. Soon became apparent that the system did not work flawless, but attempts to increase efficiency collided with the interests of the cities: they did not want to lose the grip on provincial finances. This episode is symptomatic for the situation in the late sixteenth century Republic in general. The ruling elite of nobles and municipal regents wanted to have as much influence as possible in provincial affairs to further local or regional interests. This did not preclude cooperation, but it made, in the often confused conditions of the Revolt, the process of decision-making tardy; it could lead to indecision and the maintenance of ineffective institutions.
While, after 1575, warfare was mainly conducted outside Holland and the pressure of war for a large part was financial, Overijssel was – like Gelderland – a battlefield. After 1580, the Estates were divided and important tasks of government, like the collection of taxes and the administering of justice, suffered. The Landdag retarded decisive action; it ‘institutionalized the momentum of the Revolt in Overijssel.’​[782]​ Attempts towards better organization of governmental tasks, including those to institute an executive branch, were doomed to fail in this climate of disunity, discontent and confusion.​[783]​ The chaos was contained a little bit by activities of the drosten in the quarters, the efforts of Protestant Salland nobles and the coming of a new stadtholder in 1584: the staunchly Calvinist military commander Adolf of Nieuwenaar. The influence of the Leicester reign seemed at first to further the cause of the Revolt, because the strongly neutralist Deventer magistrate was altered in 1586.​[784]​ However, the commander of the ill-paid English garrison betrayed the city to the enemy a few months later.
	The military disaster had important repercussions for the Estates of Overijssel; just as the successes after 1591 would spark change. After the loss of Deventer and the eclipse of the Leicester reign, the Council of State, with Holland behind it, took the handling of the war effort in Overijssel in its own hands.​[785]​ The Estates were sidelined. All of this would probably have been in vain if Philip II had not decided to invade England.​[786]​ The Armada campaign of 1588 spelled the end of the Spanish victories under the energetic rule of Parma. The rather small part of Overijssel that was still not Spanish held out and, from 1591 onwards, Maurice count of Nassau-Dillenburg (1567-1625), the son of William of Orange, resumed the offensive. He was already stadtholder of Holland and Zeeland and he also attained this position in Utrecht, Guelders and Overijssel. In the latter province he reconquered Deventer (1591), Steenwijk (1592) and Oldenzaal (1597).​[787]​ When the position of Overijssel slowly became more secure in the 1590s, the “foreign” rulers restored the Estates in power. Deventer had been altered when it was taken by Maurice and, just like in Kampen some ten years earlier, Calvinist adherents of the Revolt were put in power. They topped the scales in the Estates. Next to the Protestant magistrates of Kampen and Deventer stood a core of republican noble families. At the same time, many loyalist Ridderschappen discontinued their participation during the worst war years. In effect, Zwolle, where the neutralist magistrate still held sway, was the main dissonant in the assembly, but the city could be outvoted now. A Revolt-minded and non-isolationist group of men came to dominate the restored Estates.
	This development was accompanied by the establishment of a standing committee in 1593.​[788]​ It is not clear whether this was an idea from the Generality, Holland or the Overijssel itself. The former was at least not unhappy with it, because the General Means were slowly introduced after 1593. Overijssel could now finally begin to pay regular contributions to the Generality. Moreover, the tax exemptions of nobles and cities were gradually broken down. In return, the money would be used to pay the troops in the province. The Estates had clearly learned from the tumultuous 1580s. The standing committee had, just like the Landdag, no fixed place of residence. It moved with the assembly from city to city. Its six members – three noblemen and three representatives of the cities – conducted the day-to-day administration, arranged the collection of taxes and appointed drosten. Later on, the judicial status quo was also rearranged and the committee became a court of appeal, when the Landdag was not in session. Interestingly but in line with tradition, the Estates did not create much new institutions. The confiscated church property was, for instance, not administered by them or the executive.​[789]​ Only for some former monasteries a receiver was appointed, but in general most matters were left to the initiative of the Protestants.   
	In Overijssel it took almost twenty years, after its involvement in the Revolt, before a standing committee was instituted. In Gelderland one was appointed as soon as Hierges had left, early 1577. As we have seen, this was a temporary one. The coming of a new stadtholder and his counsellors made it no longer necessary. After the alteration of the Hof no one was created, because the Estates had no objections to entrust the day-to-day government to the chancellor and raadsheren. And even the Landraad-inspired committee of Delegated States only existed for about a year. However, Adolf count of Nieuwenaar was, unlike his two predecessors, also stadtholder of other provinces – Utrecht and Overijssel. This may have been a good reason for the Estates to erect a new standing committee (December 1585), about a year and a half after his appointment.​[790]​ A year earlier, Nieuwenaar had already proposed to appoint some delegates from the Landdag to assist him in matters of taxation and the church property. 
	Just as had been the case in 1583, the committee had to take over an important part of the work from the Hof; correspondence with the outside world, supervision of the war effort and taxation were the most important ones.​[791]​ However, the Court retained the right to convoke Landdagen and to provide the agenda. The new instruction also appointed a new Provincial Receiver (Ontvanger Generaal) for the General Means. Interestingly, the administration of the confiscated church property did not fall under the competence of this institution, although Nieuwenaar wanted it. No doubt, it was hard to find members for the new committee, especially in the light of the lukewarm enthusiasm for it in 1583, when four men had been appointed. How to find twelve members – three per quarter, the bannerets were discredited after the treason of count Van den Bergh – now the Overkwartier was almost completely occupied? Moreover, Zutphen and Nijmegen had been lost, so they could appoint no one. Indeed, the committee did (probably) not function and was officially disbanded in 1586. Only receiver Hans Biermans was retained for some time.
	During these heavy years – Venlo and Doesburg were, among others, also conquered by the enemy – the future of the Revolt in Guelders was doubtful. Few research has been done about the years 1585-1591, but it was clearly a time of emergency. The quarter of Nijmegen was ravaged by warfare and the Veluwe also suffered heavily, especially after Deventer had fallen in enemy hands.​[792]​ Out of fear for the enemy, and a healthy dose of jealousy against Holland, Guelders even offered Leicester the sovereignty of the duchy in 1587, although the earl had made himself already impossible in most other provinces.​[793]​ This shows that the mind of the governing elite of Gelderland was still set towards the traditional dualism. The English governor did, nevertheless, few good for the province.​[794]​ The conquest of Doetinchem led to terrible excesses by his troops and most cries for help in other matters were ignored. Eventually military perspectives got better after 1588, and most certainly after Parma had been ordered to intervene in France two years later.​[795]​  
After 1585, Arnhem became a frontier city and had to keep everybody aboard. In 1585 the city was almost sold-out to the Spanish by some of its own moderate or loyalist citizens.​[796]​ The loss of Nijmegen and Antwerp made many doubt about the future, and even consider a return to the king, like Nijmegen and Zutphen had done.​[797]​ Catholics were strongly distrusted. In Arnhem, they had to renew their oath of loyalty to the city and measures were taken to contain their activities, and promote Calvinism as well.​[798]​ Loyalty and religion remained strongly intertwined during the Revolt. The magistrate also took all kinds of measures to ensure the safety of the city. The stadtholder, however, had apparently not taken correct safety measures when he wanted to test a siege engine he had developed himself. After he entered the tower where the apparatus was displayed, a spark from his lantern fell into a barrel of gunpowder and the room exploded. Nieuwenaar was mortally wounded and died October 8th 1589.​[799]​ 
In these troubled times, the institutional formation of the early 1580s steadily became normal. New habits of action were settling down. The Hof and the Arnhem magistrate worked closely together, but had both to deal with a scarcity of good officials. The raadsheren Van Munster, Pieck and Kreynck died in the 1580s, while Van Westrum, who had been appointed on behalf of the Overkwartier in 1583, did not show up any more.​[800]​ Moreover, counsellor Van Boonenburch was appointed in the army. It was therefore not surprising that the – by then five men strong – Hof objected to the re-appointment of Van den Zande as a magistrate in 1587.​[801]​ However, in the climate of cooperation, the two organizations soon worked out a compromise. The standing committee of the Veluwe quarter was doubtlessly also troubled by the same need for personnel, most of all because the job was so demanding. What is more, less and less nobles came to the quarter meetings up to 1584,​[802]​ and this trend was probably reinforced by the dreadful conditions in the following years. The trinity of the chancery, standing committee and magistrate doubtlessly – but further research needs to map this further – continued to cooperate. An example of this is the friendly reference to the cooperation of Hof, Audit office and Delegated Quarter Estates as the ‘drie collegiën’ in the 1590s.​[803]​ This Protestant and republican core of Guelders governing elite could also dominate the government of Gelderland, or what was still left of it, at the Landdagen as long as the other capitals and many nobles were absent.​[804]​ 
The 1590s were a period of consolidation for Guelders, most certainly in the governmental field.​[805]​ Nijmegen and Zutphen were re-conquered by Maurice and he was accepted as stadtholder by the Landdag in 1591.​[806]​ The military threat did not totally disappear and warfare continued to disturb the quarters, but the biggest turmoil was over​[807]​ – although contemporaries did not know this of course. The military situation remained insecure.​[808]​ Nevertheless, the recapture of the two capitals had important implications for themselves and the Estates as well. In May Zutphen surrendered and its magistrate was altered by Maurice, advised by Leoninus and raadsheer Van der Capellen.​[809]​ The city retained the right to re-appoint the municipal board itself, however. Instead of a conservative and somewhat isolated capital of the quarter, Zutphen became the dominant factor in the region after 1591. Its magistrate was Protestant and probably less moderate than before. Moreover, many important nobles lived in, or retained close ties with, the city. Furthermore, the magistrates of the smaller cities often counted members of Zutphen regent families in their midst. The situation was less fortunate for Nijmegen. After its “reduction”, Maurits took away the municipal privilege to appoint its own magistrate, that could also no longer serve for life.​[810]​ However, initially it was hard to replace the city council; only new Calvinist mayors could be found. Many protestants had fled the city and the government had almost to threaten them to return in these uncertain times. In effect, the Catholic magistrate served for a year after the capitulation. Nevertheless, on the long term Nijmegen became a Protestant and Staats city that stood, far more than Zutphen, under supervision of government and Hof. Now the most obstinate city of Guelders finally was subdued, the conflicts between chancery and Estates probably finally ended.​[811]​ 
Working together in the governmental field was necessary to prevent more hardship for the province. The previous years had seen such a close cooperation between Hof and Veluwe and the two other quarters also erected standing committees. Zutphen did so in 1592, Nijmegen followed a year later, but due to a troubled starting up process the institution did not function satisfactorily until 1605.​[812]​ Few research has been done after these committees, so one very important question has not been answered satisfactorily yet: was the quarter of Veluwe very early with its Delegate Quarter Estates of 1580 or were the other quarters late, and why? On the basis of the scarce literature these matters cannot be resolved, but I can put forward some hypotheses.
If we assume the Veluwe was an early starter, four possible reasons can be forwarded. Maris points at the administration of the church property.​[813]​ According to her, the quarter of Veluwe started to interfere with this about the same time as the States Executive was erected. However, it seems that at various places initiatives were taken to use the property for the Protestant cause before 1580.​[814]​ Moreover, the special Audit Office, that had to administrate the geestelijke goederen provincially, worked together with representatives of the quarters.​[815]​ It was also confronted with parties in all quarters who wanted to arrange matters themselves. This institution did, as a result, only exist for a year. Afterwards, the Hof and Rekenkamer took over its tasks. This does therefore not explain why the Veluwe developed a standing committee: inhabitants of the other two quarters also interfered with the church property. The fact that the resolution, by the Veluwe Kwartierdag, ordering the establishment of the standing committee does not mention this matter – in the following years it would not surface either – is another case in point.​[816]​ Other good arguments to erect an executive committee were, as mentioned above, a better supervision of the collection of taxes, the desire to stay on top of daily business and the diminishing of the number of Kwartierdagen. However, all these reasons probably played their part in the other quarters as well. 
The argument, sometimes put forward, that the Spanish conquest of Zutphen and Nijmegen made them late in introducing a standing committee does not convince either.​[817]​ Between the erection of the States Executive in the quarter of Veluwe – October 1580 – and the Spanish conquest of the capitals laid respectively three and four an a half year. The quarters had therefore plenty of time to establish such a committee. More structural reasons were at work, I think. Three circumstances in the Veluwe quarter made it different from the rest. Firstly, the quarters of Nijmegen and Zutphen were less united internally.​[818]​ In Nijmegen the ambten conducted more administrative tasks compared to elsewhere, while in Zutphen the capital held itself somewhat aloof from quarter business before 1591; it was no agent of regional integration. The relatively integrated political framework in the Veluwe quarter seems to have been one reason. Another was the nearness of the Hof that made Arnhem a real administrative centre. We already saw that the magistrate and the standing committee sometimes included personnel of the chancery. Moreover, the city counted more officials and this may have encouraged a professional governmental climate. A climate that probably encouraged the development of institutional solutions for administrative problems. Lastly, Arnhem had a core of nobles and burghers at hand who evidently wanted to do the job. However, because for Zutphen and Nijmegen no quarter resolutions are left, it will be hard to test if it was the case there. Nevertheless, the members of the Veluwe standing committee made it work and stay active during the difficult initial years. The problems with the Nijmegen executive, between 1593 and 1605, can indicate that such a group of men was not available there.
After 1593, each quarter eventually had its own standing committee. Their tasks are, up till now, only known generally. Whether the committees of Delegated Quarter Estates had such a broad range of competencies like that of the Veluwe cannot be made clear without further investigation in the sources. We know, however, that the committees had tasks like: the execution of quarter resolutions, dealing with routine business at Kwartierdagen, all matters concerned the General Means, paying soldiers on the quarter’s repartition and judicial tasks in the financial and military affairs.​[819]​ In Zutphen their most important task was initially the payment (on time!) of troops and the supervision of the collection of taxes.​[820]​ The same goes for the Nijmegen quarter, where they, for instance, had to deal with the accounts of the tax collectors.​[821]​ In both quarters they could not, unlike their Veluwe colleagues, convoke the Kwartierdagen; this was a prerogative of the capitals.​[822]​ Eventually, between 1599 and 1601, the three committees took over the administration of the geestelijke goederen from the chancery, that had neither the manpower, nor the time to conduct it satisfactorily.​[823]​ The executives started compiling inventories of the church property in their respective quarters. An undertaking that was not so easily done, however. The committees gradually extended membership to six men; naturally keeping a delicate balance between nobles and small and capital cities.​[824]​ In sum, the Delegated Quarter Estates in Guelders were most of all occupied with fiscal matters – taxation and church property. They had less competencies than their counterparts in other provinces. It is not surprising that the tasks they did not perform, were most of all concerned with administrative business the Hof did.
The historical development of the quarters towards administrative entities had reached its zenith in the 1590s, but the old difference between monarchical and customary polity remained in existence. The quarters coordinated their own finances independently; every one appointed its own receiver to administrate their quota.​[825]​ The only provincially administered fund remained the domains, meant to pay for the costs of the central institutions – mainly the chancery – and taken care of by the Audit Office.​[826]​ This makes clear that there still was a sense of dualism, based on tradition, within the province. According to Maris, this polarisation converged into a republican establishment after 1581.​[827]​ It was a long process, however. New habits of action formed only slowly during the following decades. Initially, for instance, the province still longed for a “head”, a prince.​[828]​ Anjou had been the last one, but the flirtation with Leicester in 1587 and the fact that stadtholders retained a special place in the province, confirm this. Just like the Hof, representing absolute authority when the Landdag was not in session, the monarchical principle, embodied by the stadtholder, remained in being for a long time. No doubt, this political tradition continued to play its role in the attempts, that occasionally surfaced, to come to a central standing committee.
This process did not stop with the establishment of standing committees in the quarters. It is not the object of this thesis to analyse it after 1600, so it is sufficient to make some last remarks about it. The first initiative, after 1585, came, unsurprisingly, from the Generality.​[829]​ Just as the Landraad proposed a standing committee in 1582, delegates from “The Hague” pleaded for a ‘bequame gemeine lantsregierungh’.​[830]​ No doubt, the same financial motives laid at the basis of this proposal, because Guelders still suffered from warfare and economic crisis, so the contributions of the province were probably still not satisfactory.​[831]​ According to Marjolein ‘t Hart ‘fiscal strategies influence profoundly the form of states’,​[832]​ but in this case nothing came of it. The other option, an increase in the number of counsellors – then six –  to be better able to deal with the administration, did also not make it.​[833]​ Every time the issue of a standing committee surfaced again, one or more quarters protested about its, in their eyes, too broad competencies.​[834]​ All kinds of interests played their part: the fear to lose grip on regional taxation, the fact that the Delegated Quarter Estates already worked more or less satisfactorily, unwillingness of capitals to forfeit their dominant position in the quarter et cetera. Eventually, in 1642, after much pressure from the stadtholder, the Landdag came up with a Combined College (Gecombineerd College) of the standing committees to administrate taxation. The institution did not take over the day-to-day administration. Totally in line with tradition, it had no a fixed place of residence. Just like its Overijssel counterpart, the College rotated along the three capitals. 



























‘Nula salus bello, pacem te possumus omnes.’​[835]​

Secretary Derick Wetthen always compiled his minutes in Dutch and in a – from the point of view of the historian – terrible handwriting. He was possibly bored when, early July 1582, he wrote this in his best Latin and with his most stylish hand. Wetthen probably meant to say, war brings no good, but in times of peace we are capable of everything. This statement confirms the enduring hardship Guelders had to face. Every province experienced bad times, of course, but the east of the Republic was most heavily hit after 1575. In spite of the sufferings, the Estates of all provinces had to create a new government. War put its mark on the formation of the institutional situation in Gelderland. Its spin-offs – financial, political, psychological, social et cetera – strongly influenced the formative decades of Guelders’ political structure. The war was like a distant thunderstorm, sometimes far, sometimes closer, scaring people and ruining the places where it hit.
	However, war was not the only formative element in the strangely developed institutional structure of Gelderland. The province was different from the rest, went its own way; a path that was not better or worse than that of other regions. We saw that every province, of the four under review, experienced its own unique development. Eventually, Gelderland was capable to create, in spite and because of the war, a government that was able – although not necessarily efficient – to keep on functioning during the ancien regime. How can we explain these developments? The main questions to be answered were: (1) why did Gelderland not develop a single / central standing committee during the last quarter of the sixteenth century and (2) how can we explain that only in this province the Hof retained its dual task? 
	The root of the developments laid in the Middle Ages. Mainly due to the financial burden of warfare and dynastic problems of the ruling house, the duchy of Guelders witnessed the gradual emergence of nobles and cities in politics. The duke needed them for council and money and he could summon them ‘ter dagvaart’ when he saw fit. However, the nobles and cities also started to meet together, first on the local level, later in the regions, to be better able to further their interests. In this climate, the quarters slowly emerged as entities of representation, just as the Landdag did after the second decade of the fifteenth century. The subjects slowly formed habits of action that would colour about two centuries of representative action: high-handed meetings, mutual alliances and the creation of a sense of pride on, and identification with, the realm. The Estates, although they did not use the name back then, felt they embodied the duchy, but the duke should run government. This dualism between prince and self-conscious Estates manifested itself, among other things, in a rather demarcated division between the prince and his council, embodying the government, on the one side of the political spectrum, and the Estates, furthering the interests of the realm without creating institutions of their own, on the other. The Kwartier- and Landdagen served to discuss matters with the duke and present grievances in exchange for money if he needed it. Only under duke William of Jülich a standing committee was created beside the prince to meet the power vacuum when he was away. Under the previous dukes the traditional structures largely sufficed.
	When Guelders was conquered by Charles V and added to the Habsburg Netherlands, the dualism transformed into a tumultuous relationship with the Hof, representing the far-away duke. The contacts became increasingly explosive, but the Estates held to their old habits of action. The Court, so claimed the Estates, crossed its boundaries as an embodiment of monarchical polity, most of all in judicial affairs. It invaded their world of landrecht and custom. The kanselarij-ordonnantie was the prime cause of irritation. This kind of conflicts were not uncommon in the Netherlands. The Estates of Holland, for instance, collided with the provincial Hof in financial and political matters, because the political tradition, in and the circumstances of, the county were different. The Estates took over fiscal tasks from the government there and they increasingly organized themselves in the process. They collided on these issues, not on judicial ones as in Guelders where the administrative role of the Hof was not strongly called into question. In Overijssel, at the other hand, the chancery was strongly regarded as alien to the governing tradition, so the Estates succeeded almost completely in making its work impossible.
	The conflicts between the Guelders Landdag and the Hof became absorbed in the general political situation in the Netherlands during the 1560s. The (temporarily) last event of importance was the compilation of a new instruction for the Hof by the Estates, but it was not accepted by the government. The formerly independent duchy became increasingly and irreversibly part of the Netherlands; it got involved in, for Guelders foreign, affairs. Gelderland was also dragged into the Revolt. At first, because of its strategic location, and later as a part of the Pacification of Ghent, a moderate initiative to fill the governmental vacuum in 1576. By then, the Estates were mainly composed of moderates and loyalists, although there were many shades of grey, of course. Calvinism had yet made relatively little headway in the province and the magistrates of the capitals were appointed by the duke of Alba; and therefore Catholic and loyal. They were not that loyal, however, for the Landdag chose its own stadtholder on advice of William of Orange, after the old one had left. Moreover, the Hof as an executive was boycotted. It was composed of loyalists and the Guelders political elite hated it because of the previous conflicts. A standing committee was (temporary) appointed to run daily business.
	The coming of John of Nassau, the new stadtholder, marked a turning point for Guelders. He systematically introduced Protestantism in the province, even though this was against the wishes of a big part of the governing elite. He also purged the Hof, while the Estates themselves hesitated. The chancery was now filled with Calvinists and adherents of the Revolt. It was, however, not stripped of its administrative tasks. In Holland, such a thing had happened when the Hof van Holland fled, and in Utrecht as well. But both provinces had Estates experienced in the field of government. Utrecht had even a standing committee already to take over the administration. In Holland, the stadtholder and his council did this for a while. In Gelderland such institutions were not at hand. Moreover, the particular political culture, with the rather strong demarcation between the traditional ducal rule and the representative assembly, gave the Estates no reason to run the administration themselves. The monarchical polity – i.e. the ducal council, and later the chancery – had always done it and should do so now. The new instruction for the Hof was, indeed, focussed at judicial matters. 
Not much later, many city magistrates in Gelderland were altered, sometimes by the stadtholder, sometimes by religious and political inspired citizens. The new men in power were Protestants, but often moderates. In Arnhem, however, a group of men, strongly committed to the Revolt, came to power thanks to count John. At the same time, Guelders had slowly become part of the rebellion and its acceptance of the Union of Utrecht – by way of quarters – almost formalized it. This was the third big achievement of John of Nassau: he brought Guelders in the Revolt and kept it there, even after he had left.
	The Revolt had many repercussions for Guelders; three main problems were religion, loyalty and the ever present warfare. Calvinist excesses, financial and material burdens of the battles against the enemy, conflicts of conscience after the official abjuration of Philip II and other personal considerations, made many moderates increasingly doubt their involvement in the Revolt. Indeed, the Generality did not trust the province and sent Leoninus to make enquiries; he eventually became chancellor. In this climate, the conflicts with the Hof surfaced again, but it was the other way around now: many members of the Estates were moderates, political men, but no staunch Calvinists and supporters of the Revolt. Conversely, the new raadsheren were the vanguard of the rebellion in Guelders.
	In 1582, a normal Landdag, that, under pressure of the Landraad, had decided to establish a standing committee, exploded. The quarters of Arnhem and Zutphen refused to attend after men from Nijmegen had interfered in the meeting and tried to force their proposals on the assembly. Some of the most radical ideas involved the political role of the Court and raadsheren. Many considerations played their part, but the growing irritation of moderates from the Nijmegen quarter was a central motive. The possible perpetrators who, in conjunction with stadtholder Van den Bergh, a well known opportunist, put forward the “illegal” propositions, can be identified: Ridderschappen from the Over-Betuwe, Maas en Waal and the Vijgh-clique from around Tiel, the town of Zaltbommel, and the city of Nijmegen as well. The case-study shows that these men acted from a range of (possible) interests. Many of them were fed up with the Hof, that collaborated with the group of hard-core Staatse Arnhem-based nobles and magistrates. The raadsheren from the Nijmegen quarter had, moreover, tried to enforce an oath and impose taxes – although the quarter had agreed on them. The episode with the English soldiers, when the counsellors had intimidated “their” quarter, was the last straw it seems. Financial considerations also played their part: both the division of the contribution and the bad economic climate – and the disruption of trade – irritated many. In short, the chancery had to be curtailed. Its tasks would be more limited, at least to the pre-1543 old proportions, and a standing committee could take over some traditional tasks. Raadsheren had to be banned from the Landdag, for they were too powerful. The proposals put forward were not “particularist” in the old-fashioned sense. They were reactions of discontented moderates with well conceived interests and most certainly a sense of what was good for the Republic. Their approach to the contribution, for instance, points this out. Their proposals came forth from local and regional considerations, but they were also influenced by the general problems the Revolt created in Guelders.
	The quarter of Nijmegen had gone too far. The measures were not put into effect and heavy protests were their share. The Hof disliked, most of all, the proposed court of appeal. The quarters of Zutphen and Veluwe were indignant about all kind of matters. There had been no room for them to discuss their opinions with the other quarters, because of the rash action of Nijmegen. In its reactions, Veluwe showed itself loyal to the Revolt and the Hof, its neighbours and colleagues. The symbiosis between the city of Arnhem, the chancery and the, recently established, standing committee of the Veluwe was of massive importance for the future development of Guelders’ institutional framework. Both the projected standing committee and the curtailment of the Hof were not put into effect afterwards. Matters soon drifted to the background due to the war-time conditions and squabbles over taxation. The States Executive was eventually instituted in 1583, but it was not much more than a council next to, and in the absence of, a stadtholder. It was disbanded with the arrival of Nieuwenaar. The province had no desire to erect a permanent executive.
	This was reinforced by the course of the war. When Nijmegen and Zutphen were taken by the enemy, the cooperation between the ‘drie collegiën’ – here seen as chancery, standing committee and Arnhem magistrate – steadily fixed itself in Arnhem. The institutional arrangement was copied after the liberation of the two capitals. Their purged magistrates also consisted of Calvinists, loyal to the Revolt. They had no reason to oppose the Hof any longer. With the fading away of the moderates from the political arena, the desire to curtail the Court receded into the background. Soon, every quarter established its own standing committee that mainly administered taxation and confiscated church property, but probably also governed the quarter to some extent, just like the Veluwe one did since the 1580s. 
Interestingly, a comparable development of alterations and warfare took place in Overijssel. There the Estates were, after 1580, torn by disunity because one staunchly Calvinist (Kampen) city turned the voting balance upside down. Without any functioning executive at hand, the result for the province was chaos. It was not until Deventer was captured by the enemy that the Generality intervened and took the quarter, and its war effort, in its own hands. When, after the liberation of Deventer, perspectives improved, the Estates instituted a standing committee; especially for matters of taxation. The voting balance within the Estates had been altered in favour of the Staatsen, because of the purge of the Deventer magistrate. So, Overijssel, with a tradition of self government but without institutions to administer effectively, established them due to the war. Guelders did not need them in that form; as was confirmed by the outcome of the dreadful 1580s. 
In sum, in medieval Guelders a tradition of dualism, between duke and Estates, was established. Under Habsburg rule, the chancery took the place of the duke and his council, but the dualism remained in existence. This set of political traditions prevented John of Nassau and his adherents from the stripping the Hof of its political tasks when they purged the institution. The fact that the old-style Court was retained, made the establishment of a central standing committee less necessary. It would have been against the political habits of the Landdag to create a central executive. The course of the war eventually ensured that the Court was not robbed of its competencies in the long term. The tradition of representative action by way of the quarters evolved in official government administration per quarter during the Revolt. The States Executive(s) finally arose from a more natural Guelders habitat. It was not ‘entrenched particularism’ that held big parts of the old order in place; it was a complex mixture of all kinds of interests, the power of tradition, a sense for the common good, a basis laid by stadtholder John of Nassau and the survival of an unique Protestant and Staatse symbiosis in Arnhem. All against the background of the Dutch Revolt.   
	 
		    	  
Appendix: list of attendance at the Landdag of 1582 (June 17th –July 2nd)
For this Landdag no list of attendants is left. On the basis of other sources we can come to this list.​[836]​ Keep in mind that not everyone was necessarily present from the first day to the last. Moreover, this overview just lists official members of the Estates. Others, even the chancellor, had to be admitted to the meeting and were no members of the Staten van Gelre en Zutphen. The heading “unknown” goes for people of whom it is not known if they were either nobles or not, or which city they represented. Full names cannot always be provided due to the habit of just noting last names or titles. Finally, as I argued in chapter IV, attendance was probably greater than this list suggests.

Quarter of Nijmegen:
Ridderschap: 	Gerhard van Ooy, lord of Ooij, viscount of Nijmegen
		Bartholdt van Gendt, lord of Loenen and Wolferen, member of the Hof
Arndt van Boonenburch named Honstein, lord of Ubbergen, member
of the Hof
Jelis Pieck, lord of Enspijk, member of the Hof
Anthonis Pieck
Reijnier van Stephrade, lord of Doddendael, Walbeeck and Indoornik
Gerrit Ingen Nulant
Jan van Mekeren
Henrick van Beinhem ten Appelenberch
Arndt de Bie
Gijsbert de Cock van Neerijnen
Schenck (forename unknown)
Nijmegen:	Arndt van Rench (?)
		Johan Kelffken, mayor
Tiel:​[837]​		Jacob de Cock van Opijnen
		Henrick Lambertss.
Zaltbommel:	the ambtman (no name mentioned)

Overkwartier:​[838]​
Ridderschap:	Johan van Wittenhorst, lord of Horst
Geldern:	Derick van Westrum		
Straelen:	the drost (no name mentioned)




Bannerets:	Herman van den Bergh, son of the stadtholder
Ridderschap:	Henrick van Munster, member of the Hof
		Diederick van Baer, landdrost van Zutphen
		Joachim van Lier​[839]​





		Pelgerum van Gruijthuijs, richter in Arnhem
		Goert (?) van Heerd, holtrichter 
		Gerhard Hackfoert​[840]​
Johan Hackfoert van Twell
		Wilhem van Boeckholt, drost of Wageningen​[841]​
Van Essen, the younger (forename unknown)
		the scholt of Brummen (no name mentioned)
Arnhem:​[842]​	Jacob van Ommeren, magistrate, rekenmeester and member of the 
Veluwe Standing Committee
		Rutger Tulleken, mayor and rekenmeester
		Engelbertus van der Burgh, magistrate




Nijmegen:	Otto van Heteren 



















Ambt	No adequate translation; the field of work of a local ducal official (justice and administration, the ambtman), the local form of administration in Guelders. 
Bannerheren	Bannerets; in Guelders, semi-independent nobles, traditionally the equals to the count of Zutphen, but increasingly integrated in the duchy of Guelders during the sixteenth century. An estate in its own right on the Landdag, but banned from it after the 1580s. 
(Land)drost	Bailiff; Guelders ducal official comparable to the ambtman; also known as scholt in some areas.
Gedeputeerde Staten	States Executive; a permanent standing committee, also called Delegated States, in the Dutch Republic burdened with the day-to-day administration within a province.
Geestelijke goederen	Confiscated Catholic church property; in fact the property was not really confiscated, but it was now employed to maintain the Calvinist church.
Generale Middelen	General Means; consumer tax on various foodstuffs and means of production. Also known as Consumptiën.
Hof (van Gelre en 	Provincial High Court; the Habsburg rulers of the Netherlands
Zutphen)	usually invested such a court with both judicial and administrative tasks for a province. Under the Republic the courts usually just retained the first task.  
Holtrichter	Rural judge.
Hopman	No adequate translation; representatives of a neighbourhood.  Plural: hoplieden, representatives of the community of burghers.
Kanselarij-	Instruction for the chancery; the instruction the Hof in Guelders 
ordonnantie 	received in 1547. It mainly dealt with its judicial tasks. The Estates put forward their own in 1565.
Klaring	No adequate translation; in Guelders, a rural court of appeal above the landed courts; dominated by nobles, some representatives of the capital present, as well as some ducal councellors, but the latter could not vote traditionally.
Kwartier 	Quarter; the four, fairly autonomous, regional districts of Guelders named respectively the quarter of Nijmegen, Overkwartier (Upper quarter), the quarter of Zutphen and the quarter of Veluwe. Overijssel consisted of three quarters (Twente, Salland and Vollenhove). Holland (two) and Utrecht (four) also knew such a division, but with less political impact.  
Kwartierstaten 	Quarter Estates; the representative assemblies of the four Guelders quarters consisting of nobility and representatives of the cities.
Landdag 		The Estates of Guelders; the combined assembly of the four 
Quarter Estates. 
Landdagsrecessen	Resolutions of the Estates of Guelders; lists with decisions made by this assembly. The Quarter Estates also produced this kind of documents: Kwartierdagsrecessen. 
Landraad	Council of the Lands; set-up as a kind of Council of State to conduct the war. Under Anjou divided in two bodies: a southern one and one for the “east of the (river) Maas”.
Landrentmeester-	No adequate translation; a steward for the domains who was most 
Generaal	of all occupied with their management and supervision.
Propositie	List of propositions; agenda of important points the Landdag had to decide on, composed by the Hof and read out by the chancellor.
Quoten	Quotas; also known as Contributiën, contributions – fixed yearly – of every province to the Generality.
Raadsheer	Counsellor; in the Guelders context, the members of the Hof. They could be law-professionals or local counsellors from the quarters. 
Raad van State 	Council of State; before 1588 the general executive of the Generality, the council of advice for the stadtholder, first and foremost in military, strategic and foreign affairs. Afterwards, a supplementary Generality institution mainly administering army, fortresses and the Generality Lands. 
Rekenkamer	Audit Office, Chamber of Accounts; in Guelders, the main tasks of this institution were the administration of the domains and the auditing of all accountable officials. Its officials, auditors, were called rekenmeesters.
Richter	Justice; ducal official in the cities (in Nijmegen called Burggraaf, viscount) with judicial tasks, but he could not sentence.
Ridderschap	Estate of the nobles (or gentry, or literally knights); in Guelders every quarter had its own, the membership of this was kept in the Book of Knights.



























Abbreviations of titles, archives and archival collections
AGN – Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden
BMGN – Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden
BMGelre – Bijdragen en mededelingen van de Vere[e]niging Gelre
GldA – Gelders Archief Arnhem
Hof – Archief van het Hof van Gelre en Zutphen
Hv - Handschriftenverzameling
Nw – Staten van het Kwartier van Nijmegen en hun gedeputeerden
OAT – Oud Archief Tiel
OAA – Oud Stedelijk Archief Arnhem
RAR – Regionaal Archief Rivierenland
Rkk – Archief van de Gelderse Rekenkamer
Werken Gelre – Werken uitgegeven door de Vere[e]niging Gelre 




Archief van het Hof van Gelre en Zutphen (0124)
Inv. nr. 672, brieven uit en aan het Hof 1582a.
Inv. nr. 673, brieven uit en aan het Hof 1582b.
Inv. nr. 831, brieven van en aan het Kwartier van Nijmegen 1582.
Inv. nr. 996, brieven van en aan het Kwartier van Arnhem 1582, 1583.
Inv. nr. 1057, brieven van en aan het Kwartier van Roermond 1580-1583.

Archief van de Gelderse Rekenkamer (0012)
Inv. nr. S 2, Landdagsrecessen januari 1578 – december 1583. 

Collectie A.J. Maris (0650)
Inv. nr. 17, “Excerpten uit de Landdags- en Kwartiersrecessen einde 1578. No. 1-70 (tot 
1595).”
Handschriftenverzameling (0508)
Inv. nr. 54D, “Stukken van landzaaken” afgeschreven door Van Hell deel V 1578-1581.
Inv. nr. 54E, “Stukken van landzaaken” afgeschreven door Van Hell deel VI 1582-1585.

Oud Stedelijk Archief Arnhem (2000)
Inv. nr. 291, brieven ingekomen bij, en minuten van brieven uitgegaan van den 
magistraat van Arnhem 1582.
Inv. nr. 1263, rekeningen van de stad Arnhem 1581-1591.
Inv. nr. 4694, recessen van den Landdag van Gelre en Zutphen en het Kwartier van 
Arnhem 1582-1583.
Inv. nr. 4696, recessen van den Landdag van Gelre en Zutphen en het Kwartier van 
Arnhem 1587-1593.
Inv. nr. 4729, “Recueil van Landschaps en Quartiers resolutiën van Gelderland en 
Veluwe 1577-1714.”
Inv. nr. 4734, “Landzaaken” deel C 1582.
Inv. nr. 4742, bijlagen tot de Landdags- en Kwartierdagsrecessen 1582.
Inv. nr. 4816, brieven ingekomen bij, en minuten van brieven, uitgegaan van de 
Landschap en van het Kwartier van Veluwe, met bijlagen 1582.

Staten van het Kwartier van Nijmegen en hun gedeputeerden (0003)
Inv. nr. 606, Landdagsrecessen 1581.
Inv. nr. 607, Landdagsrecessen 1582.
Inv. nr. 612, Landdagsrecessen 1591.

Staten van het Kwartier van Zutphen en hun gedeputeerden (0005)
Inv. nr. 1384, Landdagsrecessen 1577-1589.

Regionaal Archief Rivierenland
Oud Archief Tiel (0001)
Inv. nr. 1152, Brieven ontvangen van- en minuten van brieven, verzonden aan de 
gecommitteerden van Tiel ter Landdags- en Kwartiersvergaderingen 1582, 1680- 1738. 




Inv. nr. 1217, Landdagsrecessen 1582.
(Geraadpleegd via de digitale database van  M. van Gent, documentnummer 812)
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^475	  Instructie voor landraad Johan van Arnhem 14-6-1582, GldA, OAA, Recessen Arnhem 1582-1583, inv. nr. 4694, f. 72v.
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^509	  Landdagsrecessen 18 juni – 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 31.
^510	  Afgevaardigden Tiel aan magistraat Tiel 20-6-1582; RAR, OAT, Brieven Gecommitteerden Tiel 1582), inv. nr. 1152.
^511	  N. Japikse (ed.), Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609 vol. III 1580-1582 Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën 41 (The Hague 1918) 380-384.
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^537	  Remonstrantie Hof aan Landdag 4-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Bijlagen recessen 1582, inv. nr. 4742.
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^541	  The Veluwe Quarter dealt with the case of carpenter Johan van Essen, imprisoned in Arnhem. The richter Pelgerum Gruijthuijs wanted to give him a safe conduct. Apparently the Hof agreed, so finally the magistrate – also on the request of burghers from the Koningstraat – decided to let him go. Notulen delegatie Arnhem 25, 27 juni 1582, GldA, OAA, Recessen Arnhem 1582-1583, inv. nr. 4694, f. 93v; Afgevaardigden Arnhem aan magistraat 27-6-1582, GldA, OAA, brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291.
^542	  See: Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582 for an extensive overview of the content of all articles.
^543	  Landdagsrecessen 18 juni – 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 35, f. 47, f. 52.
^544	  Ibidem, f. 52.
^545	  Ibidem, f. 34.
^546	  Ibidem, f. 36-43, f. 47.
^547	  Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 91-105 (Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummer 799); Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, ibidem, f. 109-124 (Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummer 812); The mentioned members of the Landraad were: Diederik van Baer (Zutphen Quarter), Johan van Arnhem (Veluwe) and Karel Roorda, a noble (grietman) from Friesland; not, as Theeuwen seems to think a representative from Nijmegen. Cf. B.J. Ibelings, etc. (eds.), Repertorium van ambtsdragers en ambtenaren 1428-1861. Database met gegevens van de leden en hoogste ambtenaren van de belangrijkste instellingen van vertegenwoordigende, bestuurlijke en rechtsprekende aard op het huidige Nederlandse grondgebied (The Hague 2007). Digital publication; website Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis (ING), http://www.inghist.nl/Onderzoek/ Projecten/Repertorium; Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582.
^548	  Afgevaardigden Arnhem aan magistraat Arnhem 3-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291; Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 124.See: Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582 for an extensive overview of the content of all articles and reactions. In the copies of the recessen available in the Gelders Archief some extra reactions of the Landdag are missing. The secretary who copied them concluded that the original he used was probably incomplete (Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 105). Van Gent found two complete copies (Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummer 812). I used: Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, Streekarchivariaat Noordwest-Veluwe, Oud Archief Harderwijk, Landdagsrecessen 1582, inv. nr. 1217, folios not numbered. In Van Gent’s digital database the links are mixed-up: the link to the version from Oud Archief Doetinchem refers to the one of Harderwijk. 
^549	  Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummers 799 en 812.
^550	  Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 105; Keverling Buisman, ‘Een “gemeine lantsregierung”’, 164. 
^551	  Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 91-92.
^552	  Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 109-110.
^553	  Ibidem, f. 110-113.
^554	  Ibidem, f. 116-117; Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 98-99.
^555	  Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 100-102; Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, ibidem, f. 118-120.
^556	  Landdagsreces 24-11-1581, GldA, Nw, Lr 1581, inv. nr. 606, f. 123; Landdagsreces 4-12-1581, ibidem, f. 154; Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 12.
^557	  Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 103-105
^558	  these aforementioned provinces have their own provincial Courts and they would also rather save the costs of their Delegated States if this could be done without endangering the lands. Ibidem, f. 104-105.
^559	  It is not practical that they want to burden the Provincial Court with all of this, for they have enough to do in their own field. Ibidem, f. 104.
^560	  most of all where financial matters were concerned. Ibidem, f. 105.
^561	  Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 123-124. Keverling Buisman (‘Een “gemeine lantsregierung”’, 164) rightly concludes that the decision to appoint a standing committee was taken at July 2nd.   
^562	  This makes sense because they were administered centrally, not per quarter, by the Audit Office
^563	  Conceptinstructie Gedeputeerde Staten ca. 5 juli 1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr. 54E, f. 22r.-22v. (contemporary copy in GldA, OAA, Recessen Arnhem 1582-1583, inv. nr. 4694, f. 36r.-37v.; Van Gent, Landdagsrecessen, documentnummer 1227). Van Gent incorrectly dates it at July 7th. The document was indeed handed to Nijmegen secretary Ten Have, who sent it to the Quarter of Veluwe, that day. However, this indicates that it was probably composed earlier, probably during the “illegal” Landdag. If the document was composed by the full Estates there would have been few reason to send it to the quarter of Veluwe afterwards.  
^564	  Maris, De reformatie der geestelijke en kerkelijke goederen in Gelderland, 59. According to Maris the provisional instruction was composed by the Hof, but this is unlikely. It was issued in the name of the Landdag and the Court would probably not have scratched its own members out of the project as was the case in the document. The Estates had not empowered the Court to do it either; otherwise this would have been included in the recessen.
^565	  The committee was permitted to: further the general interest of the province and maintain privileges, the previous resolutions of the Landdag, the Pacification and the Union. It is also to: maintain the discipline among the troops, sack incompetent commanders, punish unruly soldiers, monitor the usage of confiscated (ecclestrial and loyalist) goods, maintain law and order and further the cause of the Reformation. Conceptinstructie Gedeputeerde Staten ca. 5 juli 1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr. 54E, f. 22r.-22v. See also: Keverling Buisman, ‘Een “gemeine lantsregierung”’, 164-165.
^566	  Conceptinstructie Gedeputeerde Staten ca. 5 juli 1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr. 54E, f. 22v.
^567	  Cf. Keverling Buisman, ‘Een “gemeine lantsregierung”’, 164, note 24.
^568	  They were present, however. Cf. Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, 123.
^569	  On the contrary, they even acknowledge it as an authority: Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 24-25 (Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummer 435).
^570	  Although members of the Hof were not expressively excluded from membership.Another possible reason for the exclusion of counsellors from the States Executive can have been the state the Hof was in. It had, at the time, only eight members left. None of them was from the Overkwartier, so an even distribution – i.e. one raadsheer per quarter in the standing committee – was not possible. Counsellors in early July: Van Gendt, Van Boonenburch, Pieck (Nijmegen Quarter), Van Munster, Kreynck, Van der Capellen (Zutphen Quarter) and Voeth and Van den Zande (Veluwe Quarter). Bentinck had recently died and the Overkwartier had none any more since the autumn of 1580. Van de Pas, Theeuwen (eds.), Ambtenarenproject.
^571	  Conceptinstructie Gedeputeerde Staten ca. 5 juli 1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr. 54E, f. 22r.-22v.
^572	  no to part from the Landdag without appointing delegates first. Punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, ibidem, f. 105.
^573	  I agree with Maris that this matter had great impact on the future of this standing committee. Aantekeningen uit Landdagsrecessen 1582, GldA, Collectie A.J. Maris, “Excerpten uit de Landdags- en Kwartiersrecessen einde 1578. No. 1-70 (tot 1595)”, inv. nr. 17. 
^574	  Commissie Gedeputeerde Staten 28-3-1583, GldA, OAA, Recessen Arnhem 1582-1583, inv. nr. 4694, f. 27r.-32v.
^575	  Arnhem aan magistraat Arnhem 3-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291.
^576	  to finally get out of here. Ibidem.
^577	  Kopie protestbrief 3-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291. Gevoegd bij brief Zutphen aan Arnhem 15-7-1582, ibidem. Cf. Protestbrief steden Zutphens en Arnhems Kwartier ongedateerd (ca. 20 juli), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 57. Van Gent (Landdagen, documentnummer 432) incorrectly dates the letter at July 6th  and refers to the book of W.J. baron ‘d Ablaing van Giessenburg, that does not mention any date. Idem (ed.) and P.A.N.S. van Meurs, De Ridderschap van het Kwartier van Nijmegen. Namen en stamdeelen van de sedert 1587 verschenen edelen (The Hague 1899) 58.
^578	  They referred to the convocation by the stadtholder, but he did not mention the proposals of the Landraad, so they probably got an extended mandate after the 20th of June, when, as we saw above, there were difficulties about the mandates of some city delegations. Cf. Verschrijving Landdag door de stadhouder 14-05-1582, GldA, OAA, brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291; Kopie protestbrief 3-7-1582, ibidem.
^579	  It is not known when they exactly left. The municipal accounts of Arnhem do not mention the date of return of the municipal delegation.
^580	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 3-14. See: Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582 for an extensive overview of the content of all articles.
^581	  Resoluties op punten Landraad ca. 2 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 124; Gramaye aan magistraat Arnhem 6-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291.
^582	  New articles afterwards added to the old ones. Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 15-25, qoute f. 15. See: Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582 for an extensive overview of the content of all articles.
^583	  Respectively: Protestbrief steden Zutphens en Arnhems Kwartier ongedateerd (ca. 20 juli), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 57-60; Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 78-85; Reactie steden kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), ibidem, f. 62-73 (Van Gent, Landdagen, documentnummers 433 en 434). Van Gent incorrectly dates both lists with reactions of the Veluwe cities at July 6th and refers to the book of baron ‘d Ablaing van Giessenburg, that does not mention any date. Idem (ed.) and Van Meurs, De Ridderschap van het Kwartier van Nijmegen, 58. Van Gent also guesses incorrectly that the reactions on the new articles (documentnummer 434) are decisions on propositions from the States General.See: Theeuwen (ed.), Gelderse Landdagsrecessen 1582 for an extensive overview of the content of all articles.
^584	  Respectively: Reactie steden kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 62; Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 78. 
^585	  Zutphen aan Arnhem 23-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291; Zutphen aan Arnhem 30-7-1582, ibidem.
^586	  Protestbrief steden Zutphens en Arnhems Kwartier ongedateerd (ca. 20 juli), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 59-60.
^587	  Only regarding the projected strickt measures regarding the organization of the Landdag, the Overkwartier let the rest know that its delegates could be delayed due to the warfare. Regarding the debt to count John of Nassau it declared to have had nothing to do with this. Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 5-6, f. 10-11.
^588	  Can this have something to do with a conflict between the Zutphen magistrate and the Hof? During the early 1580s, the municipal board resisted its lenient policy towards Protestants in Zutphen. Van Veen, ‘De Graafschap in den tijd van overgang (2)’, especially 35.
^589	  those of the Nijmegen Quarter. Arnhem aan magistraat Arnhem 3-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291.
^590	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 13.
^591	  Articles proposed by a number of individuals from the Nijmegen Quarter. Ibidem, f. 3.
^592	  Ibidem, f. 11-12.
^593	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 23.
^594	  Cf. Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 3-6, 7-8.
^595	  They wanted to stay with the old usage. Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 63.
^596	  Ibidem.
^597	  Ibidem, f. 69.
^598	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 20-21.
^599	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 6-7; Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 63.
^600	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 18-19.
^601	  Ibidem, f. 20.
^602	  Cf. Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 69-70.
^603	  Cf. Ibidem f. 70; Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 83. This matter concerned the more equal division of war debts over the quarters. Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 18.
^604	  private jealousy and distrust, that they [the Quarter of Nijmegen] have developed against chancellor and counsellors. Klachten Hof n.a.v. “illegale” Landdag 14-7-1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr 54E, f. 26r.
^605	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 24-25
^606	  Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607,  f. 73; Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 85.
^607	  Ambt Maas en Waal aan Hof 29-5-1582, GldA, Hof, Brieven Hof-Nijmegen 1582, inv. nr. 831, briefnr. 9060; Hof aan heren Hernen, Batenburg, Persingen en Ooijen 26-6-1582, ibidem, briefnr. 9076.
^608	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 21.
^609	  It was, in the sixteenth century, not uncommon for nobles from the surrounding ambten to be political active in the city. Hageman, Het kwade exempel van Gelre, 80.
^610	  Hof aan heren Hernen, Batenburg, Persingen en Ooijen 26-6-1582, GldA, Hof, Brieven Hof-Nijmegen 1582, inv. nr. 831, briefnr. 9076.
^611	  Brouwer, De Reductie van Bommel, 43;Van de Pas, Theeuwen (eds.), Ambtanarenproject; Smit and Kers, De geschiedenis van Tiel, 78-80; Zijp, De strijd tussen de staten van Gelderland en het Hof, 31. The local gentry could, for instance appoint, the town magistrate and Derick was ambtman and richter at the same time: a strong position of power.
^612	  De Meester, Geschiedenis van de Staten van Gelderland Vol I, 13 (chapter 4); Van Reyd, Oorspronck ende voortganck vande Nederlantsche oorloghen, f.  56.
^613	  Van Gendt aan Hof 3-5-1582, GldA, Hof, Brieven Hof-Nijmegen 1582, inv. nr. 831, briefnr. 9031.
^614	  fear and fright. Quoted by: P.P.J.L. van Peteghem and H. de Schepper, ‘Het Nijmeegse richterambt in de overgang naar de nieuwe tijd. Het verzet van jonker Van Lennep tegen zijn afzetting in 1585’ in: C. Streefkerk, S. Faber (eds.), Ter recognitie. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. H. van der Linden (Hilversum 1987) 195-212, there 305. However, he confessed this in a legal case he started to get his job as richter back in 1585. Van Lennep – seen as an adherent of the Revolt – had been sacked after Nijmegen had surrendered to Philip II. Therefore, he had his reasons to exaggerate.
^615	  I thank dr. Theeuwen for this suggestion.
^616	  special confidence are entrusted with the most important matters. Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), ibidem, f. 66.
^617	  Van de Pas, ‘Gelre en de crisis in de opstand’, 149.
^618	  Keverling Buisman, ‘Bestuur en rechtspraak’, 104. This was not very uncommon in Arnhem; rekenmeesters Van Ommeren and Tulleken were also magistrates.
^619	  We saw above that they left at June 25th. 
^620	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 13-14. It is not clear whether Nijmegen also meant to exclude non-Chancery officials, like richters. This seems unlikely, because many nobles at the Landdag held such offices.
^621	  Maris, Het Archief van het Hof van Gelre vol. I, 26-27.
^622	  They could be reappointed, however. Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 81.
^623	  Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 81; Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), ibidem, f. 68.
^624	  that it seems to originate from envy and distrust against the lords counsellors. Ibidem, 66.
^625	  In that year Derick van Westrum was appointed on behalf of the Overkwartier, but after 1584 he could not work any more due to the warfare in his quarter. Van de Pas, Theeuwen (eds.), Ambtenarenproject. Maris, Het Archief van het Hof van Gelre vol. I, 52; 
^626	  It was almost a tradition for the delegates to complain about their commission at quarter meetings. They often wanted to be replaced, because their work was too heavy – for a large part due to the unsafe travelling conditions – and it burdened their own purse. Fokkink, De kwartiersvergaderingen van de Veluwe, 24-27. 
^627	  Only four men were grudgingly appointed while the instruction stipulated nine members. Keverling Buisman, ‘Een “gemeine lantsregierung”’, 165.
^628	  Hof aan Nijmegen 17-5-1582, GldA, Hof, Brieven Hof-Nijmegen 1582, inv. nr. 831, briefnr. 9048.
^629	  Klep, ‘De economische en sociale ontwikkeling in de Nieuwe Tijd’, 332.
^630	  Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 21-22.
^631	  And Arnhem could collect more Convooijen en Licenten in this way, of course. Bijeenkomst gedeputeerden Nijmeegs Kwartier en Veluwe 15-8-1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr 54E, f. 29v.-30r.
^632	  With the nooce, i.e. he hanged them. Richter Nijmegen aan Hof 12-5-1582, GldA, Hof, Brieven Hof-Nijmegen 1582, inv. nr. 831, briefnr. 9043.
^633	  and those of the advisors of the stadholder (krijgsraden) as well. Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 11-12.
^634	  Ibidem, 12.
^635	  Ibidem, 13.
^636	  Ibidem, 14.
^637	  However, the city may have also meant that the measure was already incorporated in a renewed instruction, based on the 1565 one and the idea of 1580.
^638	  Klachten Hof n.a.v. “illegale” Landdag 14-7-1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr 54E, f. 26r.-26v.
^639	  Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 81; Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), ibidem, f. 65. Zutphen reacted somewhat cryptically: ‘Fiat bij ’t Arnhemsche quartier’. 
^640	  and cannot agree with such a novelty, that is ad odds with reason and justice. Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 65.  
^641	  proponent of our office [as minister] and church. Cited by: Van Veen, ‘De Graafschap in den tijd van overgang (2)’, 28.
^642	  Keverling Buisman, ‘Bestuur en rechtspraak’, 104; Van Veen, ‘Arnhem in den tijd van overgang’, 271-274.
^643	  Van Gelder aan Voeth 20-8-1582, GldA, OAA, Recessen Arnhem 1582-1583, inv. nr. 4694, f. 162r. Van de Pas, Theeuwen (eds.), Ambtenarenproject.
^644	  Van Ommeren aan Voeth 17-8-1582, ibidem, 154r.
^645	  Fokkink, De kwartiervergaderingen van de Veluwe, 40.
^646	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 12.
^647	  Ibidem, f. 13.
^648	  Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 65; Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, ibidem, f. 80-81.
^649	  Van de Pas, ‘Gelre en de crisis in de Opstand’, passim.
^650	  Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 12.
^651	  The fourth rekenmeerster was Goessen van Varick, from the Quarter of Nijmegen, who made himself probably unpopular with his quarter by rejecting the twofold project of inspection of the domains and the old organization of the Chancery in the 1540s. Ibidem, 14. van de Pas, Theeuwen (eds.), Ambtnarenproject.
^652	  Van de Pas, ‘Gelre en de crisis in de opstand’, 138-140 and passim.
^653	  Respectivily: Nieuwe artikelen voorgelegd 5-6 juli 1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 24; Artikelen voorgelegd door enkelen uit Nijmeegse Kwartier 4-7-1582, ibidem, f. 14.
^654	  Reactie steden Kwartier Veluwe op beide sets punten Nijmegen ongedateerd (ca. eind juli / begin augustus), GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 66-68, f. 72.
^655	  foreign.
^656	  regarding the state of the Chancery erected in the times of Charles V, it is totally ridiculous to be informed by Gramaye about this, while every capital and small city knows, how much it has cost the Estates those days to defend the land against foreign counsellors and other officials. Ibidem, f. 68.
^657	  Indeed, in another reaction Zutphen stated that every resident of Guelders, although born somewhere else, had not to be regarded as foreign. Reactie Ridderschap en stad Zutphen op beide sets punten Nijmegen 3-8-1582, GldA, Nw, Lr 1582, inv. nr. 607, f. 84.
^658	  Provisionele instructie Gramaye 6-7-1582, GldA, Hv, Van Hell VI, inv. nr. 54E, f. 22r.
^659	  Arnhem aan magistraat Arnhem 3-7-1582, GldA, OAA, Brieven Arnhem 1582, inv. nr. 291.
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